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ARTICLES
All's Well That Ends Well: Toward a
Policy of Assisted Rational Suicide or
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George P. Smith, II*
* B.S., J.D., Indiana University; LL.M., Columbia University. Professor of Law,
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"There is but one truly serious philosophical problem, and that is sui-
cide. Judging whether life is or is not worth living amounts to answering
the fundamental question of philosophy." A. Camus, The Myth of
Sisyphus'
"[M]ere living is not a good, but living well. Accordingly, the wise man
will live as long as he ought, not as long as he can. He will mark in what
place, with whom, and how he is to conduct his existence, and not the
quantity, of his life. ... It is not a question of dying earlier or later, but
of dying well or ill. And dying well means escape from the danger of
living ill." Seneca, Epistula Morales 2
"In a certain state it is indecent to live longer. To go on vegetating in
cowardly dependence on physicians and machinations, after the meaning
of life, the right to life, has been lost, that ought to prompt a profound
contempt in society ... to die proudly when it is no longer possible to live
proudly." F. Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols3
"[Plerhaps we ought to make suicide respectable again. . . . Can you
ever recall a coroner saying something like: 'We've heard all the evidence
of how John Smith was facing literally insuperable odds and he made a
courageous decision. I record a verdict of a noble death?' " B. Clark,
Whose Life Is It Anyway? 4
"I'm not afraid to die but I am afraid of this illness, what it's doing to
me. I'm not better. I'm worse. There's never any relief from it now. Noth-
ing but nausea and this pain .... Who does it benefit if I die slowly?....
acknowledged.
During the Summer of 1985, I was a Fellow at the Institute of Advanced Study at
Indiana University in Bloomington, where I continued my research and began writing
this Article. I thank, most sincerely, Dr. Roger G. Newton, the Director of the Institute
and his most able Administrative Assistant, Charlene Fears, for their assistance and
support during an equally pleasant stay. I would again be remiss if I did not acknowl-
edge the encouragement and assistance which I received from Dr. David H. Smith and
the Poynter Center for the Study of Ethics and American Institutions, of which he is
the Director, during my very enjoyable Summer in Bloomington.
In December 1986, and again in May 1987, I was a Visiting Fellow at the American
Bar Foundation in Chicago and there began to enter the final stages of work on this
Article. To William L. F. Felstiner, Esquire, the Executive Director of the Foundation,
I extend my large debt of gratitude for his assistance and support. The facilities of the
Foundation were indispensable to me at a most critical juncture in my preparation of
this Article.
Obviously, the viewpoints taken in this Article are solely my own and any errors of
commission or omission are mine as well.
I A. CAMUS, THE MYTH OF SISYPHus 3 (1940-1941); OEUVRES COMPLETES
D'ALBERT CAMUS 135 (1983).
2 Seneca, Epistula Morales ("On Suicide"), in ETHICAL CHOICES 54 (R. Beck & J.
Orr eds. 1970).
3 F. Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, in THE PORTABLE NIETZSCHE 536 (W. Kauf-
man ed. & trans. 1954).
B. CLARK, WHOSE LIFE IS IT ANYWAY? 102 (1976).
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I'm stuck - stuck in life. I don't want to be here anymore. I don't see
why I can't get out." B. Rollin, Last Wishs
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INTRODUCTION
It is estimated that someone in the United States commits suicide
every nineteen minutes.6 Yet, because of the difficulty in distinguishing
6 Mansfield, Focus: Suicide, Wash. Post, Dec. 3, 1982, at E5, col. 3.
To express the national concern over the growing problem of suicide, on October 7,
1987, House Concurrent Resolution 194 was introduced expressing, as such, "the sense
of the Congress that efforts to allow people to assist others to commit suicide and efforts
to promote suicide as a rational solution to certain problems should be opposed." H.R.
Con. Res. 194, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
Joseph Cardinal Bernardin of Chicago - in a letter to all congressional members -
advocated passage of the Resolution and the condemnation of those efforts by right-to-
die advocates to legalize acts of assisted suicide. Bernardin Condemns Legal Assisted
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suicide from an accidental or natural death, particularly among the el-
derly, precise data is scarce.7 Indeed, most experts are of the opinion
that suicide is under-reported. 8 Under-reporting occurs primarily be-
cause attending physicians and involved families often cooperate in dis-
guising or ignoring the less-than-obvious suicides to avoid any social
stigma from attaching to the surviving relatives.9
Suicide may be defined "as doing something which results in one's
death, either from the intention of ending one's life or the intention to
bring about some other state of affairs (such as relief from pain) which
one thinks it certain or highly probable can be achieved only by means
of death or will produce death." 10 Since death is a necessary element of
suicide, reflexive descriptions of death are important to allow a full
understanding of the very term, suicide. Thus, one description would be
simply that one has killed herself; another would be that one has let
herself be killed. Additionally, one might perform a suicide by deliber-
ately, with premediation, taking her own life, or by ordering an agent
to accomplish the act, thereby getting herself killed. By falling into a
pool and refusing to swim to save herself, an individual could let her-
self be killed. She could even kill herself by provoking a physical con-
frontation while offering little resistance and defense, thereby letting
herself be killed. Thus, for a suicide to occur the deceased must kill
herself, get killed, or let herself be killed." As can be seen, suicide as a
form of behavior has developed its own particular praxis.
Voluntary euthanasia has been variously described as "assisted sui-
cide,12 or "within the knife's edge between suicide and murder."' 3 Sui-
Suicides, Wash. Post, Feb. 20, 1988, at C6, col. 1. However, while addressing the
University of Chicago's Center for Clinical Medical Ethics in May 1988, the Cardinal
expressed his opinion that on a "case by case" basis, artificially supplied food and
water could be withdrawn from patients when that type of method for feeding "has
become useless or burdensome." Society for the Right to Die, Newsletter I (Summer
1988).
7 Colburn, Death by Choice: Nathan Pritikin's Suicide and The Critical Problem
Affecting Aging Men, Wash. Post Health Mag., Feb. 27, 1985, at 7.
8 Id.
9 Id.
" Brandt, The Rationality of Suicide, in SUICIDE: THE PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES 117,
118 (M. Battin & D. Mayo eds. 1980) [hereafter PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES].
11 Windt, The Concept of Suicide, in PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES, supra note 10, at 39,
41.
12 Gillon, Suicide and Voluntary Euthanasia: Historical Perspective, in EUTHANA-
SIA AND THE RIGHT TO DIE 181 (A. Downing ed. 1969).
" McClanahan, The Patient's Right to Die: Moral and Spiritual Aspects of Eutha-
nasia, 38 MEM. MED. J. 303 (1963).
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cide even can be self-administered euthanasia. 14 Thus, the resulting co-
nundrum queries whether a voluntary act of euthanasia should be
regarded as a suicide or as a murder. Furthermore, the morality of
euthanasia becomes inextricably linked to that of suicide. More specifi-
cally, if committing suicide were no longer regarded as a tendentious
expression, and the very act itself were recognized as an exercise of
enlightened self-determination, so too would euthanasia be similarly re-
classified. These simple changes in the taxonomy of these two words
would, in turn, give rise to a new attitude toward both life and death.
Instead of cheapening life 5 and viewing it as a casual or inconsequen-
tial occurrence, this rethinking would show a new sensitivity to the
quality of life. It would not promote a passionate desire for death, but
for independence, honesty, and integrity. Human disposal would not be
the end sought here. Rather, the goal would be "the enhancement of
human dignity by permitting each man's last act to be an exercise of his
free choice between a tortured, hideous death and a painless dignified
one."
16
Dating from at least the seventeenth century, rational suicide has
been recognized as a concept or phenomenon. 7 One author suggests
that the rationality of a suicidal act follows from the very rationality of
the philosophy guiding the deliberations of individuals contemplating
the act. 8 By defining rationality as the logical means of problem solv-
ing which have proven their reliability over time, the rationality of
one's philosophy may be measured not only by the degree to which it is
free of mysticism, but also by the degree of self-criticism it has under-
gone by the decision maker.' 9 Accordingly, should the philosophy in
question embody a set of institutionalized political or religious beliefs,
any rational judgment must critically evaluate the very institutions
which embody these beliefs. 20 While this principle is clear, its practice
and application are extremely difficult to realize. 2' Within the context
14 See G. GRISEZ & J. BOYLE, JR., LIFE AND DEATH WITH LIBERTY AND JUSTICE
ch. 5 (1979).
Is See C. RICE, THE VANISHING RIGHT TO LIVE 79 (1969).
16 Giancola, The Discontinuance of Extraordinary Medical Treatment from a Ter-
minal Patient, 1980 MED. TRIAL TECH. Q. 326, 342.
17 See Motto, The Right to Suicide: A Psychiatrists View, in PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES,
supra note 10, at 212, 215.
lB See id. It has been stated that logical suicide is often but the simple expression of
philosophical pessimism. See J. MEERLOO, SUICIDE AND MASS SUICIDE 111 (1962).
19 See id.
20 See id.
21 See id.; see also Pepper, Can a Philosophy Make One Philosophical?, in ESSAYS
[Vol. 22:275
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of suicide, "a rational decision is the one in favor of the life course
which one would prefer, comparing death with the best option open to
one if he had the alternatives correctly and vividly before him in a nor-
mal frame of mind. '22
On the other hand, irrational suicide is exemplified by an individual
whose despair leads her to totally abandon any serious commitment to
make rational decisions on the basis of future consequences of subse-
quent actions. 23 Oftentimes, human commitments may require a kind of
irrationality if they are in fact to be respected, e.g., unfathomable grief
or mourning over the loss of a spouse or unrequited "first" loves of
teenagers. 24
Like death, suicide as a concept is forever changing.2 5 Although the
"badness" of death is debatable, 26 most members of today's society
would agree that suicide is bad or improper, 27 and that so too is eutha-
nasia. 28 Life is not an amaranth, the imaginary flower that never fades.
For all too many, the "benefits" of modern medicine and treatment
extend the fading process with tragic withering, discoloration, and odor.
The current controversy surrounding the individual's right to refuse
treatment has both its genesis and its nexus in the central objection to
an individual's exercise of her right of self-determination through sui-
cide or euthanasia. Refusing necessary life-sustaining treatment has
IN SELF-DESTRUCTION 121 (F. Shneidman ed. 1967).
22 Brandt, The Morality and Rationality of Suicide, in SUICIDOLOGY: CONTEMPO-
RARY DEVELOPMENTS ch. 12, at 391 (E. Sheidman ed. 1976) [hereafter CONTEMPO-
RARY DEVELOPMENTS]. Judgments about the rationality of suicide depend on assessing
alternative states of affairs and their probability (e.g., painful progression of a terminal
illness). J. CHILDRESS, WHO SHOULD DECIDE? PATERNALISM IN HEALTH CARE 159
(1982).
In June 1980 public television presented a case documentary on Jo Roman, a New
York City artist and writer, who undertook, with family support, rational suicide to
avoid protracted suffering from cancer. See "Rational Suicide" Raises Patient Rights
Issues, 66 A.B.A. J. 1499 (1980); Leo, How to Commit Suicide, TIME, July 7, 1980,
at 49; see also J. ROMAN, EXIT HOUSE: CHOOSING SUICIDE AS AN ALTERNATIVE(1980).
23 See Mayo, Irrational Suicide, in PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES, supra note 10, at 133-
35; see also Brandt, supra note 10, at 127.
24 See id.
21 See J. MEERLOO, supra note 18, at 111; see also Daube, The Linguistics of Sui-
cide, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 387 (1972).
26 See T. NAGEL, MORAL QUESTIONS 1 (1976).
27 See generally PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES, supra note 10.
28 See generally Kuhse, The Case for Active Voluntary Euthanasia, 14 LAW, MED.
& HEALTH CARE 145 (1986).
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been declared a "form of suicide,"2 9 and its recognition and allowance
as "modern paganism."30
In order to clarify the issues and to dispel the inherent confusion
over this point of contention, I advocate a seemingly simple change in
both the attitude and the very definition of suicide and euthanasia,
which will facilitate contemporary decision making. The forces working
to effect this change are found in the courts and state legislative bodies
as well as in professional organizations such as the American Medical
Association and the former President's Commission for the Study of
Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Re-
search. They will be explored and critically analyzed to determine
whether these forums have been responsive to growing societal de-
mands, or whether they favor unreasonable initiatives without reason
or popular support.
These mechanisms will be seen as providing a framework for princi-
pled decision making that recognizes humaneness, love, and compas-
sion, while balancing the interest of the at-risk patient against the
state's interest in preserving life. 31 In turn, these mechanisms will all
conduce to a basic recognition and application of an enlightened self-
determination. Questions of ethical, moral, philosophical, and religious
consistency are inextricably tied to any legal analysis of the issue and
are recognized and analyzed as dynamic vectors of force in the entire
decision making process. Their influence oftentimes will be seen as
more confusing than as unifying.
Whether a right to decline life-sustaining treatment implies an equal
liberty or coordinate right to commit suicide and effect euthanasia
should not be regarded as an issue of crucial concern; it is not necessary
to attempt to draw a hard and fast line between suicide and a refusal of
treatment decision. The major point made and the central recognition
sought is that competent persons within either of these contexts should
have both a moral and legal right - acting for whatever purposes - to
refuse life-sustaining medical treatment. 32 Furthermore, as part of a
treatment refusal, total parenteral nutrition, feeding gastrostomies,
nasogastric tubes, and all other means of providing alimentation should
not be required.33
29 C. RICE, supra note 15, at 83.
3 Brophy v. New Eng. Sinai Hosp., Inc., 398 Mass. 417, 443, 497 N.E.2d 626, 640
(1986) (Nolan, J., dissenting).
31 See G. SMITH, GENETICS, ETHICS AND THE LAW 2, 8, 164 (1981).
32 See J. CHILDRESS, supra note 22, at 163.
33 See Paris & McCormick, The Catholic Tradition on the Use of Nutrients and
[Vol. 22:275
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Since generally most of the states have decriminalized suicide and
seldom enforce prohibitions against assisting it, 34 under my proposal for
an unfettered recognition of a right to enlightened self-determination,
this shallow statutory ruse would be abolished.3" Perhaps the issue of
rational suicide is more tolerable or understandable if it is viewed as
limiting the right to be left alone and to choose the circumstances under
which treatment will be followed. 36
Commensurate with my primary proposal for reclassification of
terms, I propose to similarly recast euthanasia so that it is definitionally
and attitudinally consistent with the new principle of self-determina-
tion, and thus decriminalized. What is regarded as passive euthanasia
is already widely practiced and seldom prosecuted.37 If voluntary active
euthanasia were not decriminalized as a consequence of the reclassifica-
tion scheme propounded, then an immunity from prosecution must be
allowed for those assisting a competent or incompetent individual in
completing such an act of self-determination. Absent immunity from
prosecution, the traditional concept of euthanasia should be allowed as
an affirmative defense to a charge of murder and accepted if the partic-
ipating parties acted in good faith. 38
The central purpose of this Article is to show that through the self-
determination of an individual's life plan, not only is the full meaning
of liberty acknowledged, 39 the individual further recognizes that the
very endowment of free will forms "the basis of our right to individual
freedom of action, [and] the right to carry into execution the things we
freely choose to do."'40
Fluids, AMERICA, May 2, 1987, at 2.
3 See Engelhardt & Malloy, Suicide and Assisting Suicide: A Critique of Legal
Sanctions, 36 Sw. L.J. 1003, 1019-20 (1982); Podgers, Rational Suicide Raises Pa-
tient Rights Issue, 66 A.B.A. J. 1499, 1500 (1980); Euthanasia: Criminal, Tort, Con-
stitutional and Legislative Considerations, 48 NOTRE DAME LAW. 1202, 1206
(1973).
3s For analysis of another construct to validate suicide, see M. HEIFETZ, THE
RIGH'r TO DIE 97-98 (1975).
36 See Engelhardt, Suicide and the Cancer Patient, 36 CA - A CANCER J. FOR
CI.INICIANS, Mar.-Apr. 1986, at 105.
37 See Podgers, supra note 34, at 1501; see also G. GRISEZ & J. BOYLE, JR., supra
note 14, at 136-38.
38 See G. WILLIAMS, THE SANCTITY OF LIFE AND THE CRIMINAl. LAW 339-46
(1968); Newman, Treatment Refusals for the Critically and Terminally Ill: Proposed
Rules for the Family, the Physicians and the State, 3 N.Y.L. SCH. HUM. RTs. ANN.
35, 87 (1985).
39 C. FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG 146-47 (1978).
40 M. ADLER, WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS 123 (1987).
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I. THE ETIOLOGY OF SUICIDE
A. Psychological and Historical Underpinnings
While there are 140 possible causes of death, only four modes have
been recognized: natural, accident, suicide, and homicide. 4' A more
meaningful and accurate classification would consider the role of the
individual in her own act of self-destruction as being intentional,
subintentional (when an individual plays a partial or unconscious role
in promoting his own death), or unintentional. 42
Suicide, as a word, is thought to have originated either in Sir
Thomas Browne's Religio Medici written in 1635 or from Walter
Charleton in 1651. 41 "Suicidology" was used independently in the
1960s as a word to scientifically explain the study of the phenomena of
suicide. 44 The term "suicide" is applied to all those cases of death that
result directly or indirectly from either a positive or a negative act of
the victim herself, which she knows or has reason to know will produce
this desired result.45
Though one may be reconciled to the prospect of her own death, this
does not mean that she is reconciled to the prospect of death itself as an
41 CONTEMPORARY DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 22, at 6.
42 See id.
43 Id. at 7. It has been suggested that the first known document dealing specifically
with suicide is to be found in Dispute Over Suicide, an Egyptian writing thought to be
from either the Middle Kingdom or earlier, around 2100 B.C. Bearing some marked
similarities to the Book of Job, it focuses on a debate a man has with his soul,
prompted as such, because of a series of misfortunes that have befallen him. The debate
explores the values of holding onto life and seeking new pleasures or ending it and its
present level of suffering. Thus, what is seen, then, is that as long as written accounts
of history have been kept, suicide has been recorded. See D. DE CANTANZO, SUICIDE
AND SELF-DAMAGING BEHAVIOUR 26 (1984).
44 See CONTEMPORARY DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 22, at 7. See generally Daube,
supra note 25, at 4.
45 See E. DURKHEIM, SUICIDE: A STUDY IN SOCIOLOGY (J. Spaulding & G.
Simpson trans. 1951). More specifically, Durkheim posited three types of basic suicide:
altruistic, egoistic and anomic - each resulting from people's relationship to their soci-
ety. See id. chs. 2-5. Under altruistic suicide, group or sub-societal customs demand
suicide under certain circumstances - with hara-kiri and sati being notable examples
of self-inflicted honorable death and ritual burning by a widow upon her husband's
death. See id. Egoistic suicides make up the majority of all suicides in the United States
and occur when an individual has limited ties with his community. See id. Finally,
anomic suicides occur when an accustomed relationship between an individual and his
society goes awry with the loss of a business position or the death of a close friend. See
id.
[Vol. 22:275
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inescapable fact of the human condition. 46 Depending upon the mores
and the traditions of each society, throughout history suicide has been
not only acclaimed and despised, but sought after and feared.47
It has been postulated that suicide should be viewed as an attenuated
homicide, which provides a simple and economical way of ridding soci-
ety of numbers "of useless or harmful persons without social interven-
tion."' 48 The telling question, then, is put in this form: "Is it not better
to let them put themselves out of the way voluntarily and quietly, than
to force society to eject them from its midst by violence? 49
Durkheim found the etiology of suicide in "abnormal psychology; so-
cial psychology; anthropology; meteorological and other cosmic factors;
religion; marriage; the family; divorce; primitive rites and customs; so-
cial and economic crimes; crime, law and jurisprudence and in history,
education, and occupational groups."50 In a very real sense, then, sui-
cide is a social phenomenon. 5'
In viewing suicide as simply symptomatic of individual psycho-
pathology together with social disorganization, over time, its philosoph-
ical underpinnings were neglected for legal and scientific analysis. 52
Today, with respect to both the theory and application of suicide, schol-
ars are now recognizing the inextricable relationship that exists among
law, philosophy, and medical science. 53 This recognition itself becomes
a form of suicide, validating voluntary euthanasia as an acceptable al-
ternative to intolerable pain, suffering, and economic depletion.5 4
In reality, the hard questions of suicide focus on death control and
management. Ultimately, any analysis of the morality, the rationality
and the right to die must take in account a plethora of complex medical
4 A. TOYNBEE, MAN'S CONCERN WITH DEATH 264 (1968).
47 M. HEIFETZ, supra note 35, at 73.
48 E. DURKHEIM, supra note 45, at 341.
49 Id.
50 Id. at 13. The most accepted psychoanalytic view of suicide is that it is a form of
displacement or a desire to kill someone who has thwarted the individual suicidee. Id.
at 24. Through this act of displacement, the act of suicide is turned back on the suicide
victim herself. Id. Stated technically, the suicide murders the intrajected object and
thereby expiates her guilt for wanting to murder the object. Id. Accordingly, the ego is
satisfied and the superego mollified through self-murder. Id.
Today, however, suicidologists believe that hostility, frustrated dependency, hopeless-
ness, and helplessness also have considerable significance in promoting suicide. See
CONTEMPORARY DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 22, at 10.
11 E. DURKHEIM, supra note 45, at 326.
52 See PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES, supra note 10.
11 See id.
14 See id.
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and nonmedical considerations. Such considerations would include the
competent and the incompetent individual's refusal of lifesaving medical
treatment, informed consent to potentially lethal experimental studies
and fatal organ donations, as well as the destructive behaviors of alco-
hol drinking and cigarette smoking.5" Inevitably, autonomy and self-
determination become watchwords for death with dignity.
No passage within the Old Testament clearly propounds an explicit
view of the ancient Judaic view on suicide.56 In fact, the Old Testament
reports only eight incidents that might properly be considered suicide.57
As in the New Testament, the Old Testament does not contain any
explicit prohibition against suicide.58 Although cultural prohibitions
may have restrained suicides with respect to the Hebrews, the infre-
quency of suicides may be a direct result of the centrality of positivism
within the religious tenets which placed not only a high value on life
itself, but acknowledged God's special providential commitment to them
as a people.59
Neither the Greek nor Roman laws uniquely addressed the issue of
suicide - except when the acts of either a slave or soldier led to sui-
cide.60 The penalties for such acts were the forfeiture of all personalty
previously owned by the suicidee and the confiscation of his estate,
thereby preventing the passage of the estate to the heirs. 61 With respect
to Greco-Roman physicians, their assistance to suicidees was a com-
monplace activity and regarded as outside the scope and interest of the
law. 62 Indeed, the Platonists, Cynics and Stoics considered the act of
55 See id.
56 A. ALVAREZ, THE SAVAGE GOD 41-63 (1971); Farberow, Cultural History of
Suicide, in SUICIDE IN DIFFERENT CULTURES 1, 3-4 (N. Farberow ed. 1975);
Hankoff, Judaic Origins of the Suicide Prohibitions, in SUICIDE THEORY AND
CLINICAL ASPECTS 1 (L. Hankoff & B. Einsidler eds. 1979); Smart, Death in the
Judaeo-Christian Tradition, in A. TOYNBEE, supra note 46, at 116 passim.
17 See supra note 56.
58 See Judges 9:54, 16:30; 1 Samuel 31:4; 2 Samuel 17:23; 1 Kings 16:18; 2
Maccabees 7:1-42, 10:113, 14:41.
59 See D. DE CANTANZO, supra note 43, at 27; N. ST. JOHN-STEVAS, THE RIGHT
To LIFE 58 (1964). Perhaps the most notable exception to this position was in 73 A.D.
at Massada when some 960 Jews committed acts of mass suicide to avoid an inevitable
capture by victorious Romans. See D. DE CANTANZO, supra note 43, at 27; see also
Hankoff, supra note 56.
60 See Amundsen, The Physician's Obligation to Prolong Life: A Medical Duty
Without Classical Roots, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Aug. 1978, at 23.
61 Farberow, supra note 56, at 1, 6.
62 See Amundsen, supra note 60; see also Daube, supra note 25.
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suicide as "an honorable alternative to hopeless illness."63
Open toleration of suicide may have commenced with the Greeks, 64
who tolerated the act when it was undertaken for nobility of purpose,65
such as an expression of grief, high patriotic principle or to avoid dis-
honor.66 Moderation and high principle were the keys to this acceptant
view; wantonness was not condoned. 67 The "acceptance" of suicide as a
rational act came with the Roman assimilation of Greek Stoic philoso-
phy, which made suicide the most reasonable and desirable of all ways
to end life.68 Both the Stoics and the Epicureans claimed to be as indif-
ferent to death as to life. 69 For the Epicureans, the focus was pleasure;
whatever promoted pleasure was good and whatever produced pain was
evil. 70 For the Stoics, the focus was a vague, but dignified ideal of life in
accordance with nature v.7 When it no longer seemed in accord, then
death came as a rational choice befitting a rational nature.7 2
The Greek Stoics embraced a rational attitude toward suicide that
conformed to their ideal of life in accordance with nature. The ad-
vanced Stoicism of the later Roman Empire internalized these beliefs. 73
Ultimately, the dilemma drifted from the question of whether or not
one should kill herself, but how to do so with the greatest dignity, brav-
ery and style. 74 Stated otherwise, the Greeks divested suicide of all
primitive horrors and gradually began to discuss the subject more or
less in an objective unemotional manner.75 The Romans, however, rein-
vested it with emotion - but in doing so, turned the emotions upside
down. 76 Suicide was no longer morally evil; to the contrary, one's man-
63 Amundsen, supra note 60, at 27. Shintoism, Buddhism and Hinduism allow sui-
cide in cases of incurable disease; Islamic and Judaic religions condemn it, and Catholi-
cism opposes it. See M. HEIFETZ, supra note 35, at 78.
6 PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES, supra note 10, at 2.
65 See W. DURANT, THE STORY OF CIVILIZATION: THE LIFE OF GREECE 655-57
(1939).
66 See A. ALVAREZ, supra note 56, at 58-67.
67 Id. at 18.
68 See W. DURANT, supra note 65, at 657.
69 See G. WILLIAMS, supra note 38, at 252.
70 See DeLacy, Epicureanism and the Epicurean School, 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHI-
LOSOPHY 2 (P. Edwards ed. 1967).
71 See Hallie, Stoicism, 8 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, supra note 70, at 19-22.
72 See id.
71 See G. WILLIAMS, supra note 38, at 21; see also Hudson, Suicide: Madness or
the Noble Roman Way?, THE PHAROS, Fall 1952, at 45.
74 See id.
71 See id.
76 See id.
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ner of going became but a practical test of excellence and of virtue.77
Indeed, the manner in which a Roman died was viewed as the measure
of ultimate value of life."
The early Christians also showed an indifference to death, but from
a different perspective. 79 Since life itself was unimportant, and because
the world only tempted one to sin, death was a welcome blessing.
Stated otherwise, the more the Church expressed its view that the
world was full of sin and temptation and that humans wait only on
earth until death releases them to heavenly glory, the more irresistible
the temptation to suicide became. 8
Because of a growing inability to distinguish approved and glorified
martyrdom from ignominious acts of suicide, St. Augustine (354-430
A.D.) condemned suicide even though the Stoics condoned such acts for
those Christian women who had been violated by invading barbari-
ans.81 Augustine considered self-imposed death from a number of per-
spectives and concluded that the act was sinful because it violated the
Sixth Commandment: namely, "Thou shall not kill."8 2 He suggested
only two circumstances when self-imposed death would be tolerated: (1)
when performed validly by the state, as in war or as an exercise of
77 See id.
78 See G. WILLIAMS, supra note 38, at 68.
7' See D. PORTWOOD, COMMON SENSE SUICIDE 22 (1978); G. WILLIAMS, supra
note 38, at 254-55.
8 See M. HEIFETZ, supra note 35, at 77. Actually, in 452 A.D., the Council of
Aries declared suicide a crime and concluded that it was caused "by a diabolically
inspired fury." E. DURKHEIM, supra note 45, at 327.
It was not until 563 A.D., however, that a penal sanction was first imposed at the
Council of Prague. Id. Accordingly, the victims of suicide were disallowed a burial
mass "and the singing of psalms" as their bodies were buried. Id. Civil penalties were
subsequently added. Id.
In tenth century England, suicides were associated with robbers, assassins, and all
other criminals, and it was customary to drag the body of the person who committed
suicide - pierced with a stick crossways - through the streets and bury it on a high-
way. Id. at 328. In Zurich, if one who committed suicide stabbed herself, a fragment of
the wood in which the knife was fixed was driven into the body near the head. Id.
Similarly, if she had drowned herself, she was then buried under five feet of water in
the sand. Id.
81 p. LANDSBERG & L. LANDSBERG, THE EXPERIENCE OF DEATH AND THE
MODEL PROBLEM OF SUICIDES 77 passim (1953).
82 In Book I of The City of God, Augustine stated: "It is not without significance,
that in no passage of the holy canonical books there can be found either divine precept
or permission to take away our own life, whether for the sake of entering the enjoyment
of immortality, or of shunning, or ridding ourselves of anything whatsoever." W.
OATES, BASIC WRITINGS OF ST. AUGUSTINE 27 (1948).
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capital punishment; and (2) when intimated by God, as with the death
of certain individuals such as Abraham and Samson. 83 However, no au-
thority reposed within the individual to take her own life.84
In the Middle Ages, St. Thomas Aquinas followed the path of St.
Augustine and proclaimed that self-imposed death must be regarded as
sinful.8" Following the Renaissance and Reformation, the early 1600s
saw the erosion of the unyielding opposition to suicide. This turn of
events was sparked primarily by the publication of The Anatomy of
Melancholy in 1621 by Robert Burton and Biathantos in 1646 by John
Donne.86
By the eighteenth century, both opponents and defenders of suicide
found themselves still philosophically adrift without any distinct posi-
tion regarding suicide. 7 It remained for David Hume and Immanuel
Kant to polarize thought by their analyses of this issue. It is far beyond
the scope of this Article and this brief historical overview to probe the
underpinnings of these two men's philosophies. Suffice it to state suc-
cinctly that, as an empiricist, Hume laid the foundation of morality in a
"natural sentiment that distinguishes the good and the bad."88 Morality
could not be founded on God because verification of God's existence
was lacking. 9 If an obligation undertaken involved the promotion or
endurance of great suffering, society is not entitled to extract it from the
individual herself.90 Accordingly, if one's life promoted no type of mu-
tual benefit for either the individual or society, the moral imperative to
continue that life would fail.9
Kant tied the foundation of morality to the nature of the human per-
son.92 Although he espoused self-sacrifice, observing that it was better
"to sacrifice one's life rather than one's morality," he would not have
83 See id. at 28, 32-33.
84 See id.
15 See T. AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIcA 1470 (Dominican ed. 1947). The reason
for the sinfulness of the act was tied to three arguments: it contradicted the natural
inclination toward self-preservation and charity; it inflicted injury upon the particular
community wherein the suicidee lived; and i 'violated the exercise of God's rights as
Creator over humans' destiny. Id.
86 See Marzen, O'Dowd, Crone & Balch, Suicide: A Constitutional Right?, 24 DuQ.
L. REV. 1, 31 passim (1985).
87 Id. at 33.
88 Id. at 34.
89 Id.
90 Id. at 35.
91 Id.
9 Id. at 36.
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this idea confused with suicide. 3 Committing suicide was an immoral
act because:
If he destroys himself in order to escape from painful circumstances, he
uses a person merely as a means to maintain a tolerable condition up to
the end of life. But a man is not a thing. . .. 94 To destroy the subject of
morality in his own person is tantamount to obliterating from the world,
as far as he can, the very existence of morality itself.95
In 1854 the common law courts of England first recognized the crim-
inality of suicide.9 6 Although no clear answer accounts for the delay for
this action, the courts may have simply sought to enrich the coffers of
the treasury, rather than to structure a deliberate penal policy against
such acts.97
In the mid-1700s in England, the punishment for suicide was for-
feiture and confiscation of the victim's personal property, while all real
property passed to the heirs of the decedent's estate. 98 By 1870, the
Forfeiture Act99 abolished all forfeitures for suicides) °° Finally, the Su-
icide Act of 1961101 decriminalized acts of suicide and attempted sui-
cides, although complicity in another's suicide remains a felony. 02
From the colonial period through the 1970s, American society clearly
opposed suicide. 03 It is debatable whether the American colonies
adopted in toto England's common-law criminalization of suicide.10 4
However, most commentators would agree that by the nineteenth cen-
tury suicide in America was no longer viewed as a criminal offense. 05
Today, a majority of the states have statutes that prohibit assisting sui-
93 Id. at 37 (quoting Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, in METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLES
OF VIRTUES 83 U. Ellington trans. 1964)).
94 Id. (quoting Kant, supra note 93, at 83-84).
91 Id. (quoting I. KANT, LECTURES ON ETHICS 152 (L. Infield trans. 1963)).
96 See Regina v. Doody, 6 Cox Crim. Cas. 463 (1854); see also Regina v. Man, 2
K.B. 107 (1914); Regina v. Burgess, 169 Eng. Rep. 1387 (1862).
97 See G. WILLIAMS, supra note 38, at ch. 7.
98 See 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *189, *190. See generally Silving, Sui-
cide and Law, in CLUES TO SUICIDE ch. 9 (E. Shneidman & N. Farberow eds. 1957).
" The Forfeiture Act of 1870, 33 & 34 Vict., ch. 23.
100 See id.
101 The Suicide Act of 1961, 9 & 10 Eliz. 2, ch. 60.
102 See id.
103 See Marzen, O'Dowd, Crone & Balch, supra note 86, at 100.
104 See id. at 63-64.
105 See id. at 98-99. However, judicial precedent in Alabama, Oregon, and South
Carolina holds suicide to be a crime. See Southern Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Wynn, 29
Ala. App. 209, 194 So. 421 (1940); Wycoff v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 173 Or. 592, 147
P.2d 227 (1944); State v. Levell, 34 S.C. 120, 13 S.E. 319 (1891).
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cide. 06 Three other states hold an individual who assists a suicide as a
principal to murder. 07 Relying upon the common law of crimes, 108 both
Maryland'0 9 and Massachusetts' 0 would probably also penalize assist-
ing suicide. It is less certain whether Alabama,"' the District of Co-
lumbia," 2 West Virginia," 3 Virginia" 4 and Tennessee,"' would follow
suit. While Hawaii" 6 and Indiana" 7 treat acts of causing suicide as
punishable offenses, they do not prohibit the act of assisting it. Nine
other states have no such prohibitions."' Yet, prosecutions for either
aiding or abetting suicide are quite rare." 9
106 See ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.41.100-(a) (2), 11.41.120 (a) (2) (1983); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 13-1103 (A) (3) (Supp. 1985); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-1504 (1) (1977);
CAL. PENAL CODE § 401 (West 1988); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-104 (1) (b) (1978);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-56 (a) (2) (West 1985); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §
645 (1979); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.08 (West 1976); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3406
(1981); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17A, § 204 comment (1983); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
609.215 (West 1987); Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-3-49 (1972); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-
5-105 (1986); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-307 (1985); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-6 (West
1982); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40A-2-5 (1964); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 120.35, 125.15 (3)
(McKinney 1987); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21 § 813 (West 1983); OR. REV. STAT. §§
163.117, 163.125 (1) (b) (1985); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2505 (Purdon Supp.
1988); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1-10 (Law. Co-op 1976); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §
22-16-37 (1988); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.08 (Vernon 1974); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 9A.36-060 (1977); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 940.12 (West 1982); see also
Englehardt & Malloy, supra note 34, at 1019 nn.69-70 (citing various case authorities
holding similarly to statutes cited supra).
107 See Burnett v. People, 204 Il1. 208, 211, 68 N.E. 505, 508 (1903); People v.
Roberts, 211 Mich. 187, 198, 178 N.W. 690, 693 (1920); Blackburn v. State, 23 Ohio
St. 146, 162-63 (1870).
,08 See Note, Criminal Liability of Participants in Suicide: State v. Williams, 5
MD. L. REV. 324 (1941).
109 See id.
110 See Commonwealth v. Dennis, 105 Mass. 162 (1870).
I1 See Brenner, Undue Influence in the Criminal Law: A Proposed Analysis of the
Criminal Offense of Causing Suicide, 47 ALB. L. REV. 62 (1982).
112 See D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-2428 (Supp. 1984).
"I See W. VA. CODE § 16-30-8 (a) (1984).
114 See A. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAWS IN COLONIAL VIRGINIA 27 (1930).
115 See, e.g., State v. Alley, 594 S.W.2d 381 (Tenn. 1980).
116 See HAw. REV. STAT. § 707-702 (1) (b) (1975).
117 See IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-1-2 (West 1978).
118 See State v. Campbell, 217 Iowa 848, 251 N.W. 717 (1933); Oubre v. Mutual
Life Ins. Co. of New York, 21 So. 2d 191 (La. Ct. App. 1945); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 500.020 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1985); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 458, 667 (1967); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 14-17.1 (1981); 1973 N.D. Laws 215, 300; UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-1-
105 (1978); WYo. STAT. § 6-1-102 (Supp. 1985).
119 See Euthanasia: Criminal, Tort, Constitutional and Legislative Considerations,
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In summary, many American jurisdictions punish neither acts of sui-
cide nor assistance thereto. Yet, other jurisdictions criminalize at-
tempted suicide. Interestingly, since the Nation's founding, the majority
of jurisdictions have imposed no criminal sanction upon individuals
who have successfully or unsuccessfully undertaken to end their lives. 120
Despite the divergence of responses, however, America reflects common
Western attitudes toward death.
Philippe Aries, the noted French social historian, identified and
charted three phases in the development of Western attitudes toward
death. 121 In the Middle Ages, death was viewed as an unexceptional,
impersonal event. In essence, the Christian belief in immortality led the
community to accept death with a simple resignation. 2 2 The phrase 'et
moriemur' - and we shall die - characterized this attitude. At the
turn of the twentieth century, the recognition of the individual's impor-
tance lead to a much more personal conception of death. Thus, people
insisted upon participating in their own death because they saw it as a
truly exceptional moment in time; the moment that gave their own in-
dividuality a definite, observable form.'23 The logic offered here was
that if one were to be master of her own life, then obviously she must
be master of her own death, 'la mort de soi.' Curiously, in the tradi-
tional deathbed scene of this period, the dying person became the prin-
cipal character presiding over the proceedings, while the onlookers
treated the event in a matter-of-fact manner. Accordingly, mourning
tended to be quite conventional and perfunctory. 124
By the seventeenth century, the dying person shared her death with
her family and friends. All concerned parties participated in the deci-
sion making process of dying, whereas in the past, these matters were
solely the concern of the afflicted person. 2 5 Interestingly, by the middle
of the eighteenth century, a new attitude towards death had arisen: 'la
supra note 29, at 1206 (1973); see also W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW
569 (1972).
120 See Marzen, O'Dowd, Crone & Balch, supra note 86, at 98; id. at 148-242
(giving comprehensive case and statutory analysis of suicide laws in United States); see
also Engelhardt & Malloy, supra note 29, at 1019-20; Schulman, Suicide and Suicide
Prevention: A Legal Analysis, 54 A.B.A. J. 855, 858-60 (1968); Shaffer, Legal Views
of Suicide, in CONTEMPORARY DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 22, ch. 13.
121 See P. ARIES, WESTERN ATTITUDES TOWARDS DEATH: FROM THE MIDDLE
AGES TO PRESENT ch. 1 (P. Ranum trans. 1974).
122 See id. ch. 2.
123 See id.
124 See id.
125 See id. chs. 3, 4.
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mort de ton' - or thy death. Thus, the onlookers in a deathbed scene
now assumed a greater responsibility. They were expected to observe
and act upon the dying person's wishes. More importantly, they were
expected to preserve her memory.'26 The hope of living forever in the
memory of posterity took form in the architecture and iconography of
tombs with cemeteries more or less becoming museums. 27
Toynbee suggests that Western attitudes toward death have been
changing over the last 300 years as a consequence of the "contemporary
progressive recession ... of the beliefs in the tenets of Christianity.' ' 2 8
An honest belief in Christian doctrine is obviously something more than
a mere intellectual acknowledgement of a set of theological proposi-
tions; it involves an auto defe which commits the believer to action not
only on a moral and spiritual plane, but on an intellectual one as well.
In a word, "It commits him . . . to the Christian attitude towards
death."12 9
In the West, particularly in the United States, the word "death" has
until recently been regarded as an almost unmentionable word. 130 In-
deed, individuals have attempted to defy death by utilizing a deep-
freeze process known as cryonic suspension designed to suspend the
bodily processes at "death" until resuscitation can be undertaken at a
later time.13' For all these shifts in attitudes, death is still regarded as
"un-American," as evidenced by the preference of referring to death as
"passing on" or "passing away.' 32 Tragically, there is still a marked
reluctance to advise a dying person that she is dying. 33 The exagger-
ated and almost simple-minded insistence on physical continuance by
all necessary means not only ignores the qualitative condition in which
life is pursued, but also is childish and narcissistic. Such an obsession
distracts "the soul's natural quest. It is a distraction from the duty to
master the fine art of living well, which requires rising above concern
126 See C. BECKER, THE HEAVENLY CITY OF THE PHILOSOPHERS 148-49 (1932).
127 See id.; see also A. ALVAREZ, supra note 56, at 41 passim (observing history of
death practices).
128 Toynbee, Changing Attitudes Towards Death in the Modern Western World, in
A. TOYNBEE, supra note 46, at 122.
129 Id.
130 Id. at 131. See generally J. MITFORD, THE AMERICAN WAY OF DEATH (1963).
131 See G. SMITH, MEDICAL-LEGAL ASPECTS OF CRYONICS: PROSPECTS FOR IM-
MORTALITY (1983); Smith, Cryonic Suspension and the Law, 17 OMEGA 1 (1986-87);
Smith, The Iceperson Cometh: Cryonics and the Law, 1 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH ISSUES
23 (1983).
132 Toynbee, supra note 128, at 131.
133 Id. See generally SOCIETY FOR THE RIGHT TO DIE, THE PHYSICIANS AND THE
HOPELESSLY ILL PATIENT 5 passim (1985).
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for mere bodily continuance."'13 4 Acceptance of death should be viewed
"as inherent to life and happiness" and "belongs to normal life."' 135
B. Contemporary Causes and Concerns
Suicide has become a common fact of life. Many explanations have
been offered in an effort to understand it. In 1840 some commentators
believed that the increased numbers of suicides were due in large part
to socialism. 36 To prove this point, the sudden increases in suicides
were shown to have coincided with the publication of Tom Paine's Age
of Reason.37 Other causative factors, including "atmospherical mois-
ture" and "masturbation," were listed as well. 38 Indeed, masturbation
was viewed as "a certain secret vice which .. . [was] practiced to an
enormous extent in our public schools.' 1 39 Two major cures designed to
stem suicidal urges were cold showers and laxatives. 4 Another popular
belief was that suicide was an act undertaken largely by young lov-
ers.'41 Others sought to explain it away by viewing it as a "national
habit" which descended upon some people like a plague. 4 President
Dwight Eisenhower even went so far as to express his belief that the
high suicide rate in Sweden was an uncontroverted example of the
ravages of uncontrolled social welfare. 43
Perhaps the most common denominator of suicides is loneliness-a
motive arising from marital discord, sickness, unrequited love affairs,
and from social factors such as unemployment, divorce, widowhood and
imprisonment. 44 Loneliness and interpersonal conflicts are properly
considered as motives for suicides, not as causes. The causes of suicide
are understood as "the biophysical driving forces, which often do not
134 Will, In Praise of Mortality, in THE MORNING AFTER: AMERICAN SUCCESSES
AND ExCESSES 410, 411-12 (G. Will ed. 1986).
131 J. MEERLOO, supra note 18, at 111.
136 See D. MAGUIRE, DEATH BY CHOICE 216, 217 (1975).
137 See id.
138 See id.
'39 Id.
140 Id.
'4' Id. at 217.
142 See id.
143 See id.
14 See Fox, The Recent Decline of Suicide in Britain: The Role of the Samaritan
Suicide Prevention Movement in Britain, in CONTEMPORARY DEVELOPMENTS, Supra
note 22, at 499, 501-02. In "The Dialogue of a Misanthrope with His Own Soul" or,
"Dispute over Suicide," discovered in ancient Egypt and commonly regarded as the
first known discourse on suicide, social isolation and loneliness emerge as principal
reasons for the author of that manuscript to contemplate suicide. Id. at 500-01.
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even rise to the consciousness of the individual and thus cannot consti-
tute motives, but which are related to race, age, sex, work and social
status."' 145 Whatever may be classified as motives and causes within the
taxonomy of suicidal behavior, those who seek to complete the act itself
often complain that either their lives no longer have meaning or they
are no longer "worth living.' 146 They no longer have a sense of self-
mastery in their lives because of failures in interpersonal relations and
economic pursuits. 47
Another theory suggests that one can inherit certain hereditary vul-
nerabilities toward suicide.148 Sociobiologists and behavioral ecologists
in fact stress human biological adaption as the determinative factor in
understanding and dealing with the issues of suicide. Accordingly, this
perspective simply subsumes the other theories advanced by sociology,
psychodynamic models, anthropology, cognition and learning, and
physiology. 149
While no common denominator may explain suicide as a conscious
rational process, 150 Durkheim has implied that when individuals con-
sider suicide, they make a "conscious-rational choice" drawn from and
built upon motives actually founded in reality.' 51 Interestingly, at one
time or other the vast majority of all members of society has "played"
with the idea of committing suicide. 52 This fact is consistent with
Freud's Destrudo or death drive which he found in people: 53 "Man's
inner destructibility is, like every instinctual tendency, rooted in both
the primary drive to live and in its opposite - the tendency to return
to the inorganic matrix.' 5
4
145 Id. at 502.
14 Id.; see also AIDS Patients Found at Higher Risk of Suicide: Treatment Urged
for Depression, Delirium Associated with Illness, Wash. Post, Mar. 4, 1988, at A5,
col. 1.
147 See Peck, Towards a Theory of Suicide: The Case for Modern Fatalism 11
OMEGA 1, 11 (1980-1981). A cross-cultural illustration is Japan, where the ritual of
oyako-shinju - or parent-child suicide - is recognized as an honorable escape from
pressing family problems. TIME, June 11, 1983, at 51. In 1982 Japan recorded about
four hundred cases of family suicide. Id.
148 See R. LIrroN, THE BROKEN CONNECTION 256-57 (1979).
149 See D. DE CANTANZO, supra note 43, at 158-59 passim.
IS0 See E. DURKHEIM, supra note 45, at 10; J. JACOBS, ADOLESCENT SUICIDE ch. 1
(1970).
I"' E. DURKHEIM, supra note 45, at 136.
152 J. MEERLOO, supra note 18, at 65.
153 See id. at 2, 20.
114 Id. at 21. The use of hunger strikes (very often ending in death) as a form of
social and political bargaining power has drawn more attention as a consequence of
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In the United States, the two most common disorders found afflicting
suicide victims are depression and chronic alcoholism.1 55 Physicians
often neglect to diagnose a patient's depression and alcoholism. More-
over, when patients are properly diagnosed, they are not treated vigor-
ously by either actual hospitalization, drug therapy, or electroconvulsive
therapy. 156 With improved methods of treatment, heightened recogni-
tion of the symptomology of suicide, and the growth of suicide-preven-
tion services, the incidence of suicide may eventually be curtailed. 5 7
Since most Americans choosing suicide elect to complete the act by
using handguns, restricting the use of handgun availability would cause
fewer Americans to commit suicide. 58 Interestingly, lower suicide rates
exist in those states where there are strict gun control laws. 5 9
1. The Elderly
The elderly who commit suicide are not dramatically different from
younger teenagers who commit suicide. In each case, the loss of health
or reverses in economic affairs promotes an inescapable sense of hope-
lessness. 60 The principal difference between the age groups is that the
elderly succeed in their mission more often than others. Studies indicate
Northern Ireland's volatile situations. The Roman Catholic Church is increasingly re-
luctant to judge someone who commits suicide in this manner and to deny them a
proper church burial. See Briggs, Catholic Church Endeavors to Put Hunger Strikes
in Perspective, N.Y. Times, June 8, 1981, at BI, col. 1.
"I See Hudgens, Preventing Suicide, 308 NEw ENG. J. MED. 897 (1983); see also
E. ROBBINS, THE FINAL MONTHS 12 (1981).
In a clinical analysis of suicidal motivations in over 1,000 suicide cases, researchers
found that: (1) nearly 10% of those committing suicide were not consciously motivated,
but instead they were deranged or alcoholic individuals who acted impulsively; (2) 25%
of people were regarded as mentally unstable; (3) 40% of these individuals impulsively
acted based on strong emotion (pain, distress, shame, defeat), yet they were not viewed
as psychotic; and 25% of those committing suicide undertook suicide after thoroughly
considering the pros and cons of life and death. See J. MEERLOO, supra note 18, at 25.
For examples of other statistical assertions, see Dorpat, Anderson & Ripley, The Rela-
tionship of Physical Illness to Suicide, in SUICIDAL BEHAVIORS: DIAGNOSIS AND
MANAGEMENT 209 (H. Resnick ed. 1968) [hereafter DIAGNOSIS AND MANAGEMENT];
Shneidman, Orientations Toward Death: A Vital Aspect of the Study of Lives, in Di-
AGNOSIS AND MANAGEMENT, supra, at 21.
156 See Hudgens, supra note 155.
117 See id.
158 See Boyd, The Increasing Rate of Suicide by Firearm, 308 NEw ENG. J. MED.
872 (1983).
159 Hudgens, supra note 155, at 898.
160 See Streitfeld, Suicide in Pairs: Together in Final Anguish, Wash. Post, Mar. 5,
1987, at B5, col. 1.
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a ratio of attempts to completions among fifteen to twenty-four year
olds as high as 200 to 1, while in the over sixty-five year old age
groups, the ratio is 4 to 1.161
For the older and socially isolated, the intent to die is more genuine
and the choice of methods to effect that end is more lethal.1 62 Normally,
with dual suicides or murder-suicides, three common scenarios have
been identified. 63 The first scenario proffers the explanation: "You're
dying, and I love you too much to exist without you."' 64 In the second,
a gravely ill, dying wife asks her husband to kill her, since she is un-
able to carry out the act herself. Fearing a conviction, the husband may
then take his own life as well. 6 The third scenario grows out of the
inadvertent death of one of the spouses.166 For example, a distressed or
physically ill husband may murder his wife to spare her from either
losing him or being abandoned after he has departed. In effect, he is
saying that: "[L]ife will be much worse for you when I die, so I'm
going to spare you from that pain by killing you now. After I've done
that, I can kill myself.' ' 67
The number of these dual suicides may be reduced by redoubling
efforts to assure the elderly of a meaningful societal role after they have
retired or after the other spouse dies. 68 The heavy commitment in eco-
nomic support necessary to make these assurances makes their imple-
mentation questionable. Indeed, today's health care expenses for the
elderly are so astronomical that unless the average couple makes solid
financial plans for their future, upon the death of one spouse, the sur-
161 Id.; see Mitchell, What Love is About, as They Lay Dying, Wash. Post, Sept. 6,
1985, at D2, col. 1.
162 Streitfeld, supra note 160, at B5, col. 1.
163 See id.
164 Id.
165 See id.
166 See id.
167 Id. A famous 1975 suicide pact was that between Dr. Henry P. Van Dusen,
President Emeritus of Union Theological Seminary, and his wife. See 0. RUSSELL,
FREEDOM TO DIE 349-50 (1977). Dr. Van Dusen suffered for five years from a se-
verely crippling stroke, and his wife was seriously incapacitated by arthritis. Id. They
overdosed on sleeping pills. Id. at 350.
In early March 1983 the noted author Arthur Koestler, who over the years had
become a strong supporter of "auto euthanasia," ended his life by ingesting a lethal
dose of drugs. Blake, Rootless Cosmopolitan of the Age, TIME, Mar. 14, 1983, at 96.
Suffering from old age, Parkinson's Disease, and other related illnesses, the seventy-
seven year old Koestler decided that he could no longer endure. Id. His apparently
healthy fifty-six year old wife also committed suicide with him. Id.; see also Blake,
Going Gentle into that Good Night, TIME, Mar. 21, 1983, at 85.
168 See Streitfeld, supra note 160, at B5, col. 1.
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viving spouse may find herself largely discarded.
2. Teenagers
Teenage suicides present a disturbing and dramatic problem. How-
ever, whether a real or fabricated crisis exists is debatable. 169 The 1960s
and early 1970s saw a dramatic increase in the actual number of sui-
cides committed by youths. By 1975, the peak year for teenage suicides,
the total number of ten to fourteen year olds committing suicide was
11,594.170
Viewed internationally, the American problem is not a crisis. Among
young males, the U.S. suicide rates of 19.7 per 100,000 teenagers is below
the rates found in Switzerland (33.5), West Germany (21.2) and Norway
(20.2). For young women, the American rate (4.6) also falls below that
found in Denmark (5.0), France (5.0) and Japan (6.4).'17
Even though these statistics may not suggest a U.S. teenage suicide rate
of crisis dimension, one should be concerned by the fact that 31% of
high achieving teenagers listed in Who's Who Among American High
School Students have actually contemplated suicide, and 4% have at-
tempted it. 172 Furthermore, 71% of those surveyed suggested that sui-
cides for this particular age group could be effectively prevented by
teenage/parent suicide awareness programs, counseling in schools,
more direct involvement between parents and teacher-counselors, and
crisis-prevention hot lines. 73 The survey also listed the following fac-
tors as most contributive to suicide:
Feelings of personal worthlessness, 86 percent; feelings of isolation and
169 See Carlson, Is There a Teen Suicide Crisis?: Or Are Social Scientists After More
Federal Research Funds?, Wash. Post, Jan. 25, 1987, at B5, col. 1; Del Bello, Needed:
A U.S. Commission on Teen-Age Suicide, N.Y. Times, Sept. 12, 1984, at A31, col. 1;
see also Gelman & Gangelhoff, Teen-Age Suicide in the Sun Belt, NEWSWEEK, Aug.
15, 1983, at 70 (stating that every year approximately 5,000 teenagers kill themselves
and as many as half a million more attempt the act, corresponding to a 300% increase
in adolescent suicides since 1955).
170 Carlson, supra note 169, at B5, col. 1. See generally Murdoch, Gay Youths'
Deadly Despair: High Rate of Suicide Attempts Tracked, Wash. Post, Oct. 24, 1988, at
1, col. 5.
171 Id.
172 McCormack, High-Achieving Teen-Agers Tell of Considering Suicide, Wash.
Post, Sept. 14, 1986, at A7, col. 1. A Stanford University psychiatrist, Dr. Vincent
D'Andrea, has found that each year 15 out of every 100,000 students kill themselves,
and that 1 in 10 suicide attempts succeed. PARADE, Oct. 23, 1983, at 8.
173 McCormack, supra note 172, at A7, col. 1; see also Kehr, Perspective: Teen
Suicide, Wash. Post, Sept. 13, 1983, at B5, col. 1; Morse, Schooling Kids on Suicide
Prevention, Wash. Post, Oct. 12, 1984, at C5, col. 2.
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loneliness, 81 percent; pressure to achieve, 72 percent; fear of failure, 61
percent; drug and alcohol use, 58 percent; communication with parents, 58
percent; actual failure, 56 percent; lack of attention from parents, 50 per-
cent; lack of stability in the family, 49 percent; fear for personal future, 41
percent; unwanted pregnancy, 32 percent; parental divorce, 24 percent,
sexual problems, 23 percent; financial concerns, 14 percent.
174
When four Bergenfield, New Jersey, youths successfully committed a
pact suicide, wide national news coverage of this event "seems to have
had a strong impact on other teenagers,' '17 for there were thirty-five
similarly related cases during the succeeding four weeks. 76 Research
undertaken at the University of California at San Diego of more than
12,500 teenage suicides between 1973 and 1979 found that " 'the na-
tional rate of suicide among teen-agers rises significantly just after tele-
vision news or feature stories about suicide,' with the increase propor-
tional to the amount of network coverage.' 1 77 A similarly focused study
restricted to the greater New York City area found that in the weeks
following the airing of three television fictional movies on the subject of
suicide, both suicide attempts and actual completions increased.
7
1
174 McCormack, supra note 172, at A7, col. 1; see Peck, Towards a Theory of Sui-
cide: The Case for Modern Fatalism, 11 OMEGA 1 (1980-81). In analyzing case histo-
ries and suicides of 132 people between the 12 and 34, Peck observed that almost one-
third of youths feel suicide victims were found to have experienced fatalistic thought
(e.g., one's destiny is determined, and she is powerless to effect change). See id.; see
also A. PARKER, SUICIDE AMONG YOUNG ADULTS (1974); E. SHNEIDMAN, DEATH
AND THE COLLEGE STUDENT (1972).
171 Streitfield, The Aftermath of Suicides: Attention Must Be Paid, but How Much
and at What Price?, Wash. Post, May 25, 1987, at C5, col. 1. Cobb County in At-
lanta, Georgia, has become part of a "suicide cluster" afflicting half a dozen United
States communities, with 9 having a 33% higher suicide rate than the national average.
TIME, Nov. 14, 1988, at 29.
176 Streitfield, supra note 175, at C5, col. 1; see also Dobbs, Four N.J. Teenagers
Commit Suicide, Wash. Post, Mar. 12, 1987, at A3, col. 3; Illinois Suicides Similar to
New Jersey Teen-Agers, Wash. Post, Mar. 14, 1987, at A3, col. 1.
177 Russell, Teen-Age Suicides Linked to TV Coverage of Subject, Wash. Post, Sept.
11, 1986, at A3, col. 5.
178 See id.; see also Phillips & Carstensen, Clustering of Teenage Suicides After
Television Stories about Suicide, 315 NEw ENG. J.' MED. 685 (1986).
In a case brought in Ft. Lauderdale, Florida, a mother was found guilty of child
abuse after her daughter's suicide and sentenced to one year in prison, two years of
community control, and three years of probation. See Colburn, "Psychological Au-
topsy" in the Courtroom, Wash. Post Health Mag., Apr. 19, 1988, at 13, col. 1. This
case was not only the first reported case of child abuse charges after a child's suicide,
but also the first time a "psychological autopsy" was admitted as evidence in a criminal
trial. Id. The court found that the suicidee was forced by her mother to be a nude
dancer and was so exploited that her condition in life became hopeless. Id.
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Some commentators suggest that suicide "contagions" and "clusters"
can be prevented by presenting suicide news stories in a negative, even
gruesome manner instead of in a neutral or sympathetic posture. 179
Since front-page stories may have a more significant impact on its read-
ers, 180 front-page coverage of suicides should be written to suggest that
the suicidee should have sought counseling from a counselor or
friend. 8'
If a teenager believes that death would be beneficial, should society
recognize the right to end her life with assistance or autonomously? It
has been suggested that for teenagers with either catastrophic illnesses
or severe mental impairments, this right of self-determination should be
preserved.'82 Obviously, if the recognition of such a right were con-
ferred upon unemancipated teenagers, it should be fashioned in the
same manner as if the right had been given to an incompetent. Either a
family member or a close personal friend would be given the legal re-
sponsibility to determine whether actions of enlightened self-determina-
tion should be undertaken. Naturally, any action taken by the teen-
ager's legal representative would be taken in concert with the attending
physician. For emancipated teenagers, their status would be akin to
that of any other competent individuals. Thus, under present law, they
would be allowed to refuse treatment. The mechanisms for promoting
or implementing this policy of enlightened self-determination will be
developed in Parts IV and V of this Article.
Findings contradict about imitative suicide following motion pictures. In a current
study drawing from a nationwide sample of suicide cases, the results indicated no evi-
dence of increased numbers of suicides after the broadcast of three movies: "A Reason
to Live," "Surviving" and "A Desperate Existence." See Berman, Fictional Depiction
of Suicide in Television Films and Imitation Effects, 145 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 982
(1988). However, some support was interestingly found for an imitation effect in "Sur-
viving" (where carbon monoxide poisoning was the leading actor's method of suicide)
when, during a four-week period, a significant increase in suicides by youths 24 years
and younger was recorded after the movie's showing. See id. Finally, to the extent that
fictional presentations of suicide may, in fact, serve as stimuli for imitative behavior, the
effect apparently depends upon complex interactions among characteristics of the stim-
ulus, the observer of that stimulus, as well as conditions of time and geography. See id.
at 985.
179 See Streitfield, supra note 175, at C5, col. 1.
180 Id.
181 Id.
182 See Price, Pro-Suicide Activists Call for Right to Assist, Wash. Times, Mar. 13,
1987, at 6A, col. 2 (quoting Professor Margaret P. Battin, University of Utah).
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C. Indirect Self-Destructive Behaviors
Indirect self-destructive behavior comes in many forms: hyper-obe-
sity, smoking, drug and alcohol addiction (substance abuse), motorcycle
and auto racing, and skydiving. 183 This type of overt behavior distin-
guishes itself from direct self-destruction by two specific criteria: time
and awareness. Thus, since the effect of this indirect behavior is long
range and spans a period of years, people exhibiting the behavior pat-
tern are either unaware of the effects of their actions or simply do not
care. However, in no case do they consider themselves a suicidee nor
does society seek to commit them involuntarily for restraint of these
actions.18 4
The concept of indirect self-destructive behavior, then, is so broad
that it embraces a continuum of escalating danger, which begins with
self-punishment for minor risks and ends with more serious injuries
ultimately leading to death.' Yet, its essential function is to "deny
helplessness and replace it with coping mechanisms that in theory en-
hance self-esteem."1 86 Accordingly, cigarette smoking may create a feel-
ing of reinforced security yet still permit "one to spit smoke in the face
of the world."'18 7 It has been suggested that to some degree all individu-
als seek to deny their utter helplessness against bad luck, fate, and
death by indulging in some form of indirect self-destructive behavior.
Naturally, society bears the ultimate cost of such indulgent behavior.'88
Generally, indirect self-destruction proceeds so slowly that it is often
ignored. An individual may damage herself by overeating, seeking
stress, neglecting physical fitness, excessively drinking alcohol, or choos-
ing to forego treatment when an illness is contracted.'89 Moreover, alco-
holism and drug addiction have been characterized simply as forms of
"slow suicide."' 90
113 Farberow, Indirect Self-Destructive Behavior: Classification and Characteristics,
in THE MANY FACES OF SUICIDE 15, 19 (N. Farberow ed. 1980). Other destructive
behaviors include mountain climbing, scuba diving, hand gliding, trapeze performing in
circuses, acting as stuntmen, boat racing, and playing violent contact sports such as
boxing. Id.
184 Id. at 17.
185 See Litman, Psychodynamics of Indirect Self-Destructive Behavior, in THE
MANY FACES OF SUICIDE, supra note 183, at 28.
186 Id. at 39.
187 Id.
188 See id.
189 Achte, The Psychopathology of Indirect Self-Destruction, in THE MANY FACES
OF SUICIDE, supra note 183, at 41.
190 Id. at 51; see also D. DE CANTANZO, supra note 43, at 20.
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In the pursuit of pleasure, many young males have participated in
high-risk sports which yield high mortality figures. Although reliable
statistics are difficult to obtain which document both the frequency of
injuries and fatalities for the fifteen to forty year old age group, the
Metropolitan Life Insurance Company has compiled some interesting
statistics. 9 ' In 1976, out of a total 400,000 recorded motor vehicle rac-
ing drivers, 145,000 were drag racers, 115,000 motorcycle racers, and
28,000 stock car racers. From 1967 to 1976, 436 fatalities from motor-
vehicle racing were recorded: 104 from stock car racing, 77 from motor-
cycle racing, and 74 from automobile drag racing. Interestingly, during
approximately the same period, out of 700 registered balloon pilots,
only 16 fatalities resulted from balloon flying. Thirty thousand people
had delta kites or hang gliders by 1975 and 85 fatalities had resulted
from these flights. It was further estimated that 7% of all hang glider
flights ended either in injury or fatality. In 1973, glider plane pilots
numbered 13,395. From 1960 through 1973, 73 deaths occurred in
glider plane flying. Sport parachuting has drawn over 40,000 people,
with 10 to 12 fatal jumps being made each year. Another report docu-
ments the fact that after sky diving three or more years, 71% of the sky
divers sustained injury. 192 It has been submitted that habitual actions
with cumulative probabilities making it very likely that the individual
undertaking them will die as a consequence could properly be consid-
ered suicidal. 93
Society both encourages and promotes these types of "athletic" or
destructive behaviors. Why are some exercises of rational self-determi-
nation sanctioned and even encouraged for the enhancement of local
and state revenues while others are not? It has been suggested that the
sport-affiliated behaviors provide a type of "psychological service"' 94 to
society in that those participating in various media-hyped high risk
sports fulfill psychological needs for the viewing spectators. 95 Not only
may a spectator participate vicariously with the actual participant but
the spectator may actually "defy, or even experience, death."' 96 One
commentator observes:
191 See Delk, High-Risk Sports as Indirect Self-Destructive Behavior, in THE MANY
FACES OF SUICIDE, supra note 183, at 393, 395.
192 Id. at 395.
193 See D. DE CANTANZO, supra note 43, at 21; see also L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CON-
STITUTIONAL LAW 1371-73 passim (2d ed. 1988) (analyzing governmental interference
with life styles - recreational (motorcycling) and otherwise).
194 Delk, supra note 191, at 406.
191 See id.
196 Id.
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Circus acts, whenever possible, it seems, are labeled "death-defying" to
maximize their appeal to the public. This suggests that the greater the risk
of death to the performer, the more the spectator is attracted to the event.
A very daring but successful "defiance" of death may vicariously impart to
the observer a feeling of elation and well being, and even a momentary
sense of immortality. 9
7
Even though all these self-destructive behavioral actions have a high
adverse economic effect on the public as to the maintenance and exten-
sion of health care for those who pursue these high-risk or suicidal
actions and sustain injuries, little - if any - public effort has been
launched to interfere blatantly or restrict these acts of self-endanger-
ment. Only with the advent of the AIDS epidemic have voices been
raised suggesting a public quarantine of all known carriers of the dis-
ease in an effort to restrict its spread by promiscuous sexual conduct. 198
Surely if a large segment of modern society can be seen as viewing
indirect self-destructive behaviors with ambivalence if not condonation,
hope at least exists for direct forms of enlightened self-determination
through what, traditionally, has been termed voluntary active
euthanasia.
D. Aiding, Assisting, Abetting, or Advising
The first do-it-yourself handbook on suicide, A Guide to Self-Deliv-
erance,199 was published in London by EXIT - The Society for The
Right to Die with Dignity, a forty-five-year-old London-based organi-
zation. 200 Largely because of a subsequent judicial proceeding involving
EXIT, this thirty-two page pamphlet is now distributed to members of
the organization who are at least twenty-five-years-old and who have a
197 Id.
198 See Duncan, Public Policy and the AIDS Epidemic, 2 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L.
& POL'Y 169 (1986). As might be expected, AIDS represents a significant risk factor
for suicide. Marsuk, Tierney, Tardiff, Gross, Morgan, Hsu & Mann, Increased Risk
of Suicide in Persons with AIDS, 259 J. A.M.A. 133 (1988).
The Editor of the Journal of the American Medical Association recently illustrated
circumstances in which life is no longer worth living and thus active euthanasia can be
tolerated. Lundlber, It's Over, Debbie and the Euthanasia Debate, 259 J. A.M.A.
2141, 2142 (1988). He would condone administering a large and fatal overdose of ei-
ther morphine or potassium when a patient suffers "with the acquired immu-
nodeficiency syndrome who has widespread Kaposi's sarcoma, Pneumocystis carinii
pneumonis, and the dementia of cerebral toxoplasmosis." Id.
'99 SOCIETY FOR THE RIGHT TO DIE WITH DIGNITY (EXIT), A GUIDE TO SELF-
DELIVERANCE 1 (1981) [hereafter EXIT GUIDE].
2o See Leo, supra note 22, at 49.
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three-month standing membership. 201 Its basic aim is to assist the
reader in overcoming the fear of death, particularly, in overcoming the
fear of the agony of dying. 202
The pamphlet lists five different methods of suicide or self-deliver-
ance under the headings: "Sedative Drugs and Plastic Bags"; "Drugs
and Car Exhaust"; "Sedative Drugs and Hypothermia"; "Sedative
Drugs and Drowning"; and "Sedative Drugs Alone" (wherein appro-
priate dosages of various drugs and especially sedatives are listed). 203
The pamphlet counsels against acting in haste during periods of de-
pression or loneliness and suggests consultation with Samaritans or
family members.20 4 Before making a final decision concerning self-deliv-
erance, one is cautioned to consider the reasons for undertaking the act
''over a substantial period of time." Factors to consider are whether the
particular problems associated with the decision can be overcome by
seeking medical or other help, or by changing lifestyles and realizing
that an unsuccessful suicide attempt could leave one with a damaged
brain or in worse physical condition than before the suicide attempt. 205
Finally, consideration should be given to the fact that "of those who
survive apparently serious suicide attempts ..., a significant propor-
tion find that they can cope with life after all. '206 If things go awry, if
there are snags in the suggested procedures, or if the information pro-
vided proves incorrect, EXIT encourages the pamphlet reader to report
such matters to EXIT headquarters. 20 7
As an organization, EXIT neither advocates nor does it express dis-
pleasure with suicide. Rather, it maintains a position of neutrality re-
garding such decisions as ones of personal belief or judgment.208 By
advocating a policy of rational self-deliverance, when freely chosen and
appropriate, EXIT believes that the act, itself, should not be taken as
euphemistic. Self-deliverance
201 The Author, after certifying that he did not seek to read the Guide for personal
reasons, but instead only for scholastic research, was allowed to sit in the reading room,
under close observation, of the Radzinowicz Library in the Institute of Criminology at
Cambridge University and take notes. No xerox reproduction of the pamphlet was al-
lowed. A copy of these notes are on file with the U.C. Davis Law Review. Subsequent
page references are to the pamphlet, not to the Author's notes.
202 See EXIT GUIDE, supra note 199, at 1.
203 See id. at 16-23.
204 Id. at 9.
201 Id. at 10.
206 Id.
207 Id. at 15.
2w See id. at 4.
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implies that the person dies by his or her own hand, with a peaceful mind
for reasons that those closest will endorse. They will know that they were
not intended to feel guilt or grief, but rather share sympathetically in a
final display of courage and good sense. No word to express the concept
has existed until now . . . since no one so far has made any effort to
distinguish between the fulfillment of self-deliverance and the tragedy of
other forms of suicide.w9
As a socio-political organization, EXIT's objective is to work for the
enactment into legislation of the previously defeated 1969 Voluntary
Euthanasia Bill by Parliament.210 This Bill would authorize physicians
to administer euthanasia to a patient who thirty days previously exe-
cuted a written declaration requesting euthanasia in the presence of
two witnesses. 21" Two physicians - one of them a consultant - must
certify in writing that the at-risk patient would be or is presently suf-
fering from a painful and incurable physical disease likely to cause se-
vere distress and render the patient incapable of a tolerable existence. 212
Ideally, the declaration would be executed well before the patient's
good health declines and could be cancelled at any time. 213 The Bill's
authors designed the thirty-day waiting period to provide a type of
built-in safeguard against what might be taken either as an impulsive
or a reluctant decision. 214
The Central Criminal Court convicted and sentenced Nicholas Reed,
general secretary of EXIT, for conspiring, aiding and abetting an-
other's suicide with "L". 215 On appeal, the Criminal Division of the
Court of Appeal in London held that Reed neither counseled nor pro-
cured suicide with L either by or through publication and distribution
of The Guide to Self-Deliverance.2 6 Rather, Reed was properly con-
victed because he put L "in touch" with a potential suicide victim
knowing full well that L would assist in the act of suicide if the situa-
tion so demanded. 217 Thus, Reed either aided, abetted, counseled, or
procured a suicide as prohibited by statute and was properly convicted
of conspiracy. 2 8 In reducing Reed's criminal sentence to eighteen
months for the offense, the court refused to accept the mitigation argu-
209 Id. at 6.
210 See id. at 4.
211 Id.
212 Id.
213 Id.
214 Id.
215 R. v. Nicholas Reed, 1982 Grim. App. 819 (providing lower court's decision).
216 Id.
217 Id.
218 Id.
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ment that the agreement between L and Reed was only designed to
promote a fuller understanding of suicide through counseling with indi-
viduals in stressful "at-risk" situations.219 Counseling included both dis-
couraging suicide when feasible and actively participating in its com-
pletion depending upon an assessment of the most appropriate course of
action.220 The court reasoned that regardless of the alternative or condi-
tional nature of the agreement, the obvious intention was still to con-
spire to aid or abet a suicide. 221
In Attorney General v. Able,222 the Attorney General sought to halve
the distribution of the same pamphlet by applying for a declaration that
future supplies of the booklet to those who were known to be - or
were likely to be - considering or intending to commit suicide consti-
tuted an offense under Section 2(1) of The Suicide Act of 1961,223 of
aiding, abetting, counseling or procuring the suicide of another.224 The
Attorney General was alarmed because some 8,000 requested copies of
the manual had been sold to EXIT members and the pamphlet's popu-
larity was increasing. 225 The Attorney General chose the civil action
rather than criminal prosecution because the members of EXIT's exec-
utive committee "were respectable persons and had issued the booklet
out of genuine and strong held beliefs. 226
After reviewing the pamphlet's contents at length, the court refused
the application for the declaration and concluded that while the distri-
bution of the pamphlet could be an offense, before such a conclusion
could be reached,
it must at least be proved (a) that the alleged offender had the necessary
intent, that is he intended that that person would be assisted by the book-
let's contents, or otherwise encouraged to take or to attempt to take his
own life; (b) that while he still had that intention he distributed the book-
let to such a person who read it; and (c) in addition, if an offense under S
2 of the 1961 Act is to be proved, that such a person was assisted or
encouraged by so reading the booklet to take or attempt to take his own
life, otherwise the alleged offender cannot be guilty of more than an
attempt. 227
Thus, the court held that no offense under the Suicide Act of 1961 had
219 Id. at 819-20.
220 Id.
221 Id.
222 Attorney General v. Able, 1984 All E.R. 277.
223 9 & 10 Eliz. 2, ch. 60 (1961).
224 Able, 1984 All E.R. 277.
225 Id.
226 Id.
227 Id. at 288.
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been committed.22
The Suicide Act of 1961 abolished not only the crime of suicide,29
but also the crime of attempted suicide.230 But, interestingly, the Act
does not entirely erase either the former religious prohibition of suicide
as immoral nor disregard the common law that held anyone who either
incited or assisted another to commit suicide was herself guilty of abet-
ting a crime. 231 Therefore, the Suicide Act "in effect continues the old
law by making it a statutory crime to aid, abet, counsel or procure a
suicide or attempted suicide. '232 Notwithstanding the symbol or legacy
of immorality that still attaches to the Act's "on-record" 233 validity, the
actual practice of its enforcement is so light that but one or two prose-
cutions a year are made, yielding only a suspended sentence or
probation. 234
The social and religious standards that hold suicide immoral prevent
the law from dealing forthrightly with the dilemma. The law's resolu-
tion allows one to commit suicide legally, yet prohibits aid by another
in completing the act. 235 This "old-fashioned" manner of thinking de-
values enlightened acts of self-determination for perceived theological
harmony. This presents untold problems for incurably disabled but
competent individuals who desperately need assistance in ending their
travail with a semblance of dignity and compassion.
Two French authors, Claude Guillon and Yves le Bonniec, both
members of the French Association for the Right to Die in Dignity
(ADMD), co-authored Suicide: Operating Instructions.236 Acclaimed
as a best seller, the book aims to present a number of nonviolent death
alternatives "which do not degrade human dignity ... by giving people
the possibility of dying by methods less atrocious than the classic ones
of razor blades, revolvers or hanging. '237 A prominent psychiatrist at a
major Parisian hospital countered by stating, "Nine out of 10 people
need help to be taught how to live, not how to die. 238
228 Id.
229 9 & 10 Eliz. 2, ch. 60 (1961).
230 G. WILLIAMS, TEXTBOOK OF CRIMINAL LAW 530 (1978).
231 Id.
232 Id.
233 Id.
234 Id. at 530-31.
231 See id. at 531.
236 Id.; Maubouche, Final Choices: Popular Suicide Guide Enrages the French,
Wash. Post, Sept. 6, 1982, at C1, col. 6.
237 G. WILLIAMS, supra note 230, at 531.
238 Id.
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Derek Humphry helped to organize HEMLOCK, an organization
dedicated to supporting the right of terminally ill individuals to take
their own lives.2 39 In addition, he is the author of two novels on suicide.
In Jean's Way,214 he relates how he assisted his terminally ill wife in
committing suicide.24' His second book, Let Me Die Before I Wake, 242 is
an effort to analyze case histories of terminally ill patients who sought
successfully to end their lives.243 In the process of relating the successes,
precise drug dose information is listed for any readers wishing to follow
through themselves. 244 As a pro-choice society, HEMLOCK "'does not
encourage people to die; we encourage them to hang on for as long as
possible.' But . . . 'if for medical reasons life becomes unbearable, self-
deliverance is a civil right that patients should have.' "245
In the United States, the First Amendment to the Constitution pro-
tects the "right to receive ideas," 246 even though the information re-
ceived may disclose effective and painless ways of ending one's life.247
However, the state may restrict the area of distribution and the manner
of solicitation of such literature.24 Although assisting suicide is still a
crime in a number of states,249 the power and force of the First Amend-
ment is such that suicide manuals could not be suppressed.250 The First
Amendment right prevails even though there is widespread concern that
an unchecked distribution of suicide manuals might put those individu-
als who are depressed or suicidal "over the brink."' 251 In Brandenburg
v. Ohio,252 in a concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Douglas summed up
the central dilemma of First Amendment mandates and state interfer-
ence by stating that: "The line between what is permissible and not
239 See Podgers, supra note 34, at 1499.
240 D. HUMPHRY, JEAN'S WAY (1987).
241 See id.
242 D. HUMPHRY, LET ME DIE BEFORE I WAKE (1986).
243 See id.
244 See Blake, supra note 167, at 85.
245 Podgers, supra note 34, at 1499.
246 Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943). See generally J. NOWAK,
R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW ch. 18 (2d ed. 1983) (discussing
freedom of speech).
247 See J. ROBERTSON, THE RIGHTS OF THE CRITICALLY ILL 30 (1983).
248 See, e.g., Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S.
640 (1981).
249 See supra notes 106-118 and accompanying text; see also J. ROBERTSON, supra
note 247, at 29, 30.
250 See supra notes 246-47 and accompanying text,
251 See supra note 244 and accompanying text.
252 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
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subject to control and what may be made impermissible and subject to
regulation is the line between ideas and overt acts. 25 3 In the Court's
per curiam opinion, it was stated that the only reason for allowing an
interference with free speech and the free press would be when the use
of force or violation of the law, "is directed to inciting or producing
imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such ac-
tion. 'z54 The publication, sale, and distribution of a suicide manual of
the type distributed by EXIT would not fall within the Brandenburg
exception because such a manual does not advocate "imminent lawless
action."2 5 First, the action is not lawless since suicide has been
decriminalized and assisted suicides are seldom prosecuted with vigor.
Second, mere publication does not strike a chord of immediacy since a((once over" perusal would not normally produce or give rise in people
to precipitous action; rather reflecting upon it, as well as other sources,
would occur over time.256
Even though state legislation prohibits assisting others in their acts of
suicide, 257 and such assistance is theoretically prosecutable under gen-
eral homicide statutes, 258 in fact, the enforcement and prosecution of
253 Id. at 456.
254 Id. at 447.
255 Euthanasia: Criminal, Tort, Constitutional and Legislative Considerations,
supra note 34, at 1206.
256 See G. WILLIAMS, supra note 230, ch. 14, § 11. A similar "moral" problem
exists with the free distribution, without prosecution, of terrorist manuals that describe
how bridges may be demolished and human lives thus brought into chaos.
257 See supra notes 106-18 and accompanying text.
In Texas as early as 1902, a state court determined that since suicide was not illegal,
aiding a suicide could not be a criminal act. See Grace v. State, 44 Tex. Grim. 193,
194, 69 S.W. 529, 530 (1902).
In 1908 the same court held that suicide assistance must be passive - not active -
to be a defense to murder. See Sanders v. State, 54 Tex. Grim. 101, 112 S.W. 68
(1908). Accordingly, shooting an individual upon request would equate with active
homicide for which the acting party would be charged with first degree murder. Id. at
105, 112 S.W. at 70.
In a 1901 New Jersey case, a court held that since suicide was not a crime, the
public good would not prevent one from taking a life that "may be worthless to the
public." Campbell v. Supreme Conclave Improved Order of Heptasophs, 66 N.J.L.
274, 49 A. 550, 553 (1901). But see State v. Ehlers, 98 N.J.L. 236, 238. 119 A. 15, 17
(1922) (attempted suicide a punishable act).
25 See Comment, The Right to Die, 7 Hous. L. REV. 654, 656 (1970). In State v.
Cobb, 229 Kan. 522, 625 P.2d 1133 (1981), the Kansas Supreme Court sustained a
first degree murder conviction of the defendant who, acting upon the decedent's request,
injected him with an overdose of cocaine and then proceeded to shoot him. In Australia,
aiding and abetting the death of another by her own hand is a crime punished as
homicide. See Sharma, Euthanasia in Australasia, 2 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. &
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these acts is negligible.25 9 Yet, again, in theory these acts of assistance
could be classified as involuntary manslaughter,2 60 coercion, 261 general
recklessness,262 or criminal negligence. 263 As to the issue of remoteness
of actions imposing liability, the Model Penal Code requires the actual
result to involve a kind of harm or injury that is not remote or acciden-
tal,264 or - if reckless or negligently induced - "not within the risk of
which the actor is aware, or in the case of negligence, of which he
should be aware .... "265
[W]hat will usually turn on the determination [of whether the defendant
caused the result] will not be the criminality of defendant's conduct but
rather the gravity of his offense. Since the actor, by hypothesis, has sought
to cause a criminal result or has been reckless or negligent with respect to
such a result, he will be guilty of some crime under a well-considered
penal code even if he is not held for the actual result, i.e. he will be guilty
POL'Y 131, 139 (1986). In 1986 Rosewell Gilbert, 75, was sentenced to life imprison-
ment for the premeditated murder of his 51-year-old wife. Gilbert v. State, 487 So. 2d
1185 (Fla. 1986). He shot her twice in the head, thereby seeking to end her painful
and progressively degenerative conditions of osteoporosis and Alzeheimer's disease. Id.
259 See Euthanasia: Criminal, Tort, Constitutional and Legislative Considerations,
supra note 34, at 1206; see also Vesey, She Wanted to Die, So He Killed Her: Man
Gets Probation as Dead Woman's Family Praises His Devotion, Wash. Post, Nov. 24,
1985, at 1, col. 1 (Maryland woman decided to kill herself, gave gun to her friend, and
asked him to pull the trigger).
260 See Annotation, Manslaughter - Person Liable, 95 A.L.R. 2d 175, 191 passim
(1964) (person other than actor liable for manslaughter); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-
1103 (1978); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-104 (1978); CONN. GENq. STAT. ANN. § 53a-
56 (1981); ORE. REV. STAT. § 163.125 (1983); see also Regina v. Creamer, 3 All E.R.
257 (Crim. App. 1965). In Creamer the court determined: "A man is guilty of involun-
tary manslaughter when he intends an unlawful act and one likely to do harm to the
person and death results which was neither foreseen nor intended. It is the accident of
death resulting which makes him guilty of manslaughter as opposed to some lesser
offence, such as assault ...." Id. at 262.
261 See, e.g., Stephenson v. State, 205 Ind. 141, 179 N.E. 633 (1932). In Stephenson
the defendant shamed and disgraced a female companion into a (coerced) suicide that
amounted to murder. Id. After the female companion was subjected to two days of
various sexual perversions, she bought six tablets of bichloride of mercury and ingested
them in an effort to commit suicide. Id. She was initially unsuccessful in this act, but
ten days later she died - apparently of a combination of shock, loss of food and rest, a
reaction to the poison, and infection and lack of proper treatment. Id.
262 See, e.g., J. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 115, 123, 131-33
(2d ed. 1960). Charges of recklessness may arise even though the actor believed that
harm would not occur, is indifferent whether or not it occurs, or, traditionally, is
grossly ignorant or criminally inattentive to her actions. Id. at 115, 123.
263 See id. at 114, 116, 120, 127.
264 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.03(2)(b) (Official Draft 1962).
265 Id. § 2.03(3).
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of attempt, assault or some offense involving risk creation .. . .Thus the
issue in penal law is very different than in torts. Only in form is it, in
penal law, a question of the actor's liability. In substance, it is a question
of the severity of sentence which the Court is authorized or obliged to
impose.266
The concept of assisted rational suicide, or the right of terminally ill
patients to take their own life, is being accepted more and more by both
the legal and medical professions.267 One prominent Los Angeles attor-
ney has observed that state laws which classify attempted suicide as a
crime have been eliminated for the most part and that there is a grow-
ing movement to reform the laws against aiding or abetting suicide.2 68
Because of the plethora of complex moral and ethical questions
raised under suicide-assistance laws, prosecutors are generally reluctant
to bring strong actions under them. 269 A member of the New York
County District Attorney's office in Manhattan observed that a case-
by-case method is used to evaluate suicide incidents brought under spe-
cific state laws prohibiting either aiding or abetting suicide.270 He
stated: "Incidents in which persons may have questionable motives such
as financial gain, for encouraging or assisting another person's suicide
...are the type of case we'd be likely to prosecute. '271 He continued
by noting that for cases involving terminally ill patients, prosecutions
are less likely to be maintained simply because the courts appear reluc-
tant "to convict defendants when the moral issues of mercy and the
patient's privacy rights are involved. '2 72
A former Chairman of the American Medical Association's Ad Hoc
Council on Medical Ethics acknowledged recently that a physician
must recognize that after advising a patient regarding the prognosis of
her disease, the patient has a right to decide what course of treatment
will follow, including the choice of suicide.273 Perhaps somewhat over-
stating the matter, he concluded, "The day of paternalism of the profes-
sion is long since gone. '274
266 Id. § 2.03 comments at 133-34 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
267 See Podgers, supra note 34, at 1500-01.
26 See id. at 1501.
269 See id.
270 See id.
271 Id.
272 Id. Over the last 25 years or so, both suicide and attempted suicide have lost the
status of crimes. G. GRISEZ & J. BOYLE, JR., supra note 14, at 122.
273 See Podgers, supra note 34, at 1501.
274 Id.; see also Appelbaum & Roth, Patients Who Refuse Treatment in Medical
Hospitals, 250 J. A.M.A. 1296 (1983); McKegney. & Lange, The Decision to No
Longer Live on Chronic Hemodialysis, 128 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 267 (1971).
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The compelling state interest to prevent assisted suicide is quite weak
when the act is undertaken because of a terminal or severely handicap-
ping illness, but admittedly more tenable when a decision to undertake
suicide is made when death is not imminent. The state has persuasive
arguments to see that its citizens remain healthy, care for their depen-
dents and honor their contracts to fulfill binding legal obligations. 275
Yet, the most humane and practical manner in which to deal with the
immediate conundrum is to have suicide and aiding and abetting its
execution defined statutorily as noncriminal. 276
The purpose of such model legislation would be to allow competent,
but incapacitated and terminally ill citizens, to end their lives. Such a
uniform legislative declaration would allow those lacking capacity, ow-
ing to infancy, mental incompetence or unconsciousness, to utilize the
protections of surrogate decision making and exercise the same liberty
as their competent fellow citizens.
With regard to the competent decision maker, the states should enact
legislation making it lawful for any individual to furnish another
equally competent individual "with the means to commit suicide so
long as the person committing suicide takes the last definite step to
initiate the suicidal act." 277 Under such a legislative design, not only a
physician - but anyone for that matter - would be allowed to make
available to the individual desiring suicide the means to effectuate the
act. In the absence of coercion, the competence of the individual com-
mitting the suicide should be recognized as a defense against civil liabil-
ity for those assisting with the act. A mandatory, formal witness decla-
ration prior to an assisted suicide might provide an additional
precaution against foul play "masquerading as an assisted suicide." 27
Absent a bold and imaginative legislative plan of action among the
states, it will remain for the courts to be brought more and more into
275 See Engelhardt & Malloy, supra note 34, at 1021. The Georgia Supreme Court
interestingly ruled that based on the constitutional right of privacy (and on denial of
medical treatment cases) a prisoner could starve himself to death and the state had no
right to destroy such a person's will by frustrating his attempt to die to make a point or
to make a statement. See Zant v. Prevatte, 248 Ga. 832, 834, 286 S.E. 2d 715, 717
(1982).
276 See Englehart & Malloy, supra note 34, at 1037. One commentator has argued
that although attempted suicide should be recognized as a crime, it should not always
be treated as such. See C. RICE, supra note 15, at 81. Instead, the courts should assert
a power to drop the criminal charge and require the defendant to undergo psychiatric
and medical treatment. See id.
277 Englehart & Malloy, supra note 34, at 1037.
278 Id.
[Vol. 22:275
1989] Suicide or Self-Determination? 313
the deliberative decision making process here and thereby intrude not
only into the confidentiality of the doctor-patient relationship and pa-
tient autonomy, but familial privacy and independence as well.279
E. Suicide Prevention and Management
One line of reasoning holds that an act of suicide can never be "cho-
sen" since overwhelming compulsions make a free choice at best nuga-
tory, if not totally void.280 Accordingly, "no human being, no matter
how determined he or she may seem to be to put an end to life, does
not somewhere cherish the hope of being saved." '2' 1 Thus, the aim of
suicide prevention and management is not directed toward reducing su-
icide rates, but to helping distressed "at-risk" individuals find an ave-
hue of self-realization and human dignity rather than of failure.2 2 In
essence, through the efforts to implement the goals of a prevention pro-
gram, suicide prevention transcends itself into "courageous humane-
ness" where men and women come together in a sincere effort to serve
others and seek to "implement humane thinking. '28 3 In a word, suicide
prevention is "crisis intervention. '284
Counseling and professional psychiatric therapy form the corner-
stones of an effective suicide prevention program. 285 Detoxification cen-
ters, convalescent centers, particularly for alcoholics, and follow-up care
facilities are also utilized. 286 Without question, the most effective lay
program was started in 1953 by a London Anglican priest who simply
used the telephone'to communicate with despondent, friendless people
279 See generally Williams, The Right to Die, 134 NEW L.J. 73 (1984); Williams,
The Right to Commit Suicide, in MORAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE 388 (S. Gorovitz
ed. 1976). Professor Williams observes, "It is still not fully recognized that everyone
has not merely a legal but a moral right to drink the hemlock, so far as society in
general is concerned." Id.
280 See Ringel, Suicide Prevention and the Value of Human Life, in PHILOSOPHI-
CAL IssuEs, supra note 10, at 206.
281 Id.
282 See id. at 207-08.
283 Id. at 209.
284 Id. at 210; see also Garrard, Community Suicide-Prevention Activities: Greens-
boro, North Carolina, in DIAGNOSIS AND MANAGEMENT, supra note 155, at 399;
Resnik, A Community Antisuicide Organization: The Friends of Dade County Flor-
ida, in DIAGNOSIS AND MANAGEMENT, supra note 155, at 416; Shneidman &
Farberow, The Suicide Prevention Center of Los Angeles, in DIAGNOSIS AND MAN-
AGEMENT, supra note 155, at 367.
285 Ringel, supra note 280, at 210.
286 Id.
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contemplating suicide.28 7 Since then, the organization, called "The
Samaritans," has become more professional as well as more successful
than ever before imagined. 28
The underlying principle of the success of The Samaritans is that of
simply offering friendship by ordinary people to ordinary people, with
no strings attached.28 9 The befriender expects neither material reward
nor gratitude for her work. Should the client wish to unburden herself,
the befriender listens as a friend, and may introduce her to a new circle
of friends.29 The reintegration of anomic people into society is one of
the befriender's primary tasks. 291 The extent of the period of befriend-
ment can be short or long termed. For example, helping an acute reac-
tive depressive through one crisis period would give rise to a relatively
short period of befriending, while dealing with a schizophrenic might
well extend over a period of time. To prevent an emotional attachment
or involvement by the initially untrained befriender with a client, The
Samaritans offer a closely supervised training program that places ab-
solute control with each branch director of a Samaritan chapter. 292
Thus, The Samaritans take a totally advisory, as opposed to directoral,
approach to their work.2 93
Interestingly, by rendering the service of advice, oftentimes one may
cure another's problem during the course of advising.
Loneliness and the absence of human affection are states which exacerbate
any other problems; disappointment, reduction to poverty, etc., seem less
impossible to bear in the presence of the affection of another. Hence sim-
ply to be a friend, or to find someone a friend, may be the largest contri-
bution one can make either to helping a person be rational or see clearly
what is rational for him to do; this service may make one who was con-
templating suicide feel that there is now a future for him which is possible
to face. 9"
Organized efforts directed toward suicide prevention began at the
287 See Fox, The Samaritans, in DIAGNOSIS AND MANAGEMENT, supra note 155, at
405.
288 Id.
289 Id.
290 Id.
291 Id.
292 Id. at 406.
293 Fox, The Recent Decline of Suicide in Britain: The Role of the Samaritan Sui-
cide Prevention Movement, in CONTEMPORARY DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 22, at
504, 512 passim. See generally Stengel, Lay Organizations and Suicide Prevention, in
THE SAMARITANS 107 (C. Varah ed. 1965).
294 Brandt, supra note 22, at 399.
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turn of the century.2 95 Perhaps the very first such organization, the
Lemberger Freiwilligen Rettungsgesellschaft (Lemberg Volunteer Res-
cue Society) existed in Germany from 1893 to 1906.296 The organiza-
tion's volunteers offered aid to not only suicide and attempted suicide
cases, but provided other types of emergency service as well. 297 A coun-
terpart organization was also founded in Budapest, Hungary. 298
The aftermath of World War I, which brought widespread hunger
and financial chaos throughout Europe, was also the setting for the
development of preventive clinics designed to cope with the Lebensmud-
den in Vienna. 299 The outpouring from people who asked to be pro-
tected from their "own desperate thoughts" was significant. 3°° Indeed,
one distinguished commentator noted that "[tloken human contact could
prevent the fatal act in ninety percent of the cases" of suicide. 30'
In the United States, suicide prevention centers were not started until
after World War 11.302 Indeed, in 1958, the first publicly supported
suicide prevention center organized to deal "with the important other-
than-purely-medical aspects of individual suicide attempts' 30 3 was
funded by the United States Public Health Service and administered by
the University of Southern California in the Los Angeles community.3 4
Today, a vast network of counseling services is offered by various
church and volunteer organizations. 305 The National Institute of
Mental Health has been successful in showing suicide to be both a
health and a social problem and, at the same time, instilling a commit-
ment within mental health leaders to better understand and control
it.306 Yet, if this commitment is to be totally realized, a sound financial
25 Farberow & Shneidman, A Survey of Agencies for the Prevention of Suicide, in
THE CRY FOR HELP 136, 137 (N. Farberow & E. Shneidman eds. 1961).
296 Id.
297 Id.
298 Id.
299 See J. MEERLOO, supra note 18, at 137; see also Ringel, supra note 280, at 381.
See generally P. MANDELKORN, HOW TO PREVENT SUICIDE (1967).
'0 J. MEERLOO, supra note 18, at 137.
301 Id.
302 Shneidman, Farberow & Litman, The Suicide Prevention Center, in THE CRY
FOR HELP, supra note 295, at 6.
303 Id.
3 Id.; see Schulman, supra note 120, at 860-62.
101 McGee, The Volunteer Suicidologist: Current Status and Future Prospects, in
CONTEMPORARY DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 22, at 480, 481.; see also Neimeyer &
Dingemans, Death Orientation in the Suicide Intervention Worker, 11 OMEGA 15
(1980-1981).
-0 See McGee, supra note 305, at 480.
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basis must be established nationally to support the suicide prevention
centers. Volunteer and church-supported projects are not enough. Ide-
ally, suicide prevention should be assumed by local communities with
financial support budgeted in the same manner as other mental health
clinics and other governmental health programs. Indeed, in an effort to
provide continuity of operation, in the future, suicide prevention centers
will likely maintain themselves and function through comprehensive
mental health clinics.07
1. Involuntary Psychiatric Commitments
Although the criminal laws in some states allow suicides and at-
tempted suicides to be punished, in actuality, convictions under them
are infrequent. 308 Yet for persons believed to be suicidal, civil commit-
ment procedures still enjoy support. 09 For those considered mentally
ill, dangerous to themselves, or in need of either care or treatment, state
mental health laws authorize both long-term commitment by way of
hospitalization or institutionalization.310 State legislation also allows for
emergency detention in order to prevent suicide.31'
Most commitment statutes exercise a form of benevolent coercion
designed as such to prevent self-injury by suicide. Frequently, these
statutes not only specify that the defendant must be viewed as danger-
ous to herself if not committed, but also that she must be adjudged
mentally ill. Occasionally a statutory specification directs the danger-
ousness be a consequence of the mental illness.1 2 All too often today
questions concerning mental illness are decided by physicians using
standard psychiatric classifications which they apply with uncertainty.
Moreover, a physician may even apply her own personal moral judg-
ment of the lifestyles of the defendants or even lay notions of mental
health.31 3 Complex questions of causation are not considered or confus-
ingly applied since the working assumption made is "that dangerous-
310 See id. at 481.
See Greenberg, Involuntary Psychiatric Commitments to Prevent Suicide, 49
N.Y.U. L. REV. 227 (1974); see also Marzen, O'Dowd, Crone & Balch, supra note
86, at 1; Podgers, supra note 34, at 1501.
See Greenberg, supra note 308, at 229. See generally Roth, Dayley & Lerner,
Into the Abyss: Psychiatric Reliability and Emergency Commitment Statutes, 13 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 400, 412-15 (1973).
310 Greenberg, supra note 308, at 229.
311 Id.
312 See id. at 233.
313 See id. at 234.
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ness and mental illness imply one another. 314
The argument that suicide is harmful must ultimately be rejected as
specious. Nothing concrete is known of the fate that befalls one who
takes her own life. Practically, it is surely within the realm of imagina-
tion to posit a case in which suicide could well be recognized as the
lesser of two evils - as when one commits the act either to escape
excruciating pain or to be relieved of a terminal illness. Furthermore,
under certain conditions, society has shown a more willing condonation
or acceptance of suicides: to prevent enemies of the state from obtaining
national secrets, to end a desolate and tedious life, to preserve personal
or family honor, or to publicize a grave personal or political injustice. 315
Other case studies reveal that an act of suicide may appear to the
outside viewer as an act clearly disproportionate to the precipitating
cause.3 16 Attempts at suicide rooted in deep guilt feelings over social
experiences that seem insignificant to others comprise one such exam-
ple. It is quite difficult to remember that distress is subjective. Thus,
although a nonparticipant may view a stress engendering situation as
within the parameters of tolerable distress, this in no way may serve to
mitigate the real anguish of the individual who, feeling life intolerable,
ends it herself by suicide. 317
Because of a basic misunderstanding, then, of the personal circum-
stances that give rise to each suicide and a common tendency to project
one's health or well-adjusted attitude to a life situation, society con-
cludes that suicide is undesirable. Furthermore, suicide is both unchris-
tian and atheistic since absolute despair is totally inconsistent with faith
in God.3"' Again, "if one is coping well and observes that most others
cope well, one may not be able to understand the behavior of those not
coping well. ' '319 Thus, in learning of suicides, the conclusion is inevita-
bly made by the average ordinary "reasonable" person that the act is
always totally irrational and indeed, undesirable. 320
Preventing suicides means someone else is making a decision that a
potential suicide attempter is better off suffering alive than dead.321 The
right to die must be viewed as an extension of the right to live with
dignity. Otherwise, the right is nothing more than a hollow principle if
314 Id.
311 See id. at 232.
316 Id.
317 See id.
318 See generally D. DE CANTANZO, supra note 43, ch. 11.
319 Id. at 142.
320 d.
321 See Greenberg, supra note 308, at 233.
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others may first determine whether the act is reasonable or appropri-
ate.3 22 "While it may seem anomalous to speak of a 'right to die,' the
infringement of this right seriously jeopardizes the right to live one's
life as one wishes, and not to live it when it is no longer possible to do
so as one wishes. 323
There is much current debate over the scope and need for involun-
tary civil commitment; specifically, whether the state should deprive
those with mental illness of their liberty or whether involuntary civil
commitment should be abolished totally in favor of other systems of
social action. How laws should define, delegate and control state action
exercised under a broad police power or an equally broad power of
parens patriae is also of concern. 324
This debate has intensified over the past twenty years both in courts
and state legislatures, 325 and has resulted in the recognition of a number
of procedural rights for individuals who are subjected to proceedings for
commitment: prior notice, an opportunity to be heard, the right to
counsel, and the right to judicial review of an initial commitment or-
der.326 Moreover, the debate has led to the development of substantive
commitment criteria (a determination of mental illness and that one is
dangerous to self and others)3 27 and a requirement for the least restric-
tive alternative disposition, i.e., least drastic method of treatment.328
These developments have been regarded as raising serious barriers to
efforts designed to offer effective treatment opportunities to those in
need of them.329
A growing number of states have legislatively restricted their author-
ity to force treatment upon the mentally ill.330 This is all in keeping
with a national trend toward deinstitutionalization of mental pa-
322 See id.
323 Id.; see Kjervik, The Psychotherapist's Duty to Act Reasonably to Prevent Sui-
cide: A Proposal to Allow Rational Suicide, 2 BEHAVIORAL SCi. & L. 207 (1984).
324 See LaFond, The Empirical Consequences and Policy Implications of Broaden-
ing the Statutory Criteria for Civil Commitment, 3 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 395
(1985); Morse, A Preference for Liberty: The Case Against Involuntary Commitment
of the Mentally Disordered, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 54 (1982).
325 See Hermann, Barriers to Providing Effective Treatment: A Critique of Revision
in Procedural, Substantive, and Dispositional Criteria in Involuntary Civil Commit-
ment, 39 VAND. L. REv. 84, 85 (1986).
326 See id. at 89.
327 See id. at 92.
328 See id. at 86.
329 See id.
310 See Rhoden, The Limits of Liberty: Deinstitutionalization, Homelessness and
Libertarian Theory, 31 EMORY L.J. 375, 383 (1982).
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tients.33' Community health systems now provide out-patient psychiat-
ric care as a viable alternative to confinement. Indeed, as a consequence
of significant and varied litigative success concerning deinstitutionaliza-
tion and involuntary commitment, a constitutional requirement has
been structured mandating that treatment be provided in the least re-
strictive environment.332
Yet, a trend is but a trend, and certainly not a uniform response.
The present system of involuntary commitment, tied to hospitalization,
fails to embrace current state of the art therapeutic alternatives. 333
Whether all forms of involuntary therapy should be abolished is a vex-
atious question to be sure.334 However, consistent with basic concepts of
autonomy and self-determination, and the parens patriae power of the
state, reform could be undertaken by empowering duly appointed
guardians to authorize treatment for obviously incapacitated or at-risk
individuals. 335 In essence, the use of a guardian could promote a system
of involuntary treatment in the least restrictive setting, with confine-
ment to a hospital being used only as a last resort. 336
Today, the trend among state legislatures is to place concern for eval-
uating and containing the level of dangerousness of the afflicted individ-
ual over the concern for the individual's treatment needs.337 Obviously,
an exercise of state power directed toward the prevention of harm to
others is an inherent police power, just as state enforced treatment is an
331 In 1955, 559,000 patients were in mental hospitals; in 1980, only 138,000 were
institutionalized. Goldman, Adams & Taube, Deinstitutionalization: The Data Demy-
thologized, 34 Hosp. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 129, 131 (1983). See generally
Schulman, supra note 120, at 855.
332 See THE LEAST RESTRICTIVE ALTERNATIVES: PRINCIPLES & PRACTICES (H.
Turnbull ed. 1981).
133 Myers, Involuntary Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill: A System in Need of
Change, 29 VILL. L. REV. 367, 414 (1983-84).
334 See Szasz, On the Legitimacy of Psychiatric Power, 14 RUTGERS L.J. 479 (1983).
331 See Myers, supra note 333, at 412.
336 See id.; see also LaFond, An Examination of The Purposes of Involuntary Civil
Commitment, 30 BUFFALO L. REV. 499 (1981). One commentator has suggested that
an ideal suicide prevention policy would
save through methods entailing minimal unpleasantness, the lives of as
many as possible of those who do not wish to die; interfere as little as
possible with those who after some change of consideration persist in
wanting to die and afford maximum protection against interference with
the liberty of those who pose no threat of suicide.
Greenberg, supra note 308, at 242-43.
3 See Hermann, supra note 325, at 94; see also S. BRAKEL, J. PARRY & B. WEI-
NER, THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 33-37 (2d ed. 1985) [hereafter THE
MENTALLY DISABLED].
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exercise of the parens patriae power.38 Actually, state laws designed to
prevent harm to one's self function as both an exercise of police power
and of parens patriae power.339 "The revisions of civil commitment law
in the direction of a single standard of dangerousness therefore reflect a
determination that parens patriae standing alone is an insufficient ba-
sis for commitment of the incompetent mentally ill." 34° It has been sug-
gested that the overriding need for treatment of mentally unbalanced
individuals could be met by recognizing a standard that permitted com-
mitment for one who "is mentally ill and in need of care or treatment
in a mental hospital but because of illness lacks sufficient insight or
capacity to make a rational decision concerning treatment. 3 41 The
long-term testing value of this standard has yet to be determined and
verified. Nonetheless, the application of the criterion to the commitment
process has an unquestioned and equally far-reaching impact on the
rights of the patient while hospitalized and especially her ability or her
"right" to refuse treatment?34
2. Model Laws
Under a proposed Model State Commitment Statute of the American
Psychiatric Association, 341 the state's parens patriae power is given sig-
nificant weight and forms the basis for the involuntary emergency ad-
mission of an individual for both evaluation and treatment. Involuntary
admission is required upon determining that the individual is suffering
from a severe mental disorder that prevents informed decision making
regarding treatment and is thus likely to suffer substantial mental dete-
rioration or physical deterioration or likely to harm others. 344 Under the
provisions of the statute, an additional thirty-day period of commitment
is authorized if a judge determines that the individual is likely to suffer
severe mental deterioration if treatment is not continued?14
This model statute stresses the fact that treatment is the central basis
or justification for civil commitment and would mandate treatment only
338 Hermann, supra note 325, at 95.
339 Id.
w4 Id. at 95-96.
341 Id. at 100. See generally Goleman, States Move to Ease Law Committing Men-
tally Ill: Greater Readiness to Hospitalize Marks Shift in Battle over Patients Rights,
N.Y. Times, Dec. 9, 1986, at Y19, col. 1.
342 THE MENTALLY DISABLED, supra note 337, at 37.
343 See Stromberg & Stone, A Model State Law on Civil Commitment of the Men-
tally Ill, 20 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 275 (1983).
344 Id. at 321.
345 Id. at 330.
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for the incapacitated individual unable to make rational treatment deci-
sions. 346 In some respects, the model statute criteria "are broader than
those in some current state laws (for example in providing for commit-
ment of persons whose mental state is likely to deteriorate), while in
other respects the criteria are stricter (for example in permitting com-
mitment only of persons who lack capacity). 3 47 One commentator sug-
gests "that relatively few persons who. would now be committable as
dangerous would not be committable under the Model Law, and that
many severely disordered people who are now committable as gravely
disabled could be committed under the Model Law. '3 4
II. PERSONHOOD AND THE CONCEPT OF PERSON
A. Competency v. Incompetency
To be treated as a person, one must not only enjoy states of con-
sciousness as well as intentional states, but must also have the capacity
to link together by memory experiences which occur at different
times.3 49 Stated otherwise, one must have a capacity for love and engag-
ing in interpersonal relationships or "relational potential. '350 Whether
rationality or social interactive capacities are the controlling criteria to
establish personhood remains an open philosophical question. It has
been suggested that an individual's moral standing as part of the moral
community should be permitted to end only when a clear breakdown in
linkage between bodily integrity and mental or social capacity is
established. 31
To assist in determining when life may be terminated from a point
of moral justification, various questions may be posited.3" 2 Nine of the
most relevant questions are as follows: (1) Is the individual in question
characterized as a person?; (2) If so characterized, does she desire her
346 Id. at 331.
3 Id. at 335.
I4 d. See generally Note, The Role of Law in Suicide Prevention: Beyond Civil
Commitment - A Bystander Duty to Report Suicide Threats, 39 STAN. L. REV. 929
(1987).
39 See Tooley, Decisions to Terminate Life and the Concept of Person, in ETHICAL
ISSuEs RELATING TO LIFE AND DEATH 85-87 (J. Ladd ed. 1979).
350 McCormick, To Save or Let Die: The Dilemma of Modern Medicine, in How
BRAVE A NEW WORLD? 339-49 (R. McCormick ed. 1981); see also Smith, Quality of
Life, Sanctity of Creation: Palliative or Apotheosis?, 63 NEB. L. REV. 709, 729 passim
(1984).
311 See R. VEATCH, A THEORY OF MEDICAL ETHICS 240-44, 245 (1981).
352 Professor Tooley lists thirteen such questions. See Tooley, supra note 349, at 62-
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own death, and if this is the case, is that a rational desire?; (3) If the
person is sustained, what quality of life will be enjoyed? (4) What are
the economic costs of maintaining this person's life?; (5) Is the person
in an unconscious state and technologically impossible of being restored
to consciousness?; (6) Would the termination of life be a matter of ac-
tive intervention or but a matter of exercising restraint in saving the
person's life?; (7) Does the case involve direct or indirect "killing"?; (8)
Does the action contemplated require "extraordinary" or only "ordi-
nary" means to maintain the person alive?; (9) Is the illness suffered by
the individual in extremis of a fatal nature?3 53
Another complementary framework for helpful analysis has been set
out as so-called indicators of "humanhood" which provide a profile of
fifteen qualities or attitudes regarded as necessary for one to be re-
garded as a "person." The indicators are as follows: self-awareness;
self-control; time consciousness; a sense of futurity; a sense of memory;
a capability to relate to others; an ability to communicate; the ability to
assert control and not display utter helplessness; the ability to display
curiosity instead of indifference; rationality; the ability to be emotive
and intuitive; and, finally, the capacity for neo-cortical functions.354
In the absence of the synthesizing function of the cerebral cortex, the per-
son is non-existent. Such individuals are objects not subjects. . .. Personal
reality depends on cerebration and to be dead 'humanly' speaking is to be
ex-cerebral, no matter how long the body remains alive. 35
What both the nine questions previously posited and the indicators of
humanhood have in common is the shared focus on the brain and its
proper functioning as the key to the advancement or the preclusion of
all the complex human responses and attitudes which identify and rec-
ognize a human as a functioning person.
B. Toward a Uniform Determination of Death?
The traditional legal definition of death has been, "[T]he cessation of
life; permanent cessation of all vital functions and signs. '356 As to the
353 Id.
34 See Fletcher, Indicators of Humanhood: A Tentative Profile of Man, HASTINGS
CENTER REP., Nov. 1972, at 1.
355 Id. at 3.
316 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 360 (5th ed. 1979).
Daniel Callahan has attempted to provide a stipulative definition of "Natural
Death":
[T]he individual event of death at that point in a life span when
(a) one's life work has been accomplished;
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determination of death, from a biological standpoint, the law has gener-
ally treated the matter as a question of medical fact, determined accord-
ing to those criteria established by the medical profession in each
state.3 7 Consequently, no consensus is found among the states regard-
ing the matter. Limited application of a brain death standard has been
authorized by thirty-three states, with twenty-seven states having codi-
fied brain death statutes358 and the remaining six validating brain death
determination by judicial cognizance.35 9
(b) one's moral obligations to those for whom one has had responsibility
have been discharged;
(c) one's death will not seem to others as offense to sense or sensibility, or
tempt others to despair and rage at human existence; and finally
(d) one's process of dying is not marked by unbearable and degrading
pain.
Callahan, On Defining a "Natural Death", HASTINGS CENTER REP., June 1977, at
33.
117 See Brennan & Delgado, Death: Multiple Definitions or a Single Standard?, 54
S. CAL. L. REV. 1323 (1981); Dornette, How Does Your State Define Death?, LEGAL
ASPECTS MED. PRAC., May 1980, at 19; see also High, Is "Natural Death" an Illu-
sion?, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Aug. 1978, at 37. High suggests that the central con-
cern should not be directed to determining natural death, but rather three more critical
issues: the right to refuse treatment; an analysis of whether or not a particular treat-
ment is - as to each individual case - medically indicated; and what standards are
needed to assure proper care for the dying in order that they may die with dignity. Id.
at 42.
358 See ALA. CODE § 22-31-1 to -4 (1984); ALASKA STAT. § 09.65.120 (1983); ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 82-537 (Supp. 1985); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7180-7181
(West Supp. 1988); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-278(b) (1983); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
382.009 (Supp. 1987); GA. CODE ANN. § 88-1716 (1981); HAW. REV. STAT. § 327C-
1 (1985); IDAHO CODE § 54-1819 (1988); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 2, § 302(b)
(Smith-Hurd 1985); IowA CODE § 702.8 (1979); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 77-205 (1984);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:111 (West Supp. 1985); MD. ANN. CODE § 5-202 (Supp.
1987); MIcH. COMP. LAWS § 333.1021 (1980); Miss. CODE ANN. § 41-36-3 (1981);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-22-101 (1988); NEV. REV. STAT. § 451.007 (1979); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 12-2-4 (1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-323 (1985); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 63, § 3122 (1986); OR. REV. STAT. § 432.300 (1987); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-3-
501 (1987); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN., art. 4447t (Vernon Supp. 1988); VA. CODE
§ 54-325.7 (Supp. 1987); W. VA. CODE § 16-10-2 (1985); Wyo. STAT. § 35-19-101
(1988).
I" See State v. Fierro, 124 Ariz. 182, 184-87, 603 P.2d 74, 77-78 (1979) (adopting
Uniform Brain Death Act); Lovato v. District Court, 198 Colo. 419, 428, 601 P.2d
1072, 1081 (1979) (same); Swafford v. State, 421 N.E.2d 596, 602 (Ind. 1981) (adopt-
ing Uniform Determination of Death Act); Commonwealth v. Golston, 373 Mass. 249,
253-55, 366 N.E.2d 744, 748-49 (1977) (adopting brain death standard), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 1039 (1978); New York City Health & Hosp. Corp. v. Sulsona, 81 Misc. 2d
1002, 1007, 367 N.Y.S.2d 686, 691 (Sup. Ct. 1975) (adopting brain death standard for
transplantation purposes); In re Welfare of Bowman, 94 Wash. 2d 407, 421, 617 P.2d
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State legislative approaches to determining death may be grouped
into a three scheme classification. The first scheme consists of seven
states that have chosen an "alternative" approach, which provides that
the occurrence of death will be recognized when a patient suffers either
an irreversible cessation of spontaneous cardiorespiratory function or
sustains irreversible cessation of spontaneous brain function.3 60 This ap-
proach allows for a perception, inaccurate though it may be, that there
is a recognition of two entirely different phenomena of death. 6'
Eight states provide a second scheme that provides for alternative
standards for determining death, while carefully elucidating the specific
conditions under which each standard must be applied. 362 Typically,
these statutes provide that death is recognized legally when there is an
irreversible cessation of cardiorespiratory function. If respiration and
heartbeat are maintained by means of artificial support, death occurs
when the lack of brain function becomes irreversible. 63
Finally, the third scheme has been developed and applied in twelve
states by legislative enactment, and applies a brain death standard for
determining the occurrence of death.364 Within this group, some legisla-
tive directions require irreversible cessation of brain functions to deter-
mine death, thereby recognizing a strictly exclusive standard of brain
death.365 Other statutes require the recognition of death when there is
731, 738 (1980) (adopting Uniform Determination of Death Act).
360 See IDAHO CODE § 54-1819 (1988) (Uniform Determination of Death Act);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 77-205 (1984); MD. ANN. CODE, art. 43, § 54F (1980); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 41-36-3 (1981) (Uniform Determination of Death Act); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 12-2-4 (1978); OR. REV. STAT. § 432.300 (1987); VA. CODE § 54-325.7
(Supp. 1986).
361 See Capron & Kass, A Statutory Definition of the Standards for Determining
Human Death: An Appraisal and a Proposal, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 87, 109 (1972).
362 See ALA. CODE § 22-31-1 (Supp. 1984); ALASKA STAT. § 09.65.120 (1983); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 382.009 (Supp. 1987); HAW. REV. STAT. § 327C-1 (1985); IOWA CODE
§ 702.8 (1979); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:111 (West Supp. 1988); MIcH. COMP.
LAWS § 333.102 (1980); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4447t (Vernon Supp. 1988).
363 See statutes cited supra note 362.
364 See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 82-537 (Supp. 1985); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §
7180-7181 (West Supp. 1988); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19a-278(b) (1983); GA. CODE
ANN. § 88-1716 (1981); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 § 302(b) (Smith-Hurd 1985)
(applying only to Uniform Anatomical Gift Act); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-22-101
(1983); NEV. REV. STAT. § 451.007 (1979) (Uniform Brain Death Act); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 90-323 (1985); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63 § 3122 (1986); TENN. CODE ANN. §
68-3-501 (1987); W. VA. CODE § 16-10-2 (1985), (Uniform Brain Death Act); Wyo.
STAT. § 35-19-101 (1988).
365 See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 82-537 (Supp. 1985); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 §
302(b) (Smith-Hurd 1985); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-22-101 (1987); NEV. REV. STAT.
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an irreversible cessation of brain function. Yet these statutes go further
in allowing the use of other medically accepted standards to determine
death.166
In exclusively relying upon brain death as the determiner of death,
state statutes effectively preclude physicians from letting the circum-
stances of each individual case govern the ordinary medical procedures
used for determining death. Statutes of this nature also preclude utiliz-
ing necessary flexibility when the state of the medical technology is
such that new more effective advances might obsolesce a traditional
brain death standard.
In 1968, in seeking some degree of uniformity between doctors and
lawyers in defining death, a number of physicians at the Harvard
Medical School issued a report which established four criteria for the
diagnosis of irreversible coma:367 (1) unreceptivity and unresponsivity to
externally applied stimuli and inner need; (2) no spontaneous muscular
movements or spontaneous respiration; (3) no elicitable brain reflexes;
and (4) a flat electroencephalogram (EEG).3 6 The report also sug-
gested that in a case when findings of this type were made, a subse-
quent verification of them should be undertaken at least twenty-four
hours later. Furthermore, on fulfilling the criteria, and before any ef-
fort was undertaken to disconnect a respirator, the patient should offi-
cially be declared dead.3 69 The Committee's Report was not presented
for the purpose of replacing the more traditional standards for deter-
mining death; on the contrary, they were urged only as a
complement. 7 0
In 1981 Dr. William Street, a member of the original medical com-
§ 451.007 (1979); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 3122 (1986); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-
3-501 (1987); W. VA. CODE § 16-10-2 (1985); Wyo. STAT. § 35-19-101 (1988).
366 See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7180-7181 (West Supp. 1988); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-278(b) (1983); GA. CODE ANN. § 88-1716 (1981); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 90-323 (1985); see also State v. Fierro, 124 Ariz. 182, 184-87, 603 P.2d 74,
77-79 (1979) (common-law definition still sufficient to establish death despite adopting
brain death standard); Lovato v. District Court, 198 Colo. 418, 428, 601 P.2d 1072,
1081 (1979) (adopting Uniform Brain Death Act does not preclude continuing to rec-
ognize common-law standard).
36 See A Definition of Irreversible Coma: Report of the Ad Hoc Committee of the
Harvard Medical School to Examine the Definition of Brain Death, 204 J. A.M.A.
337 (1968).
368 Id.
369 See id.
370 See The Institute of Safety, Ethics, and the Life Sciences, Refinements in Criteria
for the Determination of Death: An Appraisal, A Report of The Task Force on Death
and Dying, 221 J. A.M.A. 50 (1972).
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mittee that wrote the Harvard criteria, observed that in actual imple-
mentation the criteria have been found to be too strict in some cases,
and too lax in others. Of particular concern to him was the fact that the
criteria fail to distinguish adequately between irreversible coma and
brain death. He did note that no present records disclose any recovery
for patients who met the criteria. 71
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
approved in 1978 The Uniform Brain Death Act, 372 which states: "For
legal and medical purposes, an individual who has sustained irreversi-
ble cessation of all functioning of the brain, including the brain stem, is
dead. A determination under this section must be made in accordance
with reasonable medical standards. ' 373 Before this Act was superseded
in 1980 by the Commissioners' adoption of The Uniform Determina-
tion of Death Act,37 4 four states passed legislation adopting the original
1978 provisions. 37 5
The President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in
Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research concluded in 1981
that the states should adopt a model statute entitled, "The Uniform
Determination of Death Act," which would establish much needed
clarity and certainty.376 Under this statute, "An individual who has sus-
tained either (1) irreversible cessation of circulatory and respiratory
functions or (2) irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire
brain, including the brain stem, is dead. A determination of death must
be made in accordance with accepted medical standards. ' 377 Since the
issuance of this Report and its subsequent approval by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in August 1980,
it has been adopted legislatively in twenty-four states and the District
of Columbia.378 Two states have judicially adopted its standards. 379
371 See Brain Death Criteria Described as Obsolete, Wash. Post, Apr. 22, 1981, at
A27, col. 2.
372 UNIF. BRAIN DEATH Ace § 1, 12 U.L.A. 17 (Supp. 1988).
373 Id.; see Capron & Kass, supra note 361, at 87.
374 UNIF. DETERMINATION OF DEATH ACT, 12 U.L.A. 310 (Supp. 1989).
371 See ALA. CODE § 22-31-1(b) (1984); NEv. REV. STAT. § 451.007 (1979); W.
VA. CODE § 16-10-2 (1985); Wyo. STAT. § 35-19-101 (1979); see also Comment,
Medical-Legal Agreements on Brain Death: An Assessment of the Uniform Determina-
tion of Death Act, 8 J. CONTEMP. L. 97 (1982).
376 See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN
MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DEFINING DEATH: MED-
ICAL, LEGAL AND ETHICAL ISSUES IN THE DETERMINATION OF DEATH 9-10, 172-73
(1981).
377 See id. at 172-73.
378 See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7180 (West Supp. 1988); COLO. REV.
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Interestingly, public acceptance of the concept of brain death has not
been uniform; the average, ordinary person still perceives stoppage of
the heart as the sole determinant of death. 380 With time, however, and
more dramatic "real life" news coverage of tragic Karen Quinlan-type
cases, the public will hopefully become more aware, and thus possibly
more fully educated on this matter. 38'
A very meritorious and, indeed, persuasive suggestion has been of-
fered as a means of resolving the present confusion and controversy
over standards for defining death, specifically, the adoption of neocorti-
cal death as the operative and controlling medico-legal standard. 382 De-
fining this type of death as "the irreversible loss of consciousness and
cognitive functions, ' 38 3 reveals the present legal inconsistency of up-
holding surrogate decisions to terminate life-support systems when in-
competent patients irreversibly lose all consciousness and cognitive
functions - yet failing to recognize neocortical death. 384 If this type of
death were legally validated, the moral and legal dilemmas inherent
within this area of consideration would be resolved because once a phy-
sician makes a determination that a patient had irreversibly lost all ce-
rebral qualities of human life, the patient would legally be dead. Thus,
artificial life supports and nourishment could be terminated. Substi-
tuted judgment and best interest tests would no longer be required in
order to guess what course of treatment or nontreatment should be
pursued.385
While preeminently reasonable, this suggestion is somewhat ahead of
its time for social acceptance. Although the tragic choice of continuing
"life" or a passive act of cessation of it is often wrenching, the full and
STAT. § 12-36-136 (1987); D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-2401 (Supp. 1988); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 88-1716 (1986); IDAHO CODE § 54-1819 (1988); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§
2811-2813 (1988); MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 5-202 (1988); Miss. CODE ANN.
§ 41-36-3 (1981); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 194.005 (Vernon Supp. 1988); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 50-22-101 (1987); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2108.30 (Anderson 1988); PA.
STAT. ANN. § 10201-10203 (1988); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-4-16 (1987); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 18, § 5218 (1987); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 146.71 (West 1987).
379 See Swafford v. State, 421 N.E.2d 596, 602 (Ind. 1981); In re Bowman, 94
Wash. 2d 407, 421, 617 P. 2d 731, 738 (1980).
380 See Joynt, A New Look at Death, 252 J. A.M.A. 680, 681 (1984).
381 See generally J. FEINBERG, OFFENSE TO OTHERS (1984); Abram, The Need for
Uniform Law on the Determination of Death, 27 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1187 (1981).
382 See Smith, Legal Recognition of Neocortical Death, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 850
(1986).
383 Id. at 851.
384 Id. at 888.
385 Id.
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open process of making the choice has a cathartic effect on all parties,
especially a justice system that demands equality of treatment for all
within a forum of open family debate. Put quite simply, too many peo-
ple feel that so long as there is breath, there is life, and would surely
feel uncomfortable about the utilization of this abrupt, albeit merciful,
standard of neo-cortical death. To compound the "public relations"
matter, those who are brain dead remain capable of spontaneous car-
diac and respiratory functioning. Indeed, adult patients, declared brain
dead, may give every appearance of life, especially to those family
members unfamiliar with such technologies as mechanical ventilation
and total parenteral nutrition. The average family has repeatedly
shown that abrupt and final decisions which would result in the appli-
cation of the neo-cortical standard of death are not acceptable to their
feelings. Although such decisions are agonizing, given the average unso-
phistication of the dying and the fear of death, education must be un-
dertaken to prepare the ordinary American for acceptance of this stan-
dard as well as brain death in general.
C. Living Wills and Natural Death Acts
A so-called "living will" is an instrument that indicates its maker's
preference not to be started or maintained on a course of extraordinary
treatment in the event of accidental or debilitating illness. 386 The big-
gest uncertainty surrounding living wills and their subsequent adminis-
tration is related to whether health care providers are required -
under pain of civil or criminal sanction - to execute the terms of the
will. An interlinking concern is whether those participants charged
with fulfilling the will's terms will be assured of immunity from civil or
criminal prosecution.38 7 Whether refusing life-sustaining therapies
would constitute a suicide largely remains another vexatious and un-
resolved issue. 388 Regardless of these great uncertainties, some thirty-
eight states and the District of Columbia have passed living will
36 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN
MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO FOREGO
LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT: A REPORT ON THE ETHICAL, MEDICAL, AND LEGAL
ISSUES IN TREATMENT DECISIONS 139 (1983) [hereafter PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION].
See generally SOCIETY FOR THE RIGHT TO DIE, HANDBOOK OF LIVING WILLS 1981-
1984 (1984); Kutner, Euthanasia: Due Process for Death with Dignity: The Living
Will, 54 IND. L.J. 201 (1979).
387 See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 386, at 140.
388 See id. The New Jersey Supreme Court, in In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 351, 486
A.2d 1209, 1224 (1985), held that declining life-sustaining medical treatment should
not be viewed as an attempt to commit suicide.
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legislation.389
Those jurisdictions recognizing living wills still address the types of
medical techniques that are "extraordinary" and the type of circum-
stances that will "demonstrate that the person's previously expressed
desire to forego treatment continued up to the time immediately prior
to his or her medical disability. '390 Without legislative decisions that
tackle these issues with clarity, the courts will be faced with a case-by-
case determination of the parameters of life.391
To correct some of the weaknesses and uncertainties of living will
legislation, more and more states are enacting Natural Death Acts.392
389 See ALA. CODE §§ 22-8A-1 to -10 (1984); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-3201 to
-3210 (1986); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 82-3801 to -3804 (1985); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE §§ 7185-7195 (West Supp. 1988); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 15-18-101 to -113
(1987); 1985 Conn. Acts 85-606 (Reg. Sess.); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§ 2501-2508
(1983); D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-2421 to -2430 (Supp. 1988); FLA. STAT. § 765.01-.15
(West 1986); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 88-4103 to -4106 (Harrison Supp. 1988); IDAHO
CODE ANN. §§ 39-4502 to -4509 (Supp. 1988); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 , para. 701
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1988); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 16-8-11-1 to -22 (West Supp. 1988);
IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 144A.1 to .11 (West Supp. 1988); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-28-
101 to -109 (1985); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.58.1-.10 (West Supp. 1988); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 2921-2931 (Supp. 1988); MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN.
§§ 5-601 to -614 (Supp. 1987); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 41-41-101 to -121 (Supp. 1988);
Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 459.010-.055 (Vernon Supp. 1988); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 50-9-
101 to -111 (1987); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 449.540-.690 (1986); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 137-H:1-:16 (Supp. 1987); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-7-1 to -11 (1986); N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 90-320 to -322 (1985); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §§ 3101-3111 (West Supp.
1988); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 97.050-.090 (1984); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 32-11-101 to -
110 (Supp. 1988); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4590h, § 1-11 (Vernon Supp.
1988); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 75-2-1101 to -1118 (Supp. 1988); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
18, §§ 5251-5262 (1987); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54-325.8:1-:12 (Supp. 1987); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 70.122.010-.905 (Supp. 1988); W. VA. CODE §§ 16-30-1 to -10
(1985); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 154.01-.15 (West Supp. 1988); WYO. STAT. §§ 33-26-
144 to -152 (Supp. 1986). See Gelfand, Living Will Statutes: The First Decade, 1987
Wis. L. REV. 737.
190 J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 246, at 765.
391 Id.
392 Twenty-one states and the District of Columbia have either natural death or
death with dignity legislation. See ALA. CODE §§ 22-8A-1 to -10 (Michie Supp. 1988);
ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 82-3801 to -3804 (Michie Supp. 1985); CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE §§ 7185-7195 (West Supp. 1988); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§ 2501-
2509 (1983); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 6-2421 to -2430 (Michie Supp. 1988); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 765.01-.15 (West 1988); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 31-32-1 to -12 (Harrison Supp.
1987); IDAHO CODE §§ 39-4501 to -4509 (Michie Supp. 1988); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
110 , §§ 701-710 (West Supp. 1988); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 65-28-101 to -120
(1985); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 41-41-101 to -121 (Harrison Supp. 1988); NEV. REV.
STAT. §§ 449.540-.690 (1985); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-7-1 to -11 (1981); N.C. GEN.
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Spurred by California's passing the Natural Death Act, designed to
formally establish the requirements for a "directive to physicians, '" 3 93
other states now allow a validly executed instrument to relieve a physi-
cian, staff and hospital from civil and criminal liability for removing or
withholding life-sustaining treatment. 39 4 Considerable difference exists
among the various legislative programs with respect to assessing penal-
ties for either disobeying the directive of a properly executed instru-
ment or preventing the transfer of a patient to another physician who
will respect the patient's wishes.395 The triggering mechanisms of the
legislation are often cumbersome and self-defeating. In California, for
example, before a patient may seek to avail herself of the provisions of
The Natural Death Act, she must first be diagnosed as being in a ter-
minal condition, which means "an incurable condition . . . which, re-
gardless of the application of life-sustaining procedures, would, within
reasonable medical judgment, produce death. '3 96
In actual practice, there is evidence to suggest that a patient's wish to
be kept off life-sustaining treatment may be ignored in states where
Natural Death legislation exists. 397 If attending physicians and health
care providers view such legislation as the sole means for both initiating
and implementing a decision to forego treatment, and if they believe
that the decision cannot be made by a surrogate on behalf of the patient
but only in strict accordance with an advance directive that has been
properly executed, dying patients may in fact be subject to treatment
which is neither requested nor beneficial. 398 As an additional fear, an
STAT. §§ 90-320 to -323 (1985); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 97.050-.090 (1984); TEX. REV.
CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4590h (West Supp. 1988); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 5251-
5262 (1987); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54-325.8:1-:13 (Michie Supp. 1987); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. §§ 70.122.010-.905 (West Supp. 1988); W. VA. CODE §§ 16-30-1 to -10
(1985); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 154.01-.15 (Supp. 1985); Wyo. STAT. §§ 35-22-101 to -
109 (1988). For a verbatim reproduction of the state Natural Death Acts, see PRESI-
DENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 386, at 318-87.
393 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7185-7195 (West Supp. 1988).
394 See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 386, at 141.
395 See id.
396 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7187(e)-(f), 7191(b) (West Supp. 1988). In
Bartling v. Superior Court, 163 Cal. App. 3d 186, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1984), the court
observed that even with a set of statutory guidelines such as those in the California
Natural Death Act, such guidelines were "so cumbersome that it is unlikely that any
but a small number of high educated and motivated patients will be able to effectuate
their desires." 163 Cal. App. 3d 186, 194 n.5, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220, 224 n.5 (quoting
Barber v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 1015, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 489
(1983)).
397 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 386, at 144.
398 See id.
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improper inference may be drawn that a patient does not want life-
sustaining treatment ended under any and all circumstances unless a
directive has properly been executed.399 The truth of the matter might
well reveal that a directive was not executed because of either ignorance
of its legislative existence, an unawareness of its importance, or even
uncertainty regarding how it should be composed? °°
Generally, the right to die, or natural death acts, apply only to "com-
petent adults,"' 1 with children and mental incompetents being ex-
cluded. Yet, some jurisdictions have made provision for proxy consent.
In North Carolina, the controlling statute allows proxy consent for an
irreversibly comatose patient who has not previously executed a living
will.402 Consent may be given by a spouse, legal guardian, or a majority
of the relatives of the first degree.403 No reference is made in the statute
to any other type of incompetent patient. 404 Virginia does not expressly
allude to the rights of patients with inadequate decision making capac-
ity and refers only to competent adults. 405 New Mexico provides for
proxy consent for minors, although not for incompetent adults. 40 6 Ar-
kansas, however, covers both minors and incompetent adults. 407
D. Durable Powers of Attorney
As a consequence of the numerous weaknesses encountered with liv-
ing will legislation and Natural Death Acts, additional safeguards
should be utilized for implementing advance directions on life-sus-
taining modalities of treatment. Specifically, adoption of proxy direc-
tives through durable powers of attorney statutes would go far toward
assuring an individual's desires regarding treatment. 48 A sizeable ma-
jority of states authorize durable powers of attorney that enable the
9 See id.
400 See id.
401 See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7188 (West Supp. 1988); KAN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 65-28, 102 (1985); NEV. REV. STAT. § 449.560 (1985); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 70.122.030 (West Supp. 1988).
402 See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90.322 (1985).
403 See id.
4 See id.
405 See VA. CODE ANN. § 54-325.8:1 (Michie Supp. 1987). See generally Comment,
Proxy Decisionmaking for the Terminally Ill: The Virginia Approach, 70 VA. L. REV.
1269 (1984).
406 See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-7-4 (1986).
407 See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 82-3803 (Michie Supp. 1985).
408 See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 386, at 145, 146.
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appointment of a proxy to act after a person becomes incompetent. 409
The language of these statutes is usually broad enough to accommodate
the appointment of a surrogate to facilitate problems which involve
health care for the incompetent. However, the statutes were not enacted
for remedying these specific problems of incompetence. 410
Since the usual power of attorney ceases when the principal becomes
incapacitated, some states have created specific durable powers of attor-
ney whereby an agent's authority continues after a debilitating event
happens to the principal. 41 1 In this way, the power may create an "ad-
vance proxy directive" allowing an individual to nominate another to
make all decisions regarding health care in the event the principal be-
comes incapacitated. 412 This mechanism greatly advances the efficiency
and fairness of the whole decision making process for incapacitated
persons.
As durable power of attorney statutes are adapted and applied to
areas that they were not originally designed to accommodate, care and
study must be undertaken to make certain that these original proce-
dures - initially enacted to "avoid the expense of full guardianship or
40 See Succession of McCrocklin, 242 La. 404, 137 So. 2d 74 (1962); ALASKA STAT.
§ 13.26.325 (1985); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-5501 (1975); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§
58-501 to -511 (1971); CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 2400-2407 (West Supp. 1988); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 15-14-501 (1987); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, §§ 4901-4905 (Michie
Supp. 1986); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 709.08 (1988); GA. CODE ANN. § 10-6-36 (1982);
HAW. REV. STAT. § 560:5-501 (1985); IDAHO CODE §§ 15-5-501 to -502 (Michie
Supp. 1988); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 30-2-11-1 to -3 (West Supp. 1988); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 633.705 (West Supp. 1988); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 58-610 to -617 (1983); Ky.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 386.093 (1984); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 5-501 (1988);
MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 13-601 (1974); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 201B,
§§ 1 to 7 (West Supp. 1988); MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 27.5495 (Callagan 1980); MONT.
CODE ANN. §§ 72-5-501 to -502 (1988); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 46:2B-8 (West Supp.
1988); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-5-501 (1978); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-1601 (Mc-
Kinney 1988); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 30.1-30-01 to -05 (1987); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 1337.09 (Anderson 1987); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 58, §§ 1051-1062 (West
1988); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5601 (Purdon 1988); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.
§§ 59-7-2.1-.4 (1978); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-5-501 (1978); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14,
§ 3051 (1987); VA. CODE §§ 11-9.1-.2 (1988); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 11.94.010
(1987); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 243.07 (West 1987); Wyo. STAT. § 34-9-101 to -110
(1977). For verbatim reproductions of the Durable Power of Attorney statutes found in
the Report of the Commission, see PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 386, at 393-
437. See generally Martyn & Jacobs, Legislating Advance Directives for the Termi-
nally Ill: The Living Will and Durable Power of Attorney, 63 NEB. L. REV. 779
(1984).
410 See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 386, at 147.
411 See id.
412 See id. at 146.
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conservatorship proceedings when dealing with small property inter-
ests ' 413 - are not abused when applied to incapacitated patients. 414 At
some point, procedural safeguards may be needed to assure necessary
and functional application of the durable powers of attorney. There is
no question, however, of their great potential and their already proven
success in easing the heavy and emotional burdens of decision making
and in allowing the courts to respect individual and familial privacy.4 5
E. A Statutory Clarification?
In August 1985 the National Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws approved and recommended for enactment in all states
a Uniform Rights of The Terminally Ill Act.416 This Act authorizes an
adult to execute a declaration to her physicians and health care facili-
ties directing the withholding or withdrawing of life-sustaining treat-
ment in the event she is in a terminal condition of health and thereby
unable to participate in decisions concerning medical treatment. 417 The
scope of the Act is quite narrow in that it provides only one way for the
wishes of a terminally ill person to be fulfilled. 418 It is designed to avoid
inconsistency in approach to decision making, which has continued to
plague living will statutes, by providing that the effectiveness of a pa-
tient's directive will be executed uniformly in all states. 419
The Act is not intended to affect any existing rights and responsibili-
ties of persons to make medical treatment decisions. Furthermore, its
provisions are limited to life-prolonging treatment and to those patients
whose terminal condition is incurable and/or irreversible, whose death
will soon occur, and who are unable to participate in medical treatment
decisions. 420 It does not address treating persons who have not executed
a statutory declaration nor does it pertain to treatment for minors or
treatment decisions made by proxy. Although drawing upon the basic
structure and substance of similar existing living will legislation, it sim-
plifies procedures, improves drafting, and clarifies language such as the
413 Id. at 147.
414 Id.
4'5 See id.
416 UNIFORM RIGHTS OF THE TERMINALLY ILL ACT §§ 1-18, 9A U.L.A. 506 (West
Supp. 1987).
417 See id.
411 See id.
419 See id.
420 See id.
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terms "life-sustaining treatment ' 421 and "terminal condition. '422 Legis-
lation which endeavors to clarify terms and concepts in this critical area
of concern must be applauded as a positive action. Of course, it remains
to be seen whether the states view the model as a clarification or an
obfuscation. 423
F. Humane and Dignified Death Act
The Hemlock Society of California and Americans Against Human
Suffering campaigned to amend the California Constitution to add the
Humane and Dignified Death Act. This proposed Act would have rec-
ognized and expanded "the inalienable right of privacy [by including]
the right of the terminally ill to voluntary, humane, and dignified doc-
tor-assisted aid in dying. ' 424 To exercise the right, a patient would have
had to be certified as terminally ill.425 A patient is defined as terminally
ill under the proposal if two physicians state that the patient has less
than six months to live. The patient would have had to exercise a dura-
ble power of attorney in which the patient conveyed authority to order
her death to another if a comatose or otherwise mentally disabling con-
dition ensued. 426 Although preliminary research indicated strong sup-
port for the measure, the initiative received only 130,000 of the needed
450,000 signatures to be placed on the November 1988 ballot.427 How-
ever, Americans Against Human Suffering plans another attempt in
1990.
The initiative as drafted would have been an extension of existing
state legislation. This legislation allows adults to
execute a directive directing the withholding or withdrawal of life-sus-
taining procedures in a terminal condition. The directive shall be signed
421 "Life-sustaining treatment" is defined as "any medical procedure or intervention
that, when administered to a qualified patient, will serve only to prolong the process of
dying." Id. § 1(4).
422 "Terminal condition" is defined as "an incurable or irreversible condition that,
without the administration of life-sustaining treatment, will, in the opinion of the at-
tending physician, result in death within a relatively short time." Id. § 1(9).
423 See Marzen, The Uniform Rights of The Terminally Ill Act: A Critical Analysis,
I IssuEs IN L. & MED. 441 (1986).
424 The Hemlock Soc'y of Cal., Humane and Dignified Death Initiative § 1 (a) (pro-
posing to amend article I of the California Constitution); see also Bond, Hemlock Soci-
ety Forms New Organization to Push Assisted Suicide Initiative, National Right to
Life News, Dec. 18, 1986, at 1, col. 1.
421 Parachini, The California Humane and Dignified Death Inititative, HASTINGS
CENTER REP. (Special Supplement), Jan.-Feb. 1989, at 10, 10.
426 Id.
427 Id.
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by the declarant in the presence of two witnesses not related to the declar-
ant by blood or marriage and who would not be entitled to any portion of
the estate of the declarant upon his decease under any will of the declarant
or codicil thereto then existing or, at the time of the directive, by operation
of law then existing. In addition, a witness to a directive shall not be the
attending physician, an employee of the attending physician or a health
facility in which the declarant is a patient, or any person who has a claim
against any portion of the estate of the declarant upon his decease at the
time of execution of the directive. 428
For declarants who are patients in a skilled nursing facility to make a
valid directive, one of two witnesses must be a patient advocate or
ombudsman designated as such by the California State Department of
Aging.429 The declarant can revoke the directive regardless of mental
state or competency, 430 and an exculpatory clause prohibits imposing
"criminal or civil liability on the part of any person for failure to act
upon a revocation . . . unless that person has actual knowledge of the
revocation." 431
No civil or criminal liability is imposed on a physician or licensed
health professional acting under the direction of a physician who fails
to effectuate the patient's directive unless she fails to transfer the pa-
tient to a physician who will comply with the directive.43 2 More specifi-
cally, actions of withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining procedures
from a qualified patient are not regarded as acts of suicide.43 3 Section
2443 of the California Civil Code adds that such actions shall not be
construed as condoning, authorizing, or approving mercy killing or per-
mitting "any affirmative or deliberate act or omission to end life other
than the withholding or withdrawal of health care pursuant to a dura-
ble power of attorney for health care so as to permit the natural process
of dying.' ' 434 Moreover, "an attempted suicide by the principal shall not
be construed to indicate a desire of the principal that health care treat-
ment be restricted or inhibited. '435 Applying these sections to the pro-
posed Act, the Act would not condone, authorize, or approve mercy
killing or permit any affirmative or deliberate act or omission to end
life other than by a licensed physician and when requested by the pa-
tient pursuant to a properly executed legal document.
428 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7188 (West Supp. 1989).
429 Id.
430 Id. § 7189(a).
431 Id. § 7189(b).
432 Id. § 7191(c).
433 Id. § 7192.
434 CAL. CIv, CODE § 2443 (West Supp. 1989).
435 Id.
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The Humane and Dignified Death Act is an eloquent effort to build
upon the living will legislation, Natural Death Acts such as Califor-
nia's, and durable powers of attorney acts. This proposed Act with ex-
isting legislation attempts to recognize that the continuation of life for
terminally ill persons under conditions of severe pain and suffering con-
stitutes not only severe cruelty and disregard for human dignity but
also an invasion into basic rights of privacy and self-determination.
These efforts offer a framework for principled national decision making
in this central area of human values and ethical concerns.4 36
G. New Beginnings?
From this analysis, it is obvious that death cannot be identified easily
as one event or configuration. The very gradualness of death as a pro-
cess can be apprehended when one realizes that multiple parts of the
body can continue to live even after the disintegration of its central
organization. 437 Indeed, more and more, one's physiological system does
not collapse and fail in a moment's time. Rather, technological substi-
tutes are used, allowing a total integration by a wondrously "evil" com-
puter. Thus, while the vital signs are evidenced, they are both provided
and manipulated by machines.
These new medical-legal approaches which define death have one
great practical merit; they endeavor to place and to recognize the mo-
ment of death earlier in the continuum of life than was allowed by
earlier practice and definitional structure. In so doing, the physician's
decision to discontinue therapy is made considerably easier, even
though "signs of life" are nevertheless present. Death may thus come
with dignity and mercy. Not only does this definition of death relieve
the family members and health care providers of the deep anguish of
dealing with a living corpse, but it also precludes the assessment of
heavy economic burdens of caring for one who has lost the basic attrib-
utes of personhood. Additionally, under this new definition the body
parts that survive death may be harvested and made available to deserv-
ing recipients without physicians being fearful and uncertain that their
acts might be considered invasions of privacy or criminal assaults. 438
The construct for principled decision making is obviously being
structured partially in legislative enactments. These enactments bear
clear and unmistakable evidence that complex social mechanisms are
436 See generally Engelhardt & Malloy, supra note 34, at 1003; Kuhse, supra note
28, at 145.
437 See Morison, Death: Process or Event?, 173 SCIENCE 694, 695 (1971).
438 See id.
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currently re-establishing and asserting the right of every individual to
enlightened self-determination in deciding her final rite of passage.
Passive euthanasia and rational suicide are offensive words of parlance
of a time long gone by. Autonomy and enlightened self-determination
are the more contemporaneous watchwords of today.
III. EUTHANASIA
Euthanasia, as a term, concept, or attitude has been used under vari-
ous and confusing circumstances to denote "any good death, ' 43 9 "any
assistance in helping dying patients in their dying," 440 and "only acting
directly to kill the dying patient."" 1 The intriguing fact emerging from
any study of euthanasia, then, will be that it can mean "any good
death" 442 as well as a "morally outrageous death." 443
Active euthanasia, then, involves killing while passive euthanasia
does not; one is not acceptable while the other is tolerated and accepted
more and more. However, how can letting die be more preferable -
from a moral standpoint - than helping die? If all other morally rele-
vant factors - intention, motivation, outcome - are the same, why
should there be a difference? In truth, the difference between killing
and letting die has no moral significance: "In active euthanasia, the
doctor initiates a course of events that lead to the patient's death. . . . In
letting die, the agent stands back and lets nature take her sometimes
cruel course. ... ."
The traditional argument against adoption or acceptance of euthana-
sia is that a rational patient simply does not and cannot choose eutha-
nasia.445 If this argument were so, it must further be maintained that
439 R. VEATCH, DEATH, DYING AND THE BIOLOGICAL REVOLUTION 77 (1976).
40 Id.
41 Id. Positive euthanasia has been stated as doing something that deliberately ends
life and that questions whether the act was suicide (as a voluntary or direct choice of
death). The end-goal of both direct or positive and indirect or negative euthanasia is
precisely the same - to end a patient's life and to release a patient from pointless
misery and dehumanizing loss of bodily functions. See Fletcher, In Defense of Suicide,
in SUICIDE AND EUTHANASIA: THE RIGHTS OF PERSONHOOD 38, 47 (S. Wallace & A.
Eser eds. 1981).
442 R. VEATCH, supra note 439, at 77.
443 Id. One commentator has suggested that to clarify the term "biathanasia," the
term should refer to a deliberate (or affirmative) act of killing within the concept of
mercy death. See Louisell, Euthanasia and Bianthanasia: On Dying and Killing, 22
CATH. U.L. REV. 723, 724 (1973). Louisell also suggests using a synonym,
"benemortasia," to clarify or tighten terminology. See id.
4" Kuhse, supra note 28, at 147.
445 Id.
1989)
University of California, Davis
no autonomous and rational decision could ever be made by a patient to
refuse a modality of treatment that was life sustaining." 6 Yet, this is
not what the vast majority of active euthanasia opponents assert.
Rather, they maintain that a patient can in fact make a rational choice
to follow passive euthanasia, but not active euthanasia." 7 The inconsis-
tency is obvious. The crucial question that begs answering is: Whether
a patient "can rationally choose an earlier death over a later
one. .. ."441 Accordingly, if one can make a rational choice to follow
passive euthanasia, then she must also be entitled to make a rational
choice to follow active euthanasia" 9 or, as termed in this Article, "en-
lightened self-determination. ' 4 0
A. Beneficent Euthanasia
Beneficent euthanasia is defined simply as the painless inducement of
a quick death. 451 The most common paradigm of it would include cases
when an individual suffers from an irreversible condition such as dis-
seminated carcinoma metastasis, has excruciating and unendurable
pain, is beyond reasonable medical doubt that death is imminent, is told
of her condition and requests some means of "easy death," and aside
from a desire to help such an individual, no other relevant conditions
exist.4 2
At the center of the argument for beneficent euthanasia is a societal
obligation "to treat members kindly ' 453 and consistent with a principle
of beneficence.45 4 Suffering should at all times be minimized and kind
treatment maximized.45 This position must be advocated without fear
of it being viewed as another Nazi-type plan for extermination. 4 6 The
fear that the use of euthanasia, however qualified, runs the risk of de-
stroying the social fabric of society is unfounded. 47 Beneficent euthana-
sia's utilization is totally consistent with the basic human need for dig-
nity or self-respect. It should not be viewed as a punishment, but rather
44 Id.
"7 Id.
448 Id.
49 Id.
410 R. VEATCH, supra note 439, at 135.
451 M. KOHL, THE MORALITY OF KILLING 95 (1974).
452 See id. at 95-96.
413 Id. at 96.
454 Id. at 100.
455 Id. at 99.
456 Id. at 100.
417 See E. KLUGE, THE PRACTICE OF DEATH 149 (1975).
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as a matter of meeting this basic need and of executing the societal
obligation to treat all members of society kindly or with compassion. 458
Perhaps at the heart of any discussion of euthanasia is whether such
life-ending acts are cruel in and of themselves45 9 and morally justified.
Furthermore, any discussion must consider whether in point of fact the
act of euthanasia is administered to a person.460 For one to be recog-
nized as a person, it is commonly regarded as necessary for her to have
rational awareness. 46' Query: Is a "betubed, sedated, aerated, glucosed,
458 See M. KOHL, supra note 451, at 103, 106 (1974).
4-9 See id. at 107. The poignancy and humaneness of euthanasia drew national at-
tention when, in its January 8, 1988, issue, the American Medical Association printed
an anonymous column entitled, It's Over, Debbie, 259 J. A.M.A. 272 (1988). This
article was written by a physician who described the manner in which he deliberately
injected a 20-year old young woman suffering from ovarian cancer with an overdose of
morphine. Id. Subsequently, the American Medical Association cited confidentiality
and First Amendment issues in refusing to provide the Cook County State Attorney
with the name of the physician-author for a grand jury in Chicago. Specter, AMA
Won't Identify Mercy Killer, Wash. Post, Feb. 17, 1988, at A3, col. 1. The Chief
Judge of the Cook County Court later ruled that no crime had been proved and dis-
missed a later grand jury subpoena demanding the physician-author's identity. Wilker-
son, Judge Stalls Inquiry into a Mercy Killing Case, N.Y. Times, Mar. 19, 1988, at 6,
col. 1; see also Cohn, Saving Lives, Ending Lives, Wash. Post Health Mag., Mar. 1,
1988, at 13, col. 1; Cohn, Story of "Debbie's" Death Isn't Over, Wash. Post Health
Mag., Apr. 12, 1988, at 10, col. 1.
In light of these events, the American Bar Association Journal had the Gallup Or-
ganization poll 509 lawyers from March 17-24, 1988. See Reidinger, Lawpoll, 74
A.B.A. J. 20 (1988). The poll determined by a 49% to 34% margin that these lawyers
believe that physicians who did what the resident did for Debbie should face criminal
prosecution. Id. Interestingly, 46.1% of attorneys over the age of 50 believed that there
should not be any criminal prosecution of physicians suspected of currently practicing
active euthanasia. Id. Only 35.3% believed that there should be prosecutions. Id. A
majority of the attorneys polled indicated that they would ask their physician for such
assistance if they were either in great pain or diagnosed as being hopelessly ill. Id.
In a survey conducted by the Hemlock Society in California, 5000 questionnaires
were sent to physicians practicing general medicine, cancer treatment, or care of the
aged. See Matthews, Doctors Admit Euthanasia, Group Says, Wash. Post, Feb. 26,
1988, at A6, col. 1. Of the 588 responses, 79 doctors reported that they had intention-
ally taken the lives of their terminal patients who had requested them to do so. Id.
Twenty-nine of these 79 acknowledged performing euthanasia more than three times.
Id. Among this group of 79, 84% related that they thought their actions were proper,
and the remaining 16% said that they did not consider their actions proper. Id. Sixty-
two percent of the total number of physicians believed that it is "sometimes right" for a
doctor to help a terminally ill patient. Id. In a Louis Harris poll of 200 physicians for
the Harvard Community Health Plan, 66% of those physicians opposed active euthana-
sia, and 30% supported it. Id.
4 E. KLUGE, supra note 457, at 161.
461 Id.
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mechanically manipulated" individual capable of being considered ra-
tionally aware? 462 Arguably, one simply is not a person under these
conditions, 4 3 and the individual who acts deliberately and with set pur-
pose to relieve such a suffering, incurably ill, and extremely debilitated
individual should not be recognized as having committed an act of mur-
der.464 However, for this conclusion to have merit, some type of set cri-
teria or characteristics for personhood must be acknowledged as either
correct or acceptable,465 or an incontrovertible definition of it agreed
upon.466 An analysis of the requisites of personhood and their value as
a construct for critical decision making has previously been analyzed.467
One should note only by way of re-emphasis that these various criteria
have yet to achieve the mark of incontrovertibility. Yet, there is very
wide agreement that when there is no "relational potential" or a capac-
ity for love and engaging in interpersonal relations - because of an
absence of cerebral functioning - there can be no recognition of
personhood. 461
B. Blurred Definitions and a Posited Clarification
A good number of physicians and moral theologians use "euthana-
sia" only in connection with active euthanasia, preferring to refer to
"passive euthanasia" as "the right to death with dignity. '469 The reality
of the present situation is that many of the old, chronically ill, debili-
tated or mentally impaired are allowed to die by withholding aggressive
medical treatment, and available care goes to young, mentally normal
patients. 470
Since little substance depends upon what label is attached to these
present actions, the debate about their distinctions becomes pointless. 47'
462 Id.
43 See id.
" See id. at 162.
45 See id.
466 See id.
47 See supra notes 349-55 and accompanying text.
468 See McCormick, supra note 350, at 339-49.
469 Rachels, Euthanasia, Killing and Letting Die, in ETHICAL ISSuES RELATING
TO DEATH 148 U. Ladd ed. 1979) [hereafter ETHICAL ISSUES]; see also J. RACHELS,
THE END OF LIFE (1986).
470 See Appelbaum & Klein, Therefore Choose Death?, 81 COMMENTARY 23, 27
(1986).
471 See Rachels, supra note 469, at 148. For example, if someone were to see that an
infant were drowning in a bathtub, would it make any difference whether an act of
active or passive euthanasia were followed? It could be perceived "just as bad to let it
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Indeed, because of the blurring of distinctions between active and pas-
sive euthanasia, there is really no distinct difference between the two.47 2
If death is intentionally caused by doing something or withholding some-
thing there is no morally significant distinction to be drawn between an
active means to death and a passive means to death. Both are alike or
intended means to death; and both the intention and the result are the
same - the death of the patient. If one simply withholds treatment, it
may take the patient longer to die, and he may suffer more than he would
if more direct action were taken and a lethal injection given.473
In an effort to establish analytical clarity, euthanasia should be rede-
fined as either the putting to death or the failure to prevent death in
cases of terminal illness or injury.47 4 Several motives could validate the
act: to relieve comatoseness, to relieve the effects of permanent suffering
and anxiety, or perhaps to relieve a perceived sense of burdensome-
ness. 475 Thus, as newly clarified, at least one other person would be
considered as causing or helping to cause the death of a competent indi-
vidual who desires death. In the case of an incompetent, one other per-
son would make a substituted decision in the individual's best interests
to either cause death directly or to withdraw some mechanism or pro-
cess that sustains life.4 76
In its Declaration of Venice of October 1983, the World Medical
Assembly concluded that the best interests of the patient should be the
operative standard to decide health care matters.477 Although this would
appear to be a principle grounded in common sense, there are a grow-
ing number of situations in which the medical profession operates
counter to the best interests of many of its patients. Letting die, to be
more specific, often involves a course of inaction that directly conflicts
with the best interests of a patient. An illustrative case dramatizes this
vividly.
A woman is dying of terminal cancer of the throat. She is no longer able
to take food and fluids by mouth and is suffering considerable distress. She
would be able to live for a few more weeks if medical feeding by way of a
nasogastric tube were continued. However, the woman does not want the
drown as to push its head under water," for one action is as iniquitous as the other.
Foot, Euthanasia, in ETHICAL ISSUES, supra note 469, at 29.
472 See F. HARRON, J. BURNSIDE & T. BEAUCHAMP, HEALTH AND HUMAN VAL-
uEs 48 (1983).
473 Id.; see also Rachels, Active and Passive Euthanasia, 292 NEW ENG. J. MED.
78 (1975).
414 See F. HARRON, J. BURNSIDE & T. BEAUCHAMP, supra note 472, at 42.
475 Id.
476 See id.
7 See Declaration of Venice on Terminal Illness, 140 MED. J. Aus. 431 (1981).
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extra two or three weeks of life because life has become a burden which
she no longer wishes to bear. She asks the doctor to help her die. The
doctor agrees to discontinue medical feeding, removes the nasogastric tube,
and the woman dies a few days later.418
Death was obviously in the best interests of this woman. The method,
however, for allowing its occurrence was not. If a lethal injection had
been given, a quick and painless death would have resulted. Rather,
after having nasogastric tube removed, she lingered a few days - dying
ultimately of dehydration and starvation. 4 9 Was it in this patient's
"best interests" to be starved to death? Did society in some manner
triumph because this individual was forced to suffer an undignified
ending instead of being mercifully "killed"? 480
The sad and very real fact is that a swift and painless death does not
always follow from cessation of life-sustaining treatment.481 The patient
whose kidneys have failed and for whom dialysis or transplant surgery
is not pursued will generally remain conscious and experience one or
all of the following: nausea and vomiting, an inability to concentrate
and - eventually - convulsions.482 What type of justification can be
given for utilizing a method of treatment involving more suffering, in-
stead of less, as being in an individual's best interests?
471 Kuhse, Euthanasia - Again, 142 MED. J. Aus. 610, 611 (1985).
479 Id.
480 Fearing condonation or actual use of "poisons or similar lethal agents" upon re-
quest by a patient would "risk serious abuse," the President's Commission for the
Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research re-
fused to sanction such usage. See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 386, at 62
passim. However, the Commission did recognize that dying patients' treatment refusals
should be honored. Id. at 63.
The Law Reform Commission of Canada concluded that euthanasia should not be
legalized because such a condonation would severely weaken respect for all human life.
Instead, the Commission suggested that a better answer to the sufferings of terminally
ill would be to develop more effective palliative care and to search for equally effective
pain control therapies. THE LAw REFORM COMMISSION OF CANADA, REPORT 20:
EUTHANASIA, AIDING SUICIDE AND CESSATION OF TREATMENT 17, 18, 21, 31
(1983). The Commission did recognize that patients are autonomous decision makers
and they, acting within this role, have a right to decide whether to discontinue treat-
ment already in progress or even not to commence any type of treatment at all; this
expression of one's will is but a simple question of fact. Id.
411 See Kuhse, supra note 28, at 147.
482 See id.
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C. Acts of Treatment v. Omissions of Treatment
In classical Greece, medicine had three roles: to alleviate the suffer-
ings of the sick; to lessen the violence of diseases that afflicted them; or
to refuse "to treat those who [were] overmastered by their diseases, re-
alizing that in such cases medicine is powerless. '483 Indeed, the most
common duty of all Greco-Roman physicians was "to help, or at least
to do no harm. ' 4 4 Whether a hopeless case was taken by a physician
was purely a matter of discretion. 48 This prevailing sentiment of physi-
cians in this period of civilization found strong precedent in Egyptian
and Assyro-Babylonian medicine. 46 As a medical sentiment, in fact, it
continued in vitality throughout the Middle Ages.487 In writing in his
De Augmentis Scientiarium in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth
centuries, Francis Bacon is commonly thought to have advanced the
conclusion that medicine should seek to prolong life and expand longev-
ity, and the notion has grown in an exaggerated and misdirected man-
ner since that time. 488
Thus, while a physician's so-called duty to prolong life qua life has
no classical roots, the idea of "respect for life" does have a rich tradi-
tion of observance. 489 However, even though physicians did not actively
seek to terminate a life either by abortion or euthanasia, they neither
sought to, actively prolong life, itself.490 With the rise of Christianity,
abortion, suicide, and euthanasia became sins, even though the prolon-
gation of life never became a virtue or a duty.491
1. Morality of Actions
Pope John Paul II approved the "Declaration of Euthanasia"
adopted by the Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of Faith on May
5, 1980, and in so doing advanced broad principles of humanistic care
481 Amundsen, supra note 60, at 23.
484 Id. at 27.
485 Id.
486 Id. at 25.
487 Id.
498 Id. at 27-28. Actually, Bacon, while acknowledging the responsibility of the phy-
sician to restore health and to mitigate pain, promotes this responsibility only when it
"conduces to recovery." Id. at 28 (quoting THE PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS OF FRANCIS
BACON 487 (J. Robertson ed. 1970)). When there is no hope of recovery, the responsi-
bility is to "make a fair and easy passage from life." Id. (quoting THE PHILOSOPHICAL
WORKS OF FRANCIS BACON, supra, at 487)).
489 See Amundsen, supra note 60, at 27.
490 See id.
491 Id.
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and treatment for the dying.492 Acknowledging that one may seek to
utilize advanced medical techniques of an experimental and high-risk
nature to combat illness, the Declaration allows for the interruption of
these processes when they render unsatisfactory results.493 But before
actions of this nature are allowed, the patient's "reasonable wishes"
and those of her family must be considered, together with the advice of
the attending physicians.494 Deferring to physicians' expertise in mat-
ters of this nature, the Declaration allows that they " 'may in particu-
lar judge that the investment in instruments and personnel is dispro-
portionate to the results foreseen.' -491 Further, they may conclude that
" 'the techniques applied impose on the patient strain or suffering out
of proportion with the benefits which he or she may gain from such
techniques.' "496 Obviously, the Declaration proposes a clear and une-
quivocable cost versus benefit analysis as a proper standard of
evaluation.
One may, of course, consistent with the Declaration, "make do with
the normal means that medicine can offer. '497 Thus, if such a course is
followed, "one cannot impose on anyone the obligation to have recourse
492 See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 386, at 300-07; see also Sometimes
Extending Life Only Prolongs Death, N.Y. Times, Sept. 23, 1984, at 6E, col. 1.
493 See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 386, at 305.
494 Id.
495 Id. (emphasis added).
496 Id. (emphasis added).
Louis E. Gelineau, the Roman Catholic Bishop of Providence, Rhode Island, startled
some in the church hierarchy by approving the opinion of a diocesan theologian.
Steinfeils, Bishop Sees No Moral Issue if Feeding Ends in Coma Case, N.Y. Times,
Jan. 12, 1988, at A12, col. 5. The theologian held that, as to the specific case of Marcia
Gray, a 48-year old Catholic from South Kingstown who fell into a coma in 1986 after
a cerebral hemorrhage, it was permissible to withhold nourishment because of the irre-
versible nature of the coma. Id.; see Hansen, Right to Die: A Consensus is Emerging
with Assistance of Catholic Theologians, NAT'L CATH. REP., Dec. 11, 1987, at 1, col.
1.
Joseph Cardinal Bernardin of Chicago called for common sense to be employed in
resolving this issue and noted:
We are not morally obliged to do everything that is technically possible.
In other words, there are cases when we would not be obliged to provide
artificial nutrition and hydration. We are saying that those whose lives
have, in fact, entered the dying process should be helped to live the re-
mainder of their lives with full human dignity and with as little pain as
possible.
Society for the Right to Die, Newsletter, Summer 1988, at 8; see also supra note 6 and
accompanying text.
497 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 386, at 306.
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to a technique which is already in use but which carries a risk or is
burdensome. ' 498 A refusal of this type must not be regarded as an act
equivalent to suicide; the refusal represents an acceptance of a human
condition as well as a desire to avoid treatment "disproportionate to the
results ' 499 or perhaps a wish to prevent excessive financial drains on
the patient's family and community.500 Again, the element of economic
feasibility of treatment is set forth as a proper vector of force in ulti-
mate decision making. The need to ration scarce medical resources so
that they may be expended on those who have a real possibility of re-
covery is also impliedly recognized in the Declaration.50 1 The Declara-
tion concludes that:
[Wlhen inevitable death is imminent in spite of the means used, it is per-
mitted in conscience to take the decision to refuse forms of treatment that
would only secure a precarious and burdensome prolongation of life, so
long as the normal care due to the sick person in similar cases is not
interrupted. 50 2
2. Ordinary v. Extraordinary Treatment
The principles of ordinary versus extraordinary life-sustaining
processes or treatments are very relative, not only as to time and locale,
but also in their application to specific cases. In essence, these concepts
serve as basic value judgments that aid in determining whether a given
modality of treatment presents an undue hardship to the at-risk patient
or whether it provides hope for a direct benefit. Thus, if a particular
medical or surgical course of treatment imposes too great a hardship on
the patient, and no reasonable hope of benefit could be expected, such
actions would properly be viewed as extraordinary and not obliga-
tory.503 In practice, many physicians choose to equate "ordinary" with
498 Id. (emphasis added).
499 Id.
500 Id.
501 See generally id. at 300-07. For discussion of allocation of scarce health re-
sources, see Smith, Triage: Endgame Realities, 1 J. CONTEMP. H.L. & POL'Y 143
(1985).
One prominent Jesuit theologian, Fr. Edwin J. Healey, has implied that the maxi-
mum amount of money that could be expended on an ordinary course of treatment
before it became extraordinary, was $2,000.00. See Kelly, The Duty of Using Artificial
Means of Preserving Life, 11 THEOLOGICAL STUD. 203, 206 n.9 (1950) (citing Fr.
Healey).
502 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 386, at 307.
503 See R. MCCORMICK, NOTES ON MORAL THEOLOGY, 1965 THROUGH 1980, at
565 (1981).
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"usual," and "extraordinary" with "unusual" or "heroic" medical
practice.10 4 However, once a physician decides to withhold "heroics," no
decision making framework exists which would demonstrate which al-
ternative treatments should be either pursued or withheld. For exam-
ple, sometimes a physician will initiate intravenous feeding, but at a
rate that will result in dehydration over time. 05 While this half-treat-
ment maintains the vital symbol of feeding, it does not sustain the life
of the patient over an extended period of time.506 Nonetheless, the ges-
ture serves as a type of artificial compromise for physicians wishing to
respect the symbol yet act in accordance with patients' needs or ex-
pressed wishes. 07
Determining whether medical or surgical treatment is either ordi-
nary or extraordinary may be regarded as a qualitative statement. In
reaching this statement, knowingly or unknowingly, the decision mak-
ers involved utilize a substituted judgment to conclude whether -
under similar circumstances to those in which the patient in extremis
exists - they would or would not wish to survive in such a physical
and mental state. Obviously, decisions of this moment are made within
a varied and yet complex vortex of highly charged emotions. 08
If the binding force of life is love, people should seek to maximize
responses to live in whatever assorted conditions or states they find
themselves and, at the same time, minimize suffering and maximize the
social good or utility of life.5°9 Simply stated, if an act would cause
more harm than good to an at-risk individual and to those associated
closely with her, the act could be considered an unloving one. The cen-
tral point is that in cases of this nature, a basic cost/benefit analysis is
almost always undertaken - either on a conscious or unconscious
level.5 10
On a case-by-case basis, with the standard of reasonableness as the
linchpin - as opposed to an unyielding a priori ethic - health care
providers should balance the gravity of the harm caused by extraordi-
nary care against the utility of the good that will result from such ex-
traordinary actions. The decision makers should be ever mindful of the
0 J. CHILDRESS, supra note 22, at 166.
s05 See Hilfiker, Allowing the Debilitated to Die: Facing Our Ethical Choices, 308
N. ENG. J. MED. 716 (1983).
506 See Childress, When Is It Morally Justifiable to Discontinue Medical Nutrition
and Hydration?, in By No EXTRAORDINARY MEANS 67, 81 U. Lynn ed. 1986).
s07 See id.
508 See Smith, supra note 350, at 734.
w See id.
510 See id.
[Vol. 22:275
Suicide or Self-Determination?
ethical imperative to minimize human suffering at all levels when mak-
ing ultimate decisions.51' In reality, this mandated balancing test vali-
dates a cost/benefit analysis.512 Only after recognizing that all life is
sanctified by creation and is qualitative both to the individual at peril
as well as to humankind in general may one inquire whether the medi-
cally handicapped individual possesses a sustained ability to enjoy and
fulfill loving, interpersonal relationships with others. Ultimately the in-
quiry must determine whether the present or contemplated course of
medical or surgical treatment maximizes the potential utility of life,
assuming it exists, or contrariwise, minimizes present suffering.5 3
Measures of an extraordinary nature undertaken for the specific
purpose of prolonging a life of suffering are not only unjust to the indi-
vidual in distress, but also mock societal standards of decency and hu-
manity.514 The physician's primary responsibility is to relieve suffering
when it occurs, not to engineer the survival of a patient at all costs.
Indeed, an overly aggressive modality of treatment for a terminally ill
patient should be recognized as defiling the very doctrine of primum
non nocere.515 If therapy would be futile and to no end other than mere
survival, it should not be administered. 5 6 Thus, the artificial feeding of
a terminally ill patient in irreversible coma should be regarded as a
treatment decision and not mandated except when benefits clearly out-
weigh burdens.517
511 See id. at 738.
512 See id.
513 See Will, When Homicide is Noble, in THE MORNING AFTER, supra note 134, at
84-86. In cases of this nature, the ultimate morality of an action or inaction can never
be evaluated properly without referring to the quality of life being extended by the
heroic measures. See id.
514 See G. SMITH, supra note 31, at 9.
515 Primum non nocere means "[f]irst, do no harm," Frankel, Curing Lawyers' In-
competence: Primum Non Nocere, 10 CREIGHTON L. REV. 613, 613 (1977), or
"[albove all, do no harm." Capron, Whither Health Care (Book Review), 133 U. PA.
L. REV. 535, 537 (1985) (reviewing P. STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICAN MEDICINE (1982) ("[T]he physician was likely to be of greatest assistance
by intervening as little as possible and by merely supporting the patient, while nature
resolved the illness.").
516 Beall, Mercy for the Terminally Ill Cancer Patient, 249 J. A.M.A. 2883 (1983).
517 See AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION (AMA), 1982 A.M.A. JUDICIAL COUN-
CIL CURRENT OPINIONS 9-10; PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 386, at 288. In
a challenge to the Connecticut Removal of Life Support System Act, the Connecticut
Supreme Court determined that the Act allowed the removal of artificial life support,
such as a gastrostomy tube. McConnell v. Beverly Enterprises-Connecticut, Inc., 209
Conn. 692 (1989). In this particular case, the informed consent of the terminally ill
patient's husband and children to the removal had been evidenced, and the patient
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Further subtleties and ambiguities in the taxonomy of ordinary ver-
sus extraordinary care are seen dramatically in three landmark case
opinions. In the case of In re Dinnerstein,1 8 the court observed that its
task was to discern the rather slight "distinction between those situa-
tions in which the withholding of extraordinary measures may be
viewed as allowing the disease to take its natural course and those in
which the same actions may be deemed to have been the cause of
death."5 19 The court in Superintendent of Belchertown State School v.
Saikewicz52° stated that no extraordinary means of prolonging life
should be pursued when there is no hope that the patient will recover:
"Recovery should not be defined simply as the ability to remain alive; it
should mean life without intolerable suffering." '521 Finally, in In re
Quinlan,52 the court opined: "One would have to think that the use of
the same respirator or like support could be considered 'ordinary' in the
context of the possibly curable patient but 'extraordinary' in the context
of the forced sustaining by cardio-respiratory processes of an irreversi-
bly doomed patient."'23
3. Circularity in Terminology
Obviously, the terms ordinary and extraordinary medical treatment
are "incurably circular until filled with concrete or descriptive mean-
ing. '11 4 Furthermore, one commentator would abandon these terms in
favor of a classification that merely recognizes helpful "treatment medi-
cally indicated" for non-dying patients and "curative treatment not in-
dicated" for dying patients. 25 Ultimately, these classifications must fail
because no objective criteria or concreteness is set forth which would
enable a decision maker to act unerringly. No guiding or unyielding a
priori standard is proffered - only a standard of situational reason-
ableness tied to the facts of each case. Perhaps, however, this failure
may reveal the very strength of the suggestion: a straight recognition
herself had made her intentions clear. Id. The court rejected the state attorney general's
argument that the patient's action was tantamount to suicide. Id.
518 380 N.E. 2d 134 (Mass. App. Div. 1978).
519 Id. at 137 n.7.
520 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E. 2d 417 (1977).
521 Id. at 735, 370 N.E. 2d at 424 (quoting Lewis, Machine Medicine and Its Rela-
tion to the Fatally Ill, 206 J. A.M.A. 387 (1968)).
522 70 N.J. 10, 335 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
523 Id. at 48, 335 A.2d at 668 (emphasis added).
524 Ramsey, Euthanasia and Dying Well Enough, 44 LINACRE Q. 43 (1977).
525 Id.; see also Ramsey, Prolonged Dying: Not Medically Indicated, HASTINGS
CENTER REP., Feb. 1976, at 14, 16.
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that no definitive position can be taken.
Another commentator suggests banning the artificial distinctions be-
tween ordinary and extraordinary treatment. 26 Instead, in a given case,
medical treatment is either "morally imperative" or merely "elec-
tive. 5 27 For a competent patient, refusing treatment would be accepted
when she presented reasons relevant to her declining physical or mental
health, or to familial, social, economic or religious concerns, that were
valid to her and her alone.528 The incompetent patient is faced with the
knowing reality that she is unable to make reasonable choices. Thus,
the decision maker in this setting - spouse, parent, child, next of kin,
guardian or physician - may refuse treatment on morally acceptable
grounds when such an action would seem "within the realm of reason
to reasonable people." 529
The question remains: What is the test of reasonableness?
A reasonable person would find a refusal unreasonable (and thus treat-
ment morally required) if the treatment is useful in treating a patient's
condition (though not necessarily life-saving) and at the same time does
not give rise to any significant patient-centered objections based on physi-
cal or mental burden; familial, social or economic concern; or religious
belief.53
Both of these new ordinary/extraordinary classifications of treatment
are inescapably tied to a standard of qualitative living perceived by the
at-risk patient, her family, or health care decision maker. Does this
mean that all ultimate decisions regarding treatment or nontreatment
are essentially cost-benefit ones? The feasibility of structuring a frame-
work for principled decision making will be explored in Part V of this
Article.
Ideally the concepts of ordinary and extraordinary means of treat-
ment should totally be disregarded not only because of their imprecise
terms of definition and application but also because they tend to sup-
port paternalism.5 31 While the standards of customary medical practice
determine what ought to be done, both the disease together with the
medical technologies needed to treat it displace the patient as the focus
of concern. Indeed, the patient-person becomes totally subordinated to
the patient-disease-bearer.5 32 What is demanded, then, is a simple rec-
526 See R. VEATCH, supra note 439, at 110.
527 Id.
521 See id.
529 Id.
530 Id. at 112. See generally McCormick, supra note 350, at 390, 383-99.
531 See J. CHILDRESS, supra note 22, at 166.
532 Id.
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ognition that no form of treatment is either obligatory or optional.
Rather, everything depends on the patient's condition. 33 Thus,
The only adequate grounds or standards can be found in the ratio of
benefits and burdens of the treatment to the patient. But the competent
patient should make his or her own assessment, while a proxy must make
it for an incompetent patient, using that patient's previously expressed
wishes or values when they can be determined.
34
D. Legal Distinctions
The legal distinction between acts and omission is made as follows:
In the determination of the existence of a duty, there runs through much
of the law a distinction between action and inaction. . . . [T]here arose
very early a difference, still deeply rooted in the law of negligence, be-
tween "misfeasance" and "nonfeasance" - that is to say, between active
misconduct working positive injury to others and passive inaction or a fail-
ure to take steps to protect them from harm. The reason for the distinction
may be said to lie in the fact that by "misfeasance" the defendant has
created a new risk of harm to the plaintiff, while by 'nonfeasance' he has
at least made his situation no worse, and has merely failed to benefit him
by interfering in his affairs ...
• . . Liability for "misfeasance" ... may extend to any person to whom
harm may reasonably be anticipated as a result of the defendant's conduct,
or perhaps even beyond; while for "nonfeasance" it is necessary to find
some definite relation between the parties, of such a character that social
policy justifies the imposition of a duty to act.5 35
Accordingly, the distinction between assisting with a patient's death
and allowing her to die parallels the American legal system itself in the
way culpability is assigned for either "causing" or "permitting" harm
to be inflicted upon others.5 36 In those instances when an act causes a
wrong or harm, liability is assessed against the agent who brought
about the harm.53 7 However, with cases of omission, liability will not be
imposed unless a "relationship" between the parties is established.138
The act of turning off a patient's artificial respirator may be classi-
fied traditionally as either an act of commission or an act of omission. 39
533 Id.
53 Id.
535 PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 56, at 373-74 (W. Keeton ed.
1984).
136 See Fletcher, Prolonging Life, 42 WASH. L. REV. 999, 1004-05 (1967).
137 Id. at 1009, 1012.
538 Id.
539 See To LIVE AND To DIE: WHEN, WHY AND How (R. Williams ed. 1973);
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Though a distinction may not easily be drawn - because action stems
from either activity - the physician, if found to have committed an
affirmative act of commission, may be held liable for murdering the
patient.5 40 Whether the act of turning off an artificial respirator may be
characterized as an act of commission or omission will depend on
whether the act caused life to end or whether the act simply failed to
sustain life, thereby permitting it to end. The operative verbs here are
"caused" and "permitting. '5 41 In "acting" or "causing," an act of in-
tercession is made to terminate life.541 With acts of "omitting" or "per-
mitting," the simple failure to intercede in preserving life recognizes
that death is permitted to occur.5 43 In determining legally whether the
act of turning off a hypothetical respirator is one of commission or
omission, consideration must also be given to the doctor-patient rela-
tionship, patient reliance and expectation as well as to the actual cir-
cumstances surrounding the physical act of turning off the respirator
itself.5 44
One could argue that the most crucial of all elements - motive - is
the testing rod which determines whether acts were those of commission
or omission. 545 Accordingly, a deliberate act of killing, done without a
particularized motive or evil will, which is designed to end the suffering
of a terminally ill patient, should not be classified as murder.5 46 Since
no personal gain or good inures to the actor - but rather to the recipi-
ent of the immediate action - this would be another reason not to
recognize the act as murder.5 47 Noble intentions, however, are not al-
ways exculpatory. For example, if one subscribed to the belief of
metempsychosis and decided to hasten another along toward the road to
ultimate perfection before she became either tempted or corrupted with
Fletcher, Legal Aspects of the Decision Not to Prolong Life, 203 J. A.M.A. 65 (1968).
54o Comment, The Right to Die, 7 Hous. L. REV. 654, 659 (1970).
141 See Fletcher, supra note 539.
542 See id.
143 See id.
s4 See Fletcher, supra note 536, at 1015-16. The bounds of moral judgment are
certainly questioned when ultimately deciding whether switching off a respirator is an
act of active euthanasia or merely passive euthanasia. See Rachels, supra note 473, at
78.
In a 1983 California case, Barber v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195
Cal. Rptr. 484 (1983), the court distinguished killing and letting die and stated that
actions by two doctors in turning off a vegitative patient's respirator, with permission
from the patient's wife, was not an act of killing. See id. at 1013, 1016-17, 1022.
s14 See E. KLUGE, supra note 457, at 171.
546 Id.
147 See id.
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moral guilt, this act would surely be held to be murder.5 48
Under one line of philosophical reasoning, acquiescing to a request
to kill a fully conscious individual, who for physical or psychological
reasons finds life unbearable and finds no other act suitable to bring a
resolution to the quandary, would be an act of homicide, not an act of
murder. For a murder to be committed, there must be an infringement
of rights. Here is nothing more than a simple and volitional release of
the right to life. 549
[If something is a right at all, then it can be given up; just as a gift, if it is
a gift, can be renounced. Therefore, in cases where the quality of life has
reached a certain subjective minimum, the individual has a right to give
up that life, to request euthanasia. Consequently, in such cases euthanasia
would be morally acceptable.5 O
1. Criminal Liability
To impose criminal liability for not executing a duty owed, the lead-
ing American case55' holds that this duty must be "a legal duty, and not
a mere moral obligation. It must be a duty imposed by law or by con-
tract, and the omission to perform the duty must be the immediate and
direct cause of death." '52 Since the relationship between physicians and
patient is basically contractual - arising from the nature of an offer
and acceptance - a physician has no obligation to treat all comers.
Only when the physician undertakes to treat the patient does the law
impose a duty to continue treatment, in the absence of a contrary un-
derstanding, so long as the individual case requires. 553 For the terminal
patient desiring a swift, painless death, discharging the attending physi-
cian would not only terminate the physician's duty but also would
eliminate the primary basis for his criminal liability.5 54 Therefore, the
issue of imposing criminal liability arises only when the physician has
not been discharged or has failed to withdraw from a case with proper
notice, thereby continuing the physician-patient relationship.155 The
physician may not terminate this relationship by abandoning the pa-
548 See id.
59 See id. at 179.
550 Id.
551 People v. Beardsley, 150 Mich. 206, 113 N.W. 1128 (1907).
552 Id. at 209, 113 N.W. at 1129.
553 See Euthanasia: Criminal, Tort, Constitutional and Legislative Considerations,
supra note 34, at 1207.
114 Id. at 1208.
555 Id.
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tient; it is within this context that the possibility of criminal liability
frequently arises. 556
The history of American case law of euthanasia presents an interest-
ing record of a system that prosecutes the offense in a limited man-
ner. 5 7 In fact, as early as 1916, the predominate view was that even
when life was taken with consent to relieve either suffering or "other
greater calamity,"558 the act might still form the basis of a criminal
prosecution, although unlikely.5 5 9 Consequently, both judges and juries
were reluctant to act affirmatively in these situations. 560
A survey of American case law reveals twelve cases involving active
euthanasia: only one case resulted in an actual conviction for murder;
three cases maintained convictions for offenses less than murder; seven
cases received acquittals; one case failed because of no indictment.5 61 In
construing this same survey, one authority noted that there were actu-
ally nine acquittals in all - seven of which were allowed because of
temporary insanity. 562 However, given that the standards for finding
insanity are "tightening,"5 63 future acquittals of cases similar to these
twelve may be more difficult to obtain.564
From the list of twelve cases, only one case resulted in a conviction
for murder; the plaintiff was convicted of first degree murder and sen-
tenced to death for the electrocution of his six-month-old mongoloid
556 Id. A new and novel tort action for wrongful living has recently been proposed.
See Oddi, The Tort of Interference with the Right to Die: The Wrongful Living Cause
of Action, 75 GEo. L.J. 625, 641 (1980). Under this proposed action, the tort would be
recognized as personal and thus redressed only by the individual whose right to die was
compromised; or, if that individual should subsequently die, by her surviving represen-
tative. Id. If the interfering treatment is made and the patient lives, interfering with the
right to die involves compensating the living. Id. On the other hand, if the interfering
treatment causes death earlier than nontreatment, a clear, causal connection exists be-
tween the interference and the loss - permanent death. Id. Accordingly, the decedent's
beneficiaries would appropriately be entitled to wrongful death damages, but damages
would be calculated for that period of time by which the treatment shortened life. Id.;
see also Furrow, Damage Remedies and Institutional Reform: The Right to Refuse
Treatment, 10 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 152 (1982).
117 See Euthanasia: Criminal, Tort, Constitutional and Legislative Considerations,
supra note 34, at 1213.
558 See id.
119 See id.
560 Id.
561 See id. at 1213 & n.82.
562 R. VEATCH, supra note 439, at 79.
563 Id.
Id. See generally MacKinnon, Euthanasia and Homicide, 26 CRIM. L.Q. 483
(1983-1984).
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son. 565 His sentence was subsequently commuted to life in prison,
which was in turn reduced to six years. 566 In two cases involving physi-
cians, both doctors were prosecuted for their efforts to ease the burden
of interminable suffering for their patients by injecting them with po-
tassium chloride 67 and air. 568 Neither of the physicians defended on the
grounds that they were insane when they pursued this action. 69
2. The International Perspective
An international incident that occurred in 1975 in Zurich,
Switzerland, highlights the typical legal problem encountered with a
policy of withdrawing tubal feeding. 70 In January of that year, a
prominent Swedish physician, Peter Haemmerli, was accused of mur-
der by starvation for failing to force feed unnamed terminally ill pa-
tients in a local hospital over a four-to-five-year period. 571 Although no
formal prosecution resulted since there was no allegation of a particular
murder, the charge was made as a consequence of a casual conversation
between Dr. Haemmerli and a local politically aspiring city council
member; the conversation concerned the manner in which terminal pa-
tients were treated at the hospital where the doctor was on staff.572
565 Commonwealth v. Noxon, 319 Mass. 495, 66 N.E.2d 814 (1946).
5" Euthanasia: Criminal, Tort, Constitutional and Legislative Considerations,
supra note 34, at 508 & 1214 n.86.
567 See R. VEATCH, supra note 439, at 78. In June 1973, Dr. Vincent A.
Montemorano was indicted for taking the life of his patient, a fifty-nine year old Long
Island man dying of pharynx cancer, by injecting him with potassium chloride. Id. At
trial he was found innocent of the action. Id.
16 See id. at 79-80. In New Hampshire in 1950, Dr. Herman Sander was charged
with committing the murder of Mrs. Abbie Brown, who was dying of cancer, by giving
her intravenous injections of air. Id. At trial he was acquitted. Id.
569 Id. at 80. For a brief listing and analysis of the nine or so widely publicized (but
not officially reported) mercy-killing court cases against physicians, see 0. RUSSELL,
supra note 167, at 254-56, 260, 329-30.
In a particularly famous 1957 English case, Dr. John Bodkin-Adams was charged
with murder for allegedly administering narcotics to relieve pain. Id. at 255, 329. The
court found Dr. Adams not guilty of murder even though the course of treatment that
was administered incidentally shortened the decedent's life. Id.
In 1983 two physicians were found innocent of committing murder. Barber v.
Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (1983). They had discon-
nected a patient's respirator and stopped artificial feeding and hydration for the patient.
Id. These actions were done with written approval of the patient's spouse. Id.
570 See Culliton, The Haemmerli Affair: Is Passive Euthanasia Murder?, 90
SCIENCE 1271 (1975); see also 0. RUSSELL, supra note 167, at 351.
571 Culliton, supra note 570, at 1271.
572 See id. at 1271-72.
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More specifically, it was revealed that when a comatose stroke victim
failed to gain consciousness, and in the opinion of the medical staff
would never become conscious, the staff would discontinue tubal feed-
ing and administer a saline solution which would prevent dehydration
and maintain the normal chemical balance in the blood. 73 Normally,
the patient would die within several weeks as a result of starvation and
without pain, assuming, of course, that a comatose person is immune
from any associated type of pain during this course of treatment. 574
Although Dr. Haemmerli's treatment is an accepted medical prac-
tice, the question must be raised as to the value and the humaneness of
letting people die without a semblance of dignity. Does society profit
from this type of action? What moral or ethical principles are validated
- beneficence, respect for persons? Sadly, the only position that is
maintained is that of the status quo - a position that stresses the con-
tinuation of a practice or policy merely because it has been maintained
over the years. Contemporary times demand contemporary, thoughtful,
and humane responses to the critical issue of terminally ill patients, not
lock-step repetitions of past follies.
In Holland, both the attitude towards voluntary active euthanasia
and its practice are far different from anywhere else in the world. 75 In
fact, the government has announced that it will structure legal guide-
lines under which euthanasia will be permitted. 576 It is unclear whether
the guidelines will take the form of actual legislation or administrative
regulations.5 77 Regardless of the final governmental approach, the
Dutch will retain their present prohibition against active euthanasia
and will simply fashion various permissible exceptions to existing
law.578
171 See id.
574 See id. at 1272.
571 See Cody, Dutch Weigh Legalizing Euthanasia: Gap Cited Between Law and
Practice, Wash. Post, Mar. 16, 1987, at Al, col. 3.
576 Id.
577 Id. at A12, col. 5; see Schepens, Euthanasia: Our Own Future, 3 IssuEs IN L. &
MED. 371, 377 (1988) (listing the guidelines).
578 See id. An eight-member working committee of the British Medical Association
(BMA) is currently studying euthanasia. Although presently "[tihe BMA condemns
active involuntary or active voluntary euthanasia, . . . [iln cases of passive euthanasia
there are mixed feelings." Appleyard, The Last Appointment, The Times (London),
Sunday ed., June 17, 1987, at 22, col. 3.
Switzerland, Uruguay, Peru, Japan, and Germany allow a physician the right to
comply under certain circumstances with a patient's request for death medication. See
M. HEIFETZ, supra note 35, at 96. It is not a punishable crime for a physician to assist
with a suicide if her motivation is altruistic. Id.
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Dr. Pieter Admiraal, a physician at the Reinier de Graaf General
Hospital in Delft, is perhaps the most famous open practitioner of vol-
untary active euthanasia.179 Once he determines that a patient is dying,
and after receiving a second opinion to this fact, Dr. Admiraal assem-
bles a team of other doctors, nurses, and a priest or representative of
the appropriate faith. 80 "Once a patient has repeatedly and lucidly re-
quested euthanasia and the team have discussed the various alternatives
of relief of pain or depression, the decision may be taken to go
ahead."58' Although case law does not require that parties other than
the physician and her patient be involved, as a safeguard, the spouse or
family is involved or at least advised of the decision.58 Once the final
decision is made, Dr. Admiraal follows one of two methods to imple-
ment it: a barbiturate drip will be used which normally induces a state
of unconsciousness within a few hours and death within six or eight
hours. In a few cases, a direct injection of barbiturates and curare may
be used which results in immediate unconsciousness for the patient and
death a few moments later.5 83
Out of Holland's approximate population of fourteen million people,
it is estimated that between six to ten thousand people a year (eight
percent of the total number of deaths in the nation) will die as a conse-
quence of active voluntary euthanasia implemented by their physi-
cians.584 Currently, only sixty actual deaths are formally declared as
caused by euthanasia.5 85 While each death must be investigated by the
local public prosecutor, in the event the physician is prosecuted and
found guilty, he would not be sentenced upon his conviction, thereby
avoiding establishing a criminal record. 586
179 Appleyard, supra note 578, at 13, col. 1.
580 See id. at 16, col. 4. As early as 1958, an eminent Cambridge University profes-
sor advocated that the least cumbersome approach to the euthanasia problem was to
employ referees or committees to determine the validity of requests for voluntary active
euthanasia. See G. WILLIAMS, supra note 38, at 334. He similarly advocated relieving
an assisting physician of all liability if she acted in good faith. Id. at 340.
581 Appleyard, supra note 578, at 13, col. 4.
582 See id. at 16, col. 1.
s83 See id.
584 See id. at 13, col. 4.
585 See id. at 18, col. 4.
586 See id.
In 1984 Maria Barendregt, a 94-year old, became helpless from aging. Id. at 20, col.
1. Her mind was intact although she had extended bouts of unconsciousness, and she
was unable to care for herself. Id. Her physician acquiesced to her demand for eutha-
nasia. Id. At trial the court held that proximity to death is not a necessary condition to
allow euthanasia. Id.
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E. A Constructive Proposal: Redefinition and Re-Education
In order to bring a contemporary sophistication to this area of con-
cern and investigation, a strong definitional stance surrounding the
terms "euthanasia" and "suicide" must be implemented; quite simply,
a re-education. More precisely, the essential taxonomy of euthanasia as
a word, concept, principle, attitude, or legal action must be redefined.
What have before been recognized as acts of euthanasia would after-
wards be known as acts of enlightened self-determination. Actions un-
dertaken within the context of an irreversible medical crisis or terminal
illness587 would be understood not as an act of autonomous rational sui-
cide (or active euthanasia of oneself), or as a refusal of treatment, but
rather as merely an act of enlightened self-determination. For the inca-
pacitated or incompetent individual, the action taken on his behalf by a
surrogate decision maker would similarly be viewed; the actions of
these decision makers would be judged on their reasonableness and
fairness to the terminal patient and her family.
This proposal would foster a new attitude toward death; one that
would redefine the basic tasks of medicine by not only recognizing old
age as an honorable estate but also by recognizing the unjust and inhu-
mane obligation being imposed upon terminally ill old people who are
forced to live through a period of miserable decline and painful help-
lessness. 588 The competent decision maker suffering from a severe
debilitating (terminal) disease, as well as the similarly situated incom-
petent would be accorded the privilege of holding first class citizenship;
the coordinate result of this new attitude towards health care would be
an unyielding recognition that all people possess the total right of per-
sonal autonomy.
Rational assisted suicide and all the varieties of euthanasia would no
longer be considered. The major focus of all inquiry into actions previ-
ously classified as suicide or euthanasia would be simply: Did the indi-
In the celebrated De Terp case, a physician and nurse working in an old person's
home euthanized three of their patients. Id. at 20, col. 3. At trial they were found
guilty of murder and sentenced to a year of imprisonment. Id. Only on appeal were
they freed. Id.
187 This term would be defined as "an illness in which, on the basis of the best
available diagnostic criteria and in the light of available therapies, a reasonable estima-
tion can be made prospectively and with a high probability that a person will die
within a relatively short time." Bayer, Callahan, Fletcher, Hodgson, Jennings,
Monsees, Sieverts & Veatch, The Care of the Terminally Ill: Morality and Economics,
309 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1490, 1491 (1983).
588 See Barrington, Apologia for Suicide, in PHILOSOPHICAL IssuEs, supra note 10,
at 90, 99-100.
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vidual in question, exercising her powers of rational thinking, exercise
an act of enlightened self-determination or autonomy? For the incom-
petent suffering from a similar terminal illness, the question to be an-
swered would be: Did the surrogate decision maker, acting with ration-
ality and humaneness, and thereby within the best interests of the
terminal patient, or employing the principle of substituted judgment for
that individual, exercise an act of enlightened self-determination? Obvi-
ously, health care providers and courts would presume that an individ-
ual under these circumstances or her duly appointed surrogate decision
maker acted properly. Obviously, this position is a large quantum leap
in not only thinking and hoped-for action, but also it is an eminently
fair and reasonable contemporary approach to an age-old problem.
New wine in new wine bottles is the order of the day and of tomorrow
as well.
IV. ORDERS NOT To RESUSCITATE AND THE WITHDRAWAL OR
WITHHOLDING OF TREATMENT
A. Incremental Steps Toward Passive Euthanasia
In 1973 the National Conference on Standards for Cardiopulmonary
Resuscitation and Emergency Cardiac Care sought to establish a proce-
dure which would allow physicians to indicate further medical treat-
ment was not advantageous to particular patients in their care. Accord-
ingly, the Conference suggested that a rather simple "order not to
resuscitate" (ONTR) could be indicated in the progress notes or chart
for the distressed patient and, in turn, communicated to the hospital
staff.5 89 ONTR can be distinguished from other forms of medical care
which terminate pre-existing patient support systems such as the dis-
continuance of respirators. Specifically, ONTR forbids the use of ino-
tropic or vasopressor drugs that increase cardiac contractility and main-
tain blood pressure and discourages initiating cardiopulmonary
resuscitation (CPR).5 90 A similar order is the do not resuscitate (DNR)
order. These orders are often referred to as "no codes" since they nor-
mally stipulate that no emergency treatment should be given when car-
diac or respiratory failure occurs. 591
ss9 See Standards for Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation (CPR) and Emergency Car-
diac Care (ECC), 227 J. A.M.A. 837 (1974) [hereafter Standards for CPR and ECC].
See generally Evans & Brody, The Do-Not-Resuscitate Order in Teaching Hospitals,
253 J. A.M.A. 2236 (1985) (describing study of do-not-resuscitate orders at three
teaching hospitals).
190 See Standards for CPR and ECC, supra note 589, at 837.
591 Id.; see also Rabkin, Gillerman & Rice, Orders Not to Resuscitate, 295 NEW
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The inherent problems associated with the 1973 Cardiopulmonary
Resuscitation and Emergency Care Conference Report on ONTR are
as complex today as they were then. The Conference Report offers no
guidance in determining with reasonable accuracy whether an illness is
terminal and whether continued medical treatment contravenes the best
interest of a terminally ill patient. Moreover, the Report fails to state
whether principles of triage,592 or the efficient and maximum allocation
of scarce medical resources - together with quality of life factors -
should be evaluated in the deliberative process.193
As a result of "the growing medicalization of death, ' ' 94 human acts
of intervention have nearly totally replaced natural processes.5 9 Indeed,
with the almost daily discoveries of "miracle drugs," the perfection of
new surgical routines, and the development of new sophisticated
mechanical mechanisms designed to assist or to relieve normal bodily
processes, illness can no longer be considered as having a natural course
of progressive development. 96 Thus, while pneumonia had once been
regarded as the dear friend of elderly ill patients, leading to cardio-
pulmonary seizure and almost certain death, now frenzied Code Blue
Trauma Teams daily race to jump-start hearts with electric paddles
and drugs and reinflate lungs with artificial pumps.5 97 Death is no
longer a family residential occurrence; rather it has been moved to a
hospital or some other type of health-care institution.598
The patient's autonomy or right of self-determination in health care
issues must always be balanced against the same professional autonomy
of a physician. Thus, no force or coercion should compel a physician to
treat a patient who has rejected resuscitation when the physician be-
lieves that patient resuscitation is an ethical, moral, or professional ob-
ligation.5 99 An important recognition of this professional autonomy for
ENG. J. MED. 364 (1976). See generally Miller, Death with Dignity and the Right to
Die: Sometimes Doctors Have a Duty to Hasten Death, 13 J. MED. ETHICS 81 (1987)
(advocating that technical advances in lifesaving technology should be paralleled by
advances in semantic and rhetorical approaches to death).
592 See Smith, supra note 501, at 143.
593 See P. RAMSEY, THE PATIENT AS PERSON 239-46 (1970); see also Smith, Death
Be Not Proud: Medical, Ethical and Legal Dilemmas in Resource Allocation, 3 J.
CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 47 (1987); Smith, supra note 501, at 143.
1'4 Capron, Legal and Ethical Problems in Decisions for Death, 14 LAW, MED. &
HEALTH CARE 141, 141 (1986).
595 Id.
596 Id.
97 See id.
598 Id.
599 See generally Comment, A Structural Analysis of the Physician-Patient Rela-
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the physician must be allowed through maintenance of an option for
her to transfer care of the terminal or at-risk patient.60 0
When courts are presented with a typical DNR case, they normally
will balance the patient's qualified right to refuse treatment against two
other factors: the prognosis for the patient and the degree to which the
DNR order will be invasive to bodily integrity. 601 The state interest
will yield to the individual privacy right as the prognosis for recovery
lessens and the degree of bodily invasion increases. 60 2 Accordingly,
when invasive treatment such as surgery or dialysis is dictated, the per-
vasive judicial attitude has been to uphold the patient's right to refuse
treatment, even though there may well be a favorable patient progno-
sis.60 3 The few courts that have considered ONTRs have generally ap-
proved the orders given the high invasive nature of cardiopulmonary
resuscitation. 604
1. The 1976 Massachusetts General Hospital Protocol
In 1976 the Massachusetts General Hospital formally announced its
protocol on "Optimum Care for Hopelessly Ill Patients."6° The first
step of the directive set forth the process for determining the level of
care which should be given to critically ill patients; namely, the classifi-
cation of their probability of survivability or salvageability. 60 6 Consis-
tent with the time-honored principle of triage, four classifications are
listed: Class A, when "maximal therapeutic effort without reserva-
tionship in No-Code Decisionmaking, 93 YALE L.J. 362 (1983) (criticizing current no-
code decision making and urging replacement with system based on patient's informed
consent).
600 See id.
601 See, e.g., In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, 664 (1976).
602 See, e.g., id.
603 See, e.g., Lane v. Candura, 6 Mass. App. 377, 376 N.E.2d 1232 (1978); In re
Quackenbush, 156 N.J. Super. 282, 383 A.2d 785 (1978).
601 See, e.g., Brophy v. New Eng. Sanai Hosp., 398 Mass. 417, 497 N.E.2d 626
(1986); Custody of a Minor, 385 Mass. 697, 706-08, 709 n.9, 434 N.E.2d 601, 604-05,
607 n.9 (1982); In re Dinnerstein, 380 N.E. 2d 134, 135-36 (Mass. App. Div. 1978).
Some groups of chronically ill patients should be given the option of refusing treat-
ment from the inception of that treatment. Knowing this option would particularly be
re-assuring for unsophisticated individuals who might be unaware of it. See Appelbaum
& Roth, supra note 274, at 1296; McKegney & Lange, supra note 274, at 267.
605 Massachusetts General Hospital, Report of the Clinical Care Committee: Opti-
mum Care for Hopelessly Ill Patients, 295 NEW ENG. J. MED. 362 (1976) [hereafter
Clinical Care Committee Report].
606 See id.; see also Rabkin, Gillerman & Rice, supra note 591, at 365.
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tion ' 60 7 will be given; Class B, when the same level of effort is given,
but "with daily evaluation because probability of survival is questiona-
ble"; 68 Class C, when "selective limitation of therapeutic measures 60 9
is followed (this class would normally include orders not to resuscitate
or orders to withhold antibiotics); and Class D, "where all therapy can
be discontinued,"6"0 because the patient is either brain dead or has no
chance of regaining "cognitive and sapient" functions. 61 1 A permanent
hospital committee on the optimum treatment of the hopelessly ill is in
place in the event differences of opinion arise regarding treatment of a
terminal patient. Thus, while the primary or "responsible physician"
has full authority over the treatment of her patient - including the
right not to seek the committee's advice at all or to reject it once given
- the guidelines mitigate this full authority by allowing the director of
intensive care to go directly to the chief of service and empanel the
committee, regardless of whether the primary physician wishes to pur-
sue this course.612 For obvious reasons, a physician would have to be
particularly foolhardy or, in the alternative, courageous to act against
the institutional judgment of his peers.
Institutional efforts of this nature present a model for effective and
principled decision making. They also structure a verifiable process for
evaluating the costs and benefits of treatment and nontreatment,
thereby aiding not only the health care providers in their decision mak-
ing, but also the family members or surrogate decision makers who
must approve the ultimate decision.
2. The New York State Task Force on Life and the Law Statutory
Proposal
In April 1986 the New York State Task Force on Life and the Law
issued its study of ONTRs, 613 and proposed a model legislative scheme
which was subsequently adopted by the legislature. 61 4 The statute not
607 Clinical Care Committee Report, supra note 605, at 362-63.
608 Id.
609 Id.
610 Id.
611 Id.
612 See id.
613 See NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW, PROPOSED LEGIS-
LATION AND REPORT ON Do NOT RESUSCITATE ORDERS (1986) [hereafter NEW
YORK TASK FORCE REPORT]. See generally Mooney, Deciding Not to Resuscitate
Hospital Patients: Medical and Legal Perspectives, 1986 ILL. L. REV. 1025.
614 The Proposed Legislation [hereafter Proposed Legislation], "Orders Not to Re-
suscitate," numbers twelve actual pages. See NEW YORK TASK FORCE REPORT, supra
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only provides clear and comprehensive guidelines for decision making,
but further establishes a strong mechanism for arbitration of challenges
to decisions of this nature. The legislation embodies a number of major
policies which are germane to the present issue and which go far to-
ward clarifying the medico-legal use of an order not to resuscitate.
Thus, an analysis of the legislation, itself, is necessary.
While affirming the existing presumption that all hospital patients
consent to CPR in the event of cardiac or respiratory arrest, the legisla-
tion provides for consent for the withholding of CPR or the issuance of
an order not to resuscitate in all hospitals and residential health care
facilities in the State of New York.611 Subject to a narrow therapeutic
exception, an attending physician must obtain the consent of a patient
with decisional authority prior to issuing a DNR order.61 6 This deci-
sion by the patient in a hospital may be either expressed orally or in
writing. 67
Before the issuance of a DNR order, the attending physician must
first obtain the contemporaneous consent of a patient with decisional
capacity. 61 If the at-risk patient lacks capacity at the time of issuing an
order, but had previously stated her wish to forego CPR in writing, the
writing will constitute consent to the issuance of the order.619 Interest-
ingly, the legislation wisely recognizes a narrow therapeutic exception
which permits a physician to obtain consent to a DNR order from an-
other person who acts on behalf of the patient.620 This exception is al-
lowed since isolated circumstances may occur when a patient's capacity
might be jeopardized and immediate injury occur from an actual dis-
note 613, at 59-71 (legislation on file with U.C. Davis Law Review). On August 7,
1987, Governor Mario Cuomo signed into law Chapter 818 of the Laws of New York,
that adopted in major part the Report's findings and legislative proposals. The legisla-
tion became effective April 1, 1988, and was codified as Sections 2960-2978 of the New
York Public Health Law. For a comparison of the new law with the proposals of the
New York State Task Force on Life and the Law, see Comment, Do Not Resuscitate
Orders: A Matter of Life or Death in New York, 4 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y
449 (1988).
611 See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2962 (McKinney 1987) (Proposed Legislation §§
2(6), 3, 4). The primary citation is the official codified citation of the Task Force
Proposed Legislation. The parallel Proposed Legislation sections are included to facili-
tate comparison.
616 Id. § 2964 (Proposed Legislation § 5).
617 Id. § 2964(2)(a)(b) (Proposed Legislation § 4).
618 Id. § 2964 (Proposed Legislation § 5).
619 Id. § 2964(2)(b).
620 See id. § 2964 (3) (Proposed Legislation § 5(3)).
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cussion about resuscitation.6 ,2 Although injury is not defined, the Task
Force cited two examples of situations when discussion would be inad-
visable: (1) when a patient has an arrythmia and a discussion could
trigger cardiac arrest; or (2) when a patient is in a severe state of para-
noic depression or has suicidal tendencies. 622
Unless it is determined that an adult patient lacks capacity - not
competence - to make a resuscitation decision, the presumption is
maintained that every adult is entitled to make such a decision. 623 The
"competence standard" defines an individual's ability to make all deci-
sions, while the "capacity standard" assesses one's ability to make a
specific decision about resuscitation. 624 When a patient lacks capacity to
make a decision of this type, the attending physician is required to ob-
tain the necessary consent from a surrogate. 621 In this instance, the sub-
stitute decision maker must be available as well as willing and compe-
tent to speak for the patient. 626 Provision is made for patients with
capacity to designate an individual to act for and on their behalf if they
are expected to lack capacity at the time the decision must be made. 627
One of four medical conditions must exist and a written determina-
tion made by a physician before a surrogate decision maker may con-
sent to the issuance of a DNR order. 628 The four conditions are finding
that: (1) the patient is terminally ill; (2) irreversibly comatose or per-
manently unconscious; (3) medically futile; and (4) resuscitation would
impose an extraordinary burden on the patient in light of the patient's
medical condition or the expected outcome of resuscitation. 62 9 The sur-
rogate must base any decision on the patient's known wishes or reli-
gious and moral beliefs. 630 If these wishes or beliefs are either unknown
or not ascertainable, the decision will be based on the patient's best
interests. 63'
In those cases when a patient lacks capacity to make a DNR decision
and a proper surrogate is unavailable, an order not to resuscitate can
still be given if one of two conditions is met: (1) a determination is
621 See id.
622 See id.
623 Id. § 2962(1) (Proposed Legislation §§ 3 to 5).
624 See id. § 2961(3) (Proposed Legislation § 5).
625 See id. § 2965 (Proposed Legislation § 6).
626 Id.
627 See id. § 2965(2)-(3).
628 See id. § 2965(5)(c).
629 Id.
630 Id. § 2965 (5)(a) (Proposed Legislation § 6(5)).
631 Id.
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made by two physicians that it would be medically futile to undertake
the act; or, (2) a determination is made based on clear and convincing
evidence of either the patient's known wishes or in the absence thereof,
a finding of the patient's best interests, to issue a court order for a
DNR order.632
Before issuing a DNR order for a minor, the attending physician
must first obtain the consent of such a minor's parent or legal guard-
ian.633 However, if the attending physician, in consultation with the
parents of the at-risk minor, determines that the minor does have deci-
sional capacity, the minor's consent to the issuance of a DNR order
must be obtained. 634
The consent to the issuance of a DNR order is narrow and confined
only to cardiopulmonary resuscitation; it does not authorize an exten-
sion of consent to withhold or withdraw medical treatment. 635 The leg-
islation also establishes a procedure for revoking a DNR order; the
patient must make a written or oral declaration "or by any other act
evidencing a specific intent to revoke such consent or assent" to a physi-
cian or to a nurse at the treating hospital.636 For the surrogate, parent
or legal guardian, a similar procedure for revocation is provided. 637
Once the revocation of consent is obtained, it is entered immediately in
the patient's chart and notification given to the hospital staff.638
Section 13 of this legislation mandates that all hospitals and residen-
tial health care facilities establish a dispute mediation system in which
all disagreements incident to the resuscitation decision may be aired. 639
The mediation system allows any party to the controversy to come
before it.64° If the matter is not resolved in mediation, the statute
reserves to all parties the right to seek judicial relief.641 Once a dispute
is brought before the mediation service, the issuance of a DNR is auto-
matically stayed for either seventy-two hours or until the conclusion of
the mediation process, whichever occurs first.642
Judicial review of actions allowed under the legislation may essen-
632 Id. § 2966(1) (Proposed Legislation § 7).
633 Id. § 2967 (2)(a) (Proposed Legislation § 8).
634 Id. (Proposed Legislation § 8).
635 See id. § 2968 (Proposed Legislation § 9).
636 Id. § 2969(1) (Proposed Legislation § 10).
637 See id. § 2969(2).
638 Id. § 2969(3).
639 Id. § 2972(3) (Proposed Legislation § 13).
640 Id
.
641 Id.
642 Id.
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tially be sought by the patient, attending physician, hospital, facility
director if the patient was transferred, any personal surrogate, parents,
or noncustodial parent or legal guardian of a minor patient.6 43 Even
though the statute provides for a required grace period of seventy-two
hours, the actual patient is not required to observe this period, and
''may commence action for relief with respect to any dispute under this
article at any time. ' '6 4
4
For the physicians and other health care providers who comply in
good faith with a DNR order, or who act in the good faith belief that
an order has either not been issued or has been revoked, the legislation
grants immunity from both civil and criminal liability.645 Equal protec-
tion from liability is also extended to persons designated to act for the
patient who consent or decline to consent in good faith to the issuance
of a DNR order.646 Finally, the legislation stipulates that no life insur-
ance policy will be impaired or invalidated as a consequence of a DNR
order, nor can any person require or prohibit the issuance of a DNR
order as either a condition for being insured or for receiving health care
services.64
7
To date, this proposal is the most balanced and comprehensive effort
to define, strengthen, and stabilize the rights, authority, and protections
afforded not only the at-risk patient, but also her family, surrogate de-
cision makers, and health care providers, who all participate in the is-
suance of orders not to resuscitate. It provides a vital structure for prin-
ciple decision making, a blueprint for subsequent state response, and a
framework for achieving a national construct for response to this most
critical area of contemporary medico-legal concern.
3. Unresolved Questions
In the continued development and application of DNRs, a number of
unresolved questions may be posited: (1) Will new and more effective
procedures be developed that will directly involve patients in do not
resuscitate orders before they become moribund?; (2) Will prognostica-
tive techniques advance to the point at which patients needing resusci-
tation will be identified with a certainty instead of the current practice
641 Id. § 2973(1) (Proposed Legislation § 14).
Id. § 2973(3) (Proposed Legislation § 14(2)).
645 See id. § 2974 (Proposed Legislation § 15); see also Oddi, supra note 556, at 641
(proposing new civil action to compensate patients whose right to die is interferred with
by prolonged medical treatment).
646 See N.Y. PUBLIC HEALTH LAW § 2974(3) (McKinney 1987).
647 See id. § 2975 (Proposed Legislation § 16).
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which identifies at-risk patients in vague categorical terms?; (3) Since
current studies show cancer - instead of cardiac disease and old age -
as the most likely predictor of DNR status, does this represent a dan-
ger-point in subsequent efforts that might bias or predispose the issu-
ance of a DNR order?; (4) What should be done with meeting the
demands of families who insist that all measure of life-sustaining treat-
ment be done for the moribund patient, when that patient has never
expressed herself on the issue?; (5) Should concern be raised that as a
consequence of anticipated greater specificity and detail for DNR poli-
cies at hospitals, broader categories of nontreatment decisions might be-
come acceptable?; (6) How far should health costs and the need to ra-
tion expensive and scarce interventions be considered in issuing
DNRs? 648
The complicated and often competing vectors of force or dynamics in
nontreatment decisions must be understood and dealt with. Under-
standing these dynamics is surely no simple task in a pluralistic society
in which a high level of consciousness exists regarding health care. 649
The courts can only go as far as, and with as much clarity as, the
information base which is provided by the medical profession. Of
course, the judiciary should ideally not even intrude into the doctor-
patient or familial sphere of decision making privacy. Perhaps this is
too much to expect, given the vast amount of confusion regarding the
"science" of orders not to resuscitate. The medical profession has every-
thing to gain from efforts to control itself and define the parameters of
its actions. Its input into legislative proposals such as the New York
Study are laudable efforts to bring clarity and structure to this area of
concern, thereby hopefully preventing judicial intrusiveness.
B. The American Medical Association's Guidelines for Withholding
or Withdrawing Life Prolonging Medical Treatment
When Americans died in 1950, the majority died at home with their
families and local physicians in attendance.650 Today, death has become
"medicalized," with the result that human interventions replace natural
processes, thereby prolonging life in one form or other. 651 With a grow-
ing array of high-powered life support techniques and so-called
US Youngner, Do-Not-Resuscitate Orders: No Longer Secret, But Still a Problem,
HASTINGS CENTER REP., Feb. 1987, at 24, 32.
649 See id. at 33.
650 Malcolm, Reassessing Care of Dying: Policy Seen Evolving from A.M.A. Opin-
ion, N.Y. Times, Mar. 17, 1986, at 1, col. 1.
651 See Capron, supra note 594, at 141.
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"miracle" drugs, death is simply another matter of human choice and
one laden with ethical complexities. 652 Presently, of the approximately
5,500 Americans who die each day, 80% do so "wired and incubated in
an institution where the expensive technology is arrayed and controlled
by specialists who likely know little about the patient beyond the medi-
cal problem." '653 Perhaps in recognition of this phenomena, a 1985
Louis Harris poll of 1,254 adults disclosed that 85% of them believed
that a terminally ill patient "ought to be able to tell his doctor to let
him die."'654 Eighty-two percent supported the notion of withdrawing
nasogastric (feeding) tubes if the at-risk patient directs such action. 65
A poll sponsored by the American Medical Association, the results of
which were released November 28, 1986, showed that nearly 3 of 4
Americans or 73% of the 1,510 respondents in this survey, favor "with-
drawing life support systems, including food and water, from hopelessly
ill or irreversibly comatose patients if they or their family request it. ' 65 6
Fifteen percent of the respondents opposed this option, and 12% ex-
pressed uncertainty. 657 Interestingly, 75% of those younger than sixty-
five favored the proposal, as did 64% of those sixty-five or older. 6 8
Twenty percent of the older group said they were unsure - compared
with 10% of the younger group.6 9 The withdrawal of life support sys-
tems was more likely to be favored by individual respondents having at
least a high school education as well as by those respondents whose
annual income was more than $10,000.660
On March 15, 1986, the Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs of
The American Medical Association issued Guidelines for Withholding
652 Id.
653 Malcolm, supra note 650, at 1, col. 1.
654 Wallis, To Feed or Not to Feed, TIME, Mar. 31, 1986, at 60
655 See id.; see also Cohn, Doctor and Patient, Facing Death Together, Wash. Post
Health Mag., Mar. 15, 1988, at 14, col. 1.
656 American Med. News, Nov. 28, 1986, at 13, col.-l. In a new Gallup telephone
survey of 509 lawyers conducted for the ABA Journal March 17-24, 56.8% stated that
administering a lethal injection to a terminally-ill patient who wants to die and has
made clear this wish, should be recognized as being legal. See Reidinger, supra note
459, at 38. A nearly equal percentage of attorneys, 57.6%, oppose legal euthanasia if
the patient is incompetent and consent is obtained from her legal representative. Id. In
these cases only 27.2% of the lawyers interviewed would approve of active euthanasia.
Nine out of 10 lawyers (89.2%) in the survey agreed that active euthanasia should not
be legal if the patient's consent is ambiguous. Id.
657 American Med. News, supra note 656, at 13, col. 1.
658 Id.
659 Id.
6w Id.
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or Withdrawing Life Prolonging Medical Treatment for terminally ill
or irreversibly comatose patients.66' In essence, the guidelines recognize
that a physician may ethically withdraw "all means of life-prolonging
medical treatment," 662 including food and water, from patients who are
terminally ill or who are in irreversible comas. 663 This policy statement
is consistent with the conclusion of the President's Commission for the
Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral
Research that artificial feeding should be regarded as a treatment deci-
sion and not mandated except when the benefits of the treatment out-
weigh the burdens.664
Many individuals choose to make an emotional distinction between
respirators and feeding tubes even though both are means of life sup-
port for comatose patients.665 A number of people perceive an intrave-
nous line as not only more familiar than an artificial respirator but also
less intrusive. 666 Interestingly, in the most distinguished case involving
withholding medical treatment, In re Quinlan,667 Karen Ann Quinlan's
family maintained a successful legal action to disconnect her artificial
respirator.668 However, they did not seek judicial approval of a with-
661 See Malcolm, supra note 650, at 1, col. 1; Wallis, supra note 654, at 60.
662 Malcolm, supra note 650, at 1, col. 1.
63 See id. The AMA had previously acknowledged that "[w]here a terminally ill
patient's coma is beyond doubt irreversible and there are adequate safeguards to con-
firm the accuracy of the diagnosis, all means of life support may be discontinued," but
also acknowledged that most patients of this nature were "probably given such meas-
ures as basic hygiene and artificial nutrition." 1982 A.M.A. Judicial Council Current
Opinions 9-10, in PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 386, at 186, 187; see also
Colburn, Withholding Food, Wash. Post Health Mag., Jan. 26, 1988, at 15, col. 1.
664 See Lynn & Childress, Must Patients Always be Given Food and Water?, HAS-
TINGS CENTER REP., Oct. 1983, at 17, 20; cf PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note
386, at 90, 288.
Dr. Eugene Robin of Stanford University has observed that, "The ultimate judg-
ment" to withhold or withdraw treatment "is not fundamentally a technical or medical
matter," and "is not within the doctor's province.... The final answer can be found
only in the human heart and can be determined only on an individual basis." Cohn,
The Right to Die: How Courts Have Ruled, Wash. Post Health Mag., Mar. 22, 1988,
at 8, col. 1.
665 See Annas, Do Feeding Tubes Have More Rights than Patients, HASTINGS
CENTER REP., Feb. 1986, at 26, 26-28.
666 See Colburn, AMA Ethics Panel Revises Rules on Withholding Food, Wash.
Post Health Mag., April 2, 1986, at 9, col. 1.
667 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied sub nom. Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S.
922 (1976).
668 See id.
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drawal of Karen's nutritional support,669 and she "lived" for ten years
in a coma.
While the withdrawal of nutritional support from a terminally ill or
irreversibly comatose patient may move dangerously close to murder, 60
the AMA statement specifically declares that "the physicians should
not intentionally cause death."' 671 Since the Council position is no way
binding, physicians who disagree with it are free to follow the dictates
of their own conscience. 672
Dr. Russell H. Patterson, Jr., Chairman of Neurosurgery at the
New York University-Cornell Medical Center and a past president of
the American Association of Neurological Surgeons, suggests that there
is "a rather large jump between letting someone die and killing some-
one." 671 He argues that withdrawing extraordinary life supports from
those who have no hope of ever regaining consciousness is often the
most humane treatment available. 674 He states: "After a while -
maybe weeks or months of seeing the patient with no concept of the
present, no memory of the past and no hope for the future - a lot of
families say, 'Why does this have to go on? What's the purpose?' ,675
The AMA policy acknowledges that while the physicians' social
commitment is both to sustain life and to relieve suffering, these duties
may often conflict. When an at-risk patient's informed choice is lacking
or an authorized proxy unavailable, "the physician must act in the best
interest of the patient. 6 76 When acting humanely and with informed
consent, a physician undertakes a medically necessary course of action
"to alleviate severe pain, or cease or limit treatment to permit a termi-
nally ill patient whose death is imminent to die. '677 She should not
follow a course of action that intentionally causes death.
In deciding whether the administration of potentially life-prolonging
69 See id.
670 See Annas, supra note 665.
671 Wallis, supra note 654, at 60; see also Somerville, "Should the Grandparents
Die": Allocation of Medical Resources with an Aging Population, 14 LAw, MED. &
HEALTH CARE 158 (1986) (suggesting that AMA Guidelines may soon exclude "se-
verely senile, the very old and decrepit, and . . .young profoundly retarded children"
from medical support).
672 See id.
673 Colburn, supra note 666, at 9, col. 3.
674 Id.
675 Id.; see Cohn, A Safe Passage to Death, Wash. Post Health Mag., Mar. 8, 1988,
at 8, col. 1.
676 Statement of the Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, American Med. Ass'n,
Withholding or Withdrawing Life Prolonging Medical Treatment (Mar. 15, 1986).
677 Id.
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medical treatment comports with the incompetent patient's best inter-
ests, the physician must determine whether the possibility exists for ex-
tending life under both humane and comfortable conditions. Further-
more, she must ascertain the patient's previously expressed wishes and
the familial attitudes of others who have custodial responsibility for the
patient.6 78 The AMA adds:
Even if death is not imminent but a patient's coma is beyond doubt
irreversible and there are adequate safeguards to confirm the accuracy of
the diagnosis and with the concurrence of those who have responsibility
for the care of the patient, it is not unethical to discontinue all means of
life prolonging medical treatment .... In treating a terminally ill or irre-
versibly comatose patient, the physician should determine whether the
benefits of treatment outweigh its burdens. At all times, the dignity of the
patient should be maintained.6"9
1. Past Practices
At the Yale-New Haven Hospital Symposium on "Ethical Issues in
Health Care" in June 1982, Dr. Paul B. Besson, the Editor of the
Journal of the American Geriatrics Society, cautioned that there was a
growing tendency in hospitals throughout the country to place "no-
code" orders on the hospital charts of a growing number of elderly pa-
tients.680 Several years before Dr. Besson revealed his findings, a 1973
Seattle study of nine convalescent centers, which examined the records
of 1,256 persons admitted to these centers over a two-year period, re-
vealed some rather startling statistics.68s
Over the period studied, 190 patients developed a high or continuing
fever at some time or had an impairment of their central nervous sys-
tem (e.g., stroke, aphasia, paralysis, senility, dementia, chronic or or-
ganic brain syndrome, and cerebral atheroarteriosclerosis). 682 Active
treatment - or the use of antibiotics or hospitalization or both - was
ordered for only 109 patients.683 No such treatment was ordered or ad-
ministered for 81 patients, or more than 40% of patients.6 4 Of those
treated, 9% died.68 Of those untreated, 59% died. 686 The authors of the
678 Id.
679 Id.
61 Doctor Sees Trend Not to Resuscitate, Wash. Post, June 13, 1982, at Al, col. 3.
61 See Brown & Thompson, Nontreatment of Fever in Extended-Care Facilities,
300 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1246 (1979).
682 Id.
683 Id.
684 Id.
685 Id.
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study conclude that this obvious pattern of nontreatment strongly sug-
gests that the physicians and nurses at these medical facilities did not
intend actively to treat their patients when high mortality was ex-
pected. 687 The lives of the untreated patients could have been prolonged
for a short time if antibiotics had been administered or hospitalization
followed. 688 The general conclusions of this study complement other
surveys of health professionals favorably disposed to withdrawing or
withholding life-prolonging treatment to terminally ill patients - with
as many as 30% favoring euthanasia under certain prescribed
conditions.68 9
In 1979 the Veterans Administration, which administers the largest
hospital system in the nation with 1.2 million annual patient admis-
sions, prohibited entering "no-code" or do not resuscitate orders on a
patient's medical chart. 690 In late August the Administration promul-
gated a new policy which recognizes a patient's right to die and now
allows "no-code" decisions to be written in a patient's chart. 691 Pursu-
ant to the new policy, "no-code" decisions must be made by a senior
physician with the permission of the at-risk patient.692 When the pa-
686 Id.
6 See id.
691 See id.
689 See D. CRANE, THE SANCTITY OF SOCIAL LIFE: PHYSICIAN'S TREATMENT OF
CRITICALLY ILL PATIENTS 58-61 (1975); Noyes, Jochimsen & Travis, The Changing
Attitudes of Physicians Toward Prolonging Life, 25 J. AM. GERIATRIC SOC'Y 470
(1977).
A recent article studied patients (and their family support groups) who were admit-
ted for at least 24 hours to the medical or respiratory intensive care units at North
Carolina Memorial Hospital in Chapel Hill, between January 1-December 31, 1983.
See Danis, Patrick, Southerland & Green, Patients' and Families Preferences for Med-
ical Intensive Care, 260 J. A.M.A. 797 (1988). The study indicated that 70% of pa-
tients and families were 100% willing to undergo intensive care again to achieve one
month of survival. Id. This willingness was regardless of their age, functional status,
perceived quality of life, hypothetical life expectancy, or the nature of their previous
intensive care unit experiences. Id. Eight percent were, however, completely unwilling
to undergo intensive care to achieve any prolongation of survival. Id. Thirty-eight per-
cent of the patients and 41% of the patients' families in the survey reported that the
circumstances under which they would refuse to repeat intensive care are: when no
hope of recovery exists, when severe neurologic impairment exists, and when being kept
alive by machine. Zweibel, Measuring Quality of Life Near the End of Life, 260 J.
A.M.A. 839 (1988). This study points dramatically to the need for a more focused
measure of quality of life for research on end-of-life treatment preferences. See id.
690 See Weiner, New VA Policy Allows Right-to-Die Instructions, Wash. Post, Sept.
20, 1983, at 1, col. 1.
91 See id.
692 Id.
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tient is adjudged legally incompetent, the family must consent before a
no-code order may be entered on the hospital records.6 93 While the pol-
icy expressly prohibits using no-code orders to accommodate a patient's
request for "voluntary euthanasia," and forbids physicians to "take any
affirmative steps to 'hasten the patient on his/her way,' ",694 in actual-
ity, the policy validates passive euthanasia or letting die.695 Application
of the 1979 Veterans Administration Policy simply meant that if a phy-
sician chose to respect the request or right of a patient to forego futile
life-saving therapy, the physician's decision could not formally be en-
tered in the patient's hospital chart. Accordingly, in cases when a pa-
tient suffered cardiac arrest and her attending physician was not on
duty, resuscitation would normally be undertaken against the patient's
wishes.
The new AMA policy incorporates an obvious quality of life stan-
dard of evaluation by utilizing "the best interests of the patient" test
and by mandating a cost-benefit analysis. 96 Basic social justice de-
mands that each individual be given an opportunity to maximize her
individual potential. Yet, the point is often reached when maintenance
of an individual defies all concepts of social justice and basic humanita-
rianism. When an individual's medical condition represents a negation
of any "truly human" qualities or "relational-potential," then the best
and most equitable form of treatment should be no treatment at all.6 97
In the final analysis, common sense and common decency should be the
touchstones for decision making.
These policies of the American Medical Association 698 and the
Veterans Administration, 699 which recognize the patient's right to die
humanely and with dignity, supported by the actual evidence of selec-
tive nontreatment of the terminally ill, 7°° illustrate that intelligent
health care providers are exercising common sense, common decency,
love, and compassion in their actions.70' They are not bridled by com-
plicated and obtuse distinctions between ordinary and extraordinary
treatment standards, acts of commission and omission, and a plethora of
693 Id.
694 Id.
695 See id. See generally Kuhse, supra note 28, at 125.
696 See Cohen, Ethical Problems of Intensive Care, 47 ANEsTHESIOLOGY 217
(1977); Smith, supra note 501, at 143; Smith, supra note 350, at 709.
697 See McCormick, supra note 350, at 349.
691 See supra notes 676-79 and accompanying text.
699 See supra notes 690-95 and accompanying text.
700 See supra note 689 and accompanying text.
701 See Fletcher, Love is the Only Measure, 83 COMMONWEALTH 427 (1966).
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philosophical concerns over slippery slopes. Rather, they act coura-
geously and forthrightly; when motivated by the age-old command to
do no harm, they serve the best interests of their patients. 70 2
2. Other Official Postures
In 1983 the President's Commission for the Study of Ethical
Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research con-
cluded that artificial feeding should be regarded as a treatment decision
and not mandated except when the benefits of its use outweigh the bur-
dens.703 As mentioned previously, in 1986 the American Medical
Association's Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs announced its
conclusion that all means of life-prolonging treatment - including food
as well as water - could be withdrawn from patients in an irreversible
state or those in a terminal condition.70
The Roman Catholic Church takes the position that under some ex-
ceptional circumstances providing nourishment may not be obligatory
because of the ineffective or burdensome nature of the act. 705 Thus, the
withholding of nutrition and hydration does not have as its purpose the
hastening of death but rather the cessation of a life from which the
patient can derive no benefit because of her futile or terminal condi-
tion.70 6 With but one exception, the prominent Catholic theologians are
of one mind: nutrition and fluids need not always "be provided to all
patients, including the terminally ill." '707
Even though a judicially determined order to withdraw life-sus-
taining treatment does not overtly affront the integrity of the corporate
hospital in which the terminal patient might be, some health providers
may nevertheless view the court order as an intolerable compromise or
invasion of their own personal professional rights as physicians and
702 See G. SMITH, supra note 31, at 2, 8, 164.
703 See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 386, at 288.
704 See Wallis, supra note 654, at 60. More recently, the Maryland Attorney
General stated that permanently unconscious patients have a constitutional and com-
mon-law right to die with dignity by refusing life sustaining treatment, which includes
artificially administered nutrients and liquids. 73 Op. Att'y Gen. 88-046 (1988). This
position conflicts with the position of the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Baltimore
who labels the acts of withdrawal as homicide. Valentine, Md. Offers Guidance on
Euthanasia, Wash. Post, Oct. 18, 1988, at B1, col. 1.
70 See Paris & McCormick, supra note 33, at 358.
706 See id.
707 Id. at 361. See generally D. KELLY, THE EMERGENCE OF ROMAN CATHOLIC
MEDICAL ETHICS IN NORTH AMERICA (1979).
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nurses as using their skills to promote death.70 1 In cases of this nature,
the dying patient should be transferred to another hospital willing to
cease all artificial life supports.70 9 When transfers are not feasible be-
cause of costs and/or unavailable beds in other hospitals, the issue be-
comes whether care of a dying patient can be undertaken at home. Be-
cause of an unmistakable perception of pain because of the patient's
marked change of appearance resulting from the withdrawal of fluids
and nutrition, coping with at-home care can be difficult to manage.710
Thus, what might be initially thought of as a rather simple decision to
withdraw treatment becomes very complex since the decision affects
more than the dying patient.
An artful act of self-deception has been used in the past to deal with
this issue and continues in use today.71' This deception consists of con-
tinuing the intravenous feeding of a critically ill patient but at a dimin-
ished rate, so that over-time, the patient becomes dehydrated. Thus,
both the gesture and symbol of feeding is maintained, but at a rate that
will not really sustain the patient's life for any period of time. Consid-
ered a "compromise" by those who wish to show a modicum of respect
for the patient's direct wishes or perceived needs under a substituted
judgment test, this procedure is simply a blatant act of self-deception,
"because an agent can carry it out only by failing to acknowledge that
the patient will become malnourished and dehydrated while the IV line
maintains the fiction and expresses the symbol of feeding. Otherwise
the agent would have to take responsibility for the outcome .... 712
The courts must also confront this issue in deciding "whether the
corporate hospital should be required to provide services for its patients
that the profession deems ethical and the courts hold to be lawful. '713
The modern hospital must be recognized, institutionally, as the final
rite of passage, regardless of whatever standard of care and treatment
can be provided. 714
Probably the overriding purpose of health law is to support medical and
nursing care where the patient's wishes and best interest coincide. The
coincidence of autonomy and appropriate health care is very clearly pre-
sent when a competent judgment or substitute judgment is made allowing
708 See Gostin, The Right to Choose Death: The Judicial Trilogy of Brophy, Bouvia,
and Conroy, 14 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 198, 201 (1986).
709 See id. at 200.
710 See id.
711 See Childress, supra note 506, at 81.
712 Id. at 81; see Hilfiker, supra note 505, at 716.
713 Gostin, supra note 708, at 201.
714 See id.
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a patient to spend his or her final brief moments of life in the health care
setting that has been humanely treating and caring for the patient. 713
When conscious awareness is lost and not capable of being re-estab-
lished, and all aspects of comfortable existence are removed as well,
actions that omit nourishment by tubes are not subterfuges for euthana-
sia, but merely good medicine.7 16
3. The Hastings Center Guidelines on the Termination of Life-
Sustaining Treatment and the Care of the Dying
In issuing its Guidelines on the Termination of Life-Sustaining
Treatment and the Care of the Dying in 1987, the prestigious Hastings
Center of New York set a new tone of acceptance and understanding in
this area of concern.717 Consistent with the newly enacted Do Not
Resuscitate Order Legislation in New York State, 718 the Guidelines of-
fer an ethical framework for analyzing problem cases involving long-
term life-supporting technology, ventilators and dialysis,719 emergency
interventions (e.g., cardiopulmonary resuscitation),7 20 nutrition and hy-
dration of terminal patients,72' antibiotics and other life-sustaining
medication, 722 and palliative care and pain relief.7 23
Four central values form the foundation of the Hastings Center
Guidelines: (1) medicine should always promote the patient's well-be-
ing or welfare; (2) the patient should possess absolute autonomy or self-
determination when determining the nature of her own medical care;
(3) the integrity of health care professionals must be guaranteed by
recognizing the stringent ethical obligations which physicians, nurses,
and other health care providers have to their patients; and (4) the im-
portance of justice and equity in critical decisions of termination of
treatment - in other words, the individual patient's right to access an
adequate level of health care as well as to distribute available health
715 Id.
716 See Williamson, Prolongation of Life or Prolonging the Act of Dying?, 202 J.
A.M.A. 162 (1967).
717 See HASTINGS CENTER OF NEW YORK, GUIDELINES ON THE TERMINATION OF
LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT AND THE CARE OF THE DYING 46-52 (1987) [hereaf-
ter HASTINGS CENTER GUIDELINES].
718 See supra notes 613-47 and accompanying text.
719 See HASTINGS CENTER GUIDELINES, supra note 717, at 35-42.
720 See id. at 43-56.
721 See id. at 57-62.
722 See id. at 63-68.
723 See id. at 69-75.
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care resources.
724
The issue of costworthiness must also be considered as a value in
decision making of this nature. Treatment that is wasteful, useless, or
harmful is simply not costworthy.7 25
An ethic that aims to provide costworthy care cannot assume that any
medical intervention that offers some benefit, no matter how marginal,
should be provided regardless of its cost to others. Such an ethic must ask
whether treatment that is marginally beneficial is cost worthy in light of
some satisfactory balance between benefit to the individual patient and
alternative uses of these resources.
72 6
These policy statements will be indispensable to health care profes-
sionals and other decision makers who are called upon to make the
ultimate treatment decisions. These policies should also assist the legis-
latures in responsibly designing frameworks, hopefully along the lines
of the New York Do Not Resuscitate Model.
4. Age-Based Rationing of Health Care
The director of The Hastings Center, Dr. Daniel Callahan, au-
thored a controversial book in 1987 entitled, Setting Limits: Medical
Goals in an Aging Society,7 27 in which he introduces the principle of
age-based rationing.72 He argues persuasively that a national policy
should be introduced and implemented that prohibits the development
or application of medical technologies that are designed or likely "to
produce only chronic illness and a short life, increase the present bur-
den of chronic illness, '7 2 9 or that extend the lives of the elderly yet
"offer no significant improvement in the quality of life. ' ' 73° The social
policy which he advocates would limit life-extending treatment for the
aged and could be implemented by denying Medicare benefits to vari-
ous elderly groups."' In creating these groups, various factors, based
upon quality of life standards, are used to determine when morally ap-
propriate care can be withheld.132
724 See id. at 6-8.
725 See id. at 119-25.
726 Id. at 122. See generally Smith, supra note 501, at 143.
727 D. CALLAHAN, SETTING LIMITS: MEDICAL GOALS IN AN AGING SOCIETY
(1987)
728 See id. at 140. See generally Angelo, Examining the Limits of Life, TIME, Nov. 5,
1987, at 76.
729 D. CALLAGHAN, supra note 727, at 143.
730 Id.
731 See id. at 198-99.
732 See id. at 181-82.
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The underlying tenet of the framework is that if no genuine benefit
is conferred upon the patient by the medical assistance, and there is no
meaningful life present, no life-prolonging actions should be under-
taken.733 Accordingly, if medical treatment can morally be stopped, arti-
ficially provided food and water can and should be stopped.734 This
later recognition is the most difficult to accept or "sell" because it goes
against the great moral tradition of meeting a societal "duty" to feed
the hungry and provide water to the thirsty.735
Dr. Callahan's arguments are indeed very persuasive. However, a
strong inconsistency exists between the broad policy of age-based ra-
tioning - limiting health care for the elderly - and his refusal to
accept the rights of self-determination of the elderly through the legali-
zation of assisted suicide or euthanasia.
Fearing that such a policy "would serve as a threatening symbol of
[the] devaluation of old age, ' 736 Callahan believes that there "might be"
a significant number of elderly drawn to this newly-approved situation;
they would interpret the action or its legalized condonation "as a socie-
tal concession to the view that old age can have no meaning and signifi-
cance if accompanied by decline, pain and despair. '737 For Callahan,
legalization of assisted suicide would approach an official recognition
"that pain is not to be endured, that community cannot be found for
many of the old, and that a life not marked by good health, by hope
and vitality, is not a life worth living. ' 738 To base a denial of full rights
of self-determination for the elderly on fears of what "might happen"
demeans the whole value of autonomy and constricts its application to
only "approved" or presently "legitimate" purposes. It is the individ-
ual - regardless of age or infirmity - who should make the final
determinations about her health care or medical needs. What official
state policy is promoted by maintaining one in a state of "endured"
713 See id. at 190. For individuals declared to be brain dead, no further care of any
kind (medical or nursing) is directed. Id. at 182-83. For the severely demented it is
inappropriate to terminate nursing care or either artificial or natural nutrition and
hydration. Id. For those suffering a mild impairment of competence, advanced life sup-
ports are not morally required. Id. For the severely ill, mentally alert patient, nursing
care should be provided; and finally, for the physically frail, mentally alert patient,
extended intensive care and advanced life supports are unwarranted at public expense.
Id.
734 See id. at 187, 191.
731 See id. at 188.
736 Id. at 196.
737 Id.
738 Id.
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pain? Are community values preserved by condoning a continuation of
such states of human existence? I think not.
5. Handicapped Newborns
The final rule of the Department of Health and Human Services
promulgated on April 15, 1985, entitled, "Child Abuse and Neglect
Prevention and Treatment Program," 73 9 formulates a specific set of reg-
ulations regarding the medical treatment of severely handicapped
newborns in state hospitals that receive federal grant assistance. 740
Withholding from infants medically indicated treatment, including "ap-
propriate nutrition, hydration and medication," is prohibited. 41 Thus,
little latitude is left for medical judgment regarding the treatment's ad-
visability. The three circumstances when treatment is not required are
when the infant is either chronically and irreversibly comatose, "the
treatment would merely prolong dying" and "not be effective in amelio-
rating or correcting all of the infant's life-threatening conditions, or
[would] otherwise be futile in terms of the survival of the infant and the
treatment itself under such circumstances would be inhumane. '742
Even though severely handicapped infants cannot express their pref-
erences as to continuing or discontinuing their lives, their incapacity
should not mandate medical therapy which would salvage or prolong
their "lives" at the cost of significant suffering.74 3 "Where treatment
739 "Child Abuse and Neglect Prevention and Treatment Program," 45 C.F.R. §
1340 (1988).
740 See id.; see also Child Abuse Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-457, 98 Stat.
1749 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 701-709 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)).
741 45 C.F.R. § 1340 (1988).
742 Id. § 1340.15 (1988).
743 See generally H. KUHSE & P. SINGER, SHOULD THE BABY LIvE? (1986); Smith,
supra note 350, at 709. A nontreatment policy for severely handicapped or defective
infants might be more morally and socially acceptable if the decisions were made ac-
cording to criteria "authoritatively articulated and publicly announced" and not depen-
dent on whatever particular physicians and distressed families might decide. Robertson,
Substantive Criteria and Procedures in Withholding Care from Defective Newborns,
in THE LAW MEDICINE RELATION: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLORATION 217, 221-24 (S.
Spicker, J. Healey, Jr. & H. Englehardt, Jr., eds. 1981). Second, such a policy might
be more assured if the decision makers (e.g., physicians and parents) adherring to the
articulated criteria followed a "specific process for assuring that a given infant falls
within the category of those who may justifiably be selected for non treatment." Id.
The class of infants justifiably selected would be those "whose suffering is so great that
continued life is not in their interest" or "whose conscious existence is so greatly limited
that investing in their care appears to reasonable people to yield no benefits" (e.g.,
when the infants are irreversibly comatose or when death is imminent). Id.
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has a high probability of causing significant pain and suffering and a
low probability of preserving a life valuable to the patient, should we
not permit a decision to withhold it?"
744
The question raised in light of this government policy for handi-
capped newborns is whether a standard of aggressive treatment should
be implemented and imposed on all incapacitated (e.g., incompetent)
patients except when either death would occur in the near future or,
alternatively, the patient is irreversibly comatose. 745
Is it always in the best interest of the elderly senile patient with advanced
cancer to receive chemotherapy or radiation therapy until he is highly un-
likely to survive beyond the near future? Should the severely debilitated
(but not comatose) stroke victim be resuscitated an indefinite number of
times until respiration cannot be restored by any means? There comes a
point at which further prolongation of one's life simply does not make up
for the burden of continued aggressive treatment, especially if the quality
of life prolonged is diminished by suffering and incapacity. If it would be
cruel to prolong the life of adult patients under these circumstances, then
it must also be cruel to prolong the life of handicapped infants under com-
parable circumstances. 7"
Although inhumane or cruel treatment deserves serious consideration,
the other very practical issue is an economic one; namely the need to
find health care resources to meet the needs of those receiving life-pro-
longing treatments. Cost-benefit analysis becomes a valid consideration
in rationing scarce medical resources. 747
744Moskop & Saldanha, The Baby Doe Rule: Still a Threat, HASTINGS CENTER
REP., Apr. 1986, at 8, 8-9.
74- See id. at 14.
746 Id.
747 See Donley, A Brave New World of Health Care, 2 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. &
POL'Y 47, 51 (1986); Mehlman, Rationing Expensive Lifesaving Medical Treatments,
1985 Wis. L. REv. 239; Pellegrino, Rationing Health Care: The Ethics of Medical
Gatekeeping, 2 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 23 (1986); Sommerville, "Should
the Grandparents Die?": Allocation of Medical Resources with an Aging Population,
14 LAW, MEDICINE & HEALTH CARE 158 (Sept. 1986); Smith, supra note 593, at 47,
49; Smith, supra note 501, at 143.
Most authors believe that terminally ill patients receive proportionately more expen-
sive treatment than other patients and that the issue of extended care should conse-
quently be made within the reasonable context of cost containment. Based upon these
assumptions, a distinguished group of researchers has set three basic goals for cost con-
tainment policies of the terminally ill: (1) develop more reasonable criteria for admit-
ting patients to intensive or critical care units; (2) promote the autonomy of patients
and their families as decision makers in health care issues; and (3) further develop and
thereby promote alternative forms of institutional care such as the hospice. Bayer, Cal-
lahan, Fletcher, Hodgson, Jennings, Monsees, Sievert & Veatch, The Care of the Ter-
minally Ill: Morality and Economics, 309 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1490, 1491, 1493
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The distinction drawn between defective newborns and critically ill
adults is most alarming. Emotions and feelings run much higher; deci-
sions are made within a vortex of emotionalism when they concern in-
fants rather than adults and the elderly. Perhaps this distinction is be-
cause aspirations are higher for the young than for the old. In any
event, decisions to withdraw or withhold treatment for both groups
should be made when a cost-benefit analysis reveals that the costs of
treatment outweigh the long-run benefits and ignore the patient's best
interests. 748
C. The Legal Perspective
1. A Right to Refuse Treatment?
The preservation or sanctity of life has always been an important
state interest in the common law; in always holding life sacred, the
common law prohibited a person from either committing suicide or per-
mitting her own destruction.7 49 This general prohibition was equally
applicable to those who were hopelessly ill as to those in good health.750
A number of early cases likened a patient's refusal of life-saving treat-
ment to suicide. Accordingly, the state's interests in preserving the sanc-
tity of life weighed against a patient's right to die with dignity.75' Re-
(1983); see also Fries, Aging, Natural Death and the Compression of Morbidity, 303
NEW ENG. J. MED. 130, 131, 135 (1980). Fries predicts that the mean average age at
death by the year 2000 will be 82.4 years. Id. at 131.
748 See Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370
N.E.2d 417 (1977); PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 386, at 5 & n.3, 228; see
also Englehardt, Ethical Issues in Aiding the Death of Young Children, in
BENFICIENT EUTHANASIA 180, 187 (M. Kohl ed. 1975). Englehardt proposes a con-
cept of injury for continuance of existence as an analogue of the tort of wrongful life.
See id. He states: "It seems reasonable . . . that the life of children with diseases that
involve pain and no hope of survival should not be prolonged." Id. at 189. See gener-
ally R. WEIR, SELECTIVE NON TREATMENT OF HANDICAPPED NEWBORNS (1984);
Englehardt, Euthanasia and Children: The Injury of Continued Existence, 83 J. PE-
DIATRICS 170 (1973).
749 See Cantor & Conroy, Best Interests, and the Handling of Dying Patients, 37
RUTGERS L. REV. 543, 549 (1985); Euthanasia: Criminal, Tort, Constitutional and
Legislative Considerations, supra note 34, at 1203.
750 See Clarke, The Choice to Refuse or Withhold Medical Treatment: The Emerg-
ing Technology and Medical-Ethical Consensus, 13 CREIGHTON L. REV. 795, 815
(1980).
751 See, e.g., In re President & Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d
1000, 1009, reh. en banc denied, 331 F.2d 1010 (D.C. Cir. 1964); John F. Kennedy
Memorial Hosp. v. Heston, 58 N.J. 576, 579-80, 279 A.2d 670, 672-74 (1971).
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cent cases have tended to ignore the suicide analogy,752 and some have
failed to mention at all the state's interest in the sanctity of life.753
Moreover, the analogy to suicide is wholly inappropriate; popular per-
ception normally views an act of suicide as a choice which recognizes
the worthlessness of life, while the decision to decline life-saving medi-
cal measures is a choice that does not express a realization that life is
worthless. Indeed, to decline treatment does not imply a rejection of life
any more than other behavior which involves high risks to life and
health. Similarly, the right to decline treatment does not imply a right
to commit suicide.75
4
As a corollary to the state interest in the sanctity of life, the state also
has a basic interest in preserving life, preventing suicide, protecting in-
competents and third party defendants, as well as preserving the medi-
cal profession's integrity.755 Thus, in validating or invalidating a right
to die by refusing medical treatment, the courts will balance the indi-
vidual rights of self-determination or autonomy against these state in-
terests. The nuances of this balancing depend entirely on the facts of
each case; no unyielding a priori standard can be set and applied in an
equally unyielding manner. Common sense and reasonable judgments
are all that can be expected or actually made in tragic cases of this
nature.
75 6
The most significant state interest here is the preservation of life.
Thus, the assertion or maintenance by the state of its interest depends
on how "life" is defined. The state will always act to prevent "irra-
tional self-destruction. ' 75 7 Ultimately, the central question must address
the appropriately structured guidelines available which could test the
very rationality of decision making. What may seem reasonable to a
legally competent but suffering patient may seem irrational to her at-
tending physician. Sadly, in actual practice, the determination of a pa-
tient's right to die is essentially a judgment call.
752 See, e.g., Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160, 162 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978),
afl'd, 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980); In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 351, 486 A.2d 1209,
1224 (1985).
"I See, e.g., In re Melideo, 88 Misc. 2d 974, 390 N.Y.S.2d 523 (Sup. Ct. 1976).
154 See 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIOETHICS 1502 (W. Reich ed. 1976).
711 See Byrn, Compulsory Lifesaving Treatment for the Competent Adult, 44
FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 35 passim (1975).
756 See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (state's interest in preventing
spread of smallpox held to supersede person's right to refuse treatment inocculation).
See generally G. GRISEZ & J. BOYLE, JR., supra note 14.
151 Bartling v. Superior Court, 163 Cal. App. 3d 186, 196, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220, 225
(1984).
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Case precedent does recognize, however, that if compelled treatment
will be brief and painful or extend life only as a consequence of great
bodily intrusion, the "rationality" of original decision making by the
patient will be given greater presumptive validity while at the same
time minimizing the state's interest in preserving life.758 On the other
hand, a state's interest would prevail when medical treatment preserves
life rather than merely seeks to prolong it,759 produces little, if any,
pain and suffering, and constitutes no significant bodily intrusion.760
For the terminally ill patient, the qualitative value of sustained life
should not be an issue of great moment; rather, it should merely be
conceded that the dying processes should not unduly be prolonged.761
For the nonterminal but chronically ill, retarded, debilitated, or coma-
tose patient, the state interest in preserving life is maintained if for no
other reason than to protect such individuals from being eliminated.
The state must protect the patient from herself when suffering depres-
sion, from physicians who need hospital bed-space, and from families
who can no longer bear the social and economic costs of maintaining
the patient's life. 762
Of course, tests such as "the best interest of the patient," and "the
substituted judgment test" allow a court to inquire into the extent state
action may force a continuation of life in a terminal state. The length of
one's life expectancy before it becomes affirmatively diagnosed as termi-
nal is a vexatious issue. Should an individual suffering from AIDS,
with an expected minimum of six years to live, be recognized as
758 See Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160, 162 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978), affd, 379
So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980); see also Superintendent of Belchertown State School v.
Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977); In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 53-55,
355 A.2d 647, 665-68, cert. denied sub nom. Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922
(1976); In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 660 P.2d 738 (1983).
759 See Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 737-40, 370 N.E. 2d at 423-24; Quinlan, 70 N.J. at
23-29, 355 A.2d at 655-57; In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d
266 (1981); Eichner v. Dillon, 72 A.D.2d 431, 468-69, 426 N.Y.S.2d 517, 545 (1980).
160 See In re Quackenbush, 156 N.J. Super. 282, 290, 383 A.2d 785, 789 (1978); see
also John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v. Heston, 58 N.J. 576, 279 A.2d 670 (1971).
761 See P. RAMSEY, ETHICS AT THE EDGES OF LIFE: MEDICAL AND LEGAL INTER-
SECTIONS 1-14 (1978).
762 See Sherlock, For Everything There is a Season: The Right to Die in the United
States, 1982 B.Y.U. L. REV. 545, 560 (1982). While the principle of beneficence could
arguably support a course of medical treatment against a patient's wishes, it is re-
stricted or bounded by respect for persons or simply recognition of one's autonomy.
This principle of personal respect mandates that full attention be given to the compe-
tency of the patient who disclaims using prolonged life-sustaining therapies. See J.
CHILDRESS, supra note 22, at 175.
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nonterminal and forced to live on by the state? 63 It has been suggested
that the closer one's "life expectancy is to zero, the more the condition
becomes 'terminal' and the patient's interests" more determinative.764
While every competent person may assert a well-structured right to
refuse medical treatment based on any reason, courts are now recogniz-
ing a coordinate right to avoid being declared incompetent as a conse-
quence of that basic refusal. 76 To date, the United States Supreme
Court has not definitively ruled on whether an individual possesses a
constitutional right to forego a modality of medical treatment calculated
to save her life.7 66 Thus, care must be taken to recognize that other
individuals may be empowered to determine when and if life supports
are not necessary to maintain continued existence.7 67 After having liti-
gated the issue, several prominent state jurisdictions have concluded
that competents may assert a qualified right to refuse treatment.7 68
The validation of a qualified right to die769 is derived from several
theories: the common law "right to bodily integrity, T770 a so-called pe-
numbra "right of privacy, ' 771 the first amendment right of "free exer-
763 See Comment, Balancing the Right to Die with Competing Interests: A Socio-
Legal Enigma, 13 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 109, 127 (1985).
'6 Id. at 126. For example, a patient might be classified as terminal because she is
expected to live for nine months even though other significant variables exist: her treat-
ment may be intrusive and painful, and she has expressed a desire to be removed from
life-sustaining mechanisms to die in a more dignified manner. Id. at 123-24. Another
scenario is a patient in a more terminal condition because she only has a five-month life
expectancy: her treatment is less intrusive and thus less painful and, furthermore, her
desire to be taken off life-supporting treatment has wavered. Id. In this latter case, the
patient's condition would have to be more serious to meet or overcome the competing
state interest in preserving life. Id. For a set of additional interesting hypotheticals, see
id. at 125.
765 See R. VEATCH, supra note 439, at 146.
766 See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 246, at 764.
767 See id.
16 See, e.g., Bartling v. Superior Court, 163 Cal. App. 3d 186, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220
(1984); In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985).
769 See Jonas, The Right to Die, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Aug. 1978, at 31.
770 See, e.g., Bartling, 163 Cal. App. 3d at 195, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 225; Conroy, 98
N.J. at 348, 486 A.2d at 1222; ; In re Storar. 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 276, 438
N.Y.S.2d 266, 272, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981); In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114,
132-33, 660 P.2d 738, 743 (1983).
71 See, e.g., Bartling, 163 Cal. App. 3d at 195, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 225; In re Spring,
380 Mass. 629, 405 N.E.2d 115 (1980); Superintendent of Belchertown State School v.
Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 739-41, 370 N.E.2d 417, 425-27 (1977); In re Quinlan, 70
N.J. 10, 40, 355 A.2d 647, 663, cert. denied sub nom. Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S.
922 (1976); Storar, 52 N.Y.2d at 363, 420 N.E.2d at 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 266.
In In re Yetter, 62 Pa. D. & C.2d 619 (1973), the court held, that "the right of
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cise of religion, ' 7 72 and to a growing extent, state natural death legisla-
tion.773 The right to refuse medical treatment has recently been
recognized as a "newly created constitutional right of personal auton-
omy. 7 74 Current trends suggest that a refusal-of-treatment decision
should be as informed as the initiating consent to it.775 Indeed, the doc-
trine of informed refusal is an inherent part of the doctrine of informed
consent.
7 6
2. A Detailed Analysis of Leading Case Precedents
Surely, almost every week in some city, either a competent individual
or one lacking in capacity, who is afflicted with an irreversible health
condition that classifies her as terminal, makes the decision not to pro-
long her life. Some of these cases are reported by the local news, while
others are in lower courts without official published records. However,
more and more cases find their way to appellate tribunals. It is neither
the intention nor the purpose of this Article to survey and analyze all of
these cases. Rather, discussion of a number of the early and new para-
digmatic "landmarks" is in order to place the ethical, philosophical,
theological, medical, and legal issues in a practical, working context.
3. The Precedential Core
In 1976 the New Jersey Supreme Court in the case of In re
Quinlan,777 implicitly determined that in the case of a terminal afflic-
privacy includes a right to die with which the State should not interfere where there are
no minor or unborn children and no clear and present danger to public health, welfare
or morals." Id. at 623; see also G. GRIsEz & J. BOYCE, JR., supra note 14, at 98
passim; Delgado, Euthanasia Reconsidered - The Choice of Death as an Aspect of
the Right of Privacy, 17 ARIz. L. REV. 474 (1975).
772 See, e.g., In re Osborne, 294 A.2d 372 (D.C. 1972); In re Estate of Brooks, 32
Ill. 2d 361, 205 N.E.2d 435 (1965). See generally Ford, Refusal of Blood Transfusions
by Jehovah Witnesses, 10 CATH. LAW. 212 (1964); Paris, Compulsory Medical Treat-
ment and Religious Freedom: Whose Law Shall Prevail?, 10 U.S.F. L. REv. 25
(1975).
713 See, e.g., In re Hamlin, 102 Wash. 2d 810, 689 P.2d 1372 (1984).
'14 Friendly, The Courts and Social Policy: Substance and Procedure, 33 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 21 (1978).
775 See Truman v. Thomas, 27 Cal. 3d 285, 611 P.2d 902, 165 Cal. Rptr. 308
(1980); Crisher v. Spak, 122 Misc. 2d 355, 471 N.Y.S.2d 741 (Sup. Ct. 1983).
776 See In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985).
777 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied sub nom. Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S.
922 (1976).
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tion that offers no hope of reversal, one effectively has a right to die.778
Consequently, Quinlan became the first major judicial decision approv-
ing the discontinuation of life-supporting treatments.
Even though prior decisions had refused to allow a patient's consent
as a defense to criminal liability, the court found other reasons to con-
clude that criminal liability would not be imposed under the facts of
this case. 779 Specifically, the effects of disconnecting Ms. Quinlan's res-
pirator would be a natural result of her affliction and not the result of
criminal agency. 780 Furthermore, because the court based its decision on
the free exercise of Ms. Quinlan's right of privacy, the criminal law
could not be utilized to punish the exercise of this constitutional
right.78 ' This constitutional recognition, growing out of the holding in
Griswold v. Connecticut,7 2 served to protect the individuals, i.e., the
physicians, who effectuated the exercise of the privacy right.783
Miss Quinlan's father, supported unanimously by the family, was
given the authority to withdraw the respirator which all medical ex-
perts agreed was keeping her alive.784 Tragically, she remained alive for
ten years after she was removed from the respirator. 75 Even though
this withdrawal of artificial respiration occurred, it is interesting to
note that her father never sought judicial permission to withdraw nutri-
tion and hydration from her - acts that could be recognized as ex-
traordinary given the prognosis of her recovery. 786
In 1977, one year after Quinlan, the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court decided Superintendent of Belchertown State School v.
Saikewicz.7 8 7 Joseph Saikewicz was a retarded, incompetent sixty-seven-
year-old patient at a state mental health facility who suffered from an
incurable form of leukemia.788 The court held that before Saikewicz
could decline an extraordinary course of treatment (e.g., chemotherapy)
that would temporarily sustain his life but bring complicated and seri-
778 See id.; see also Hirsch & Donovan, The Right to Die: Medico-Legal Implica-
tions of In re Quinlan, 30 RUTGERS L. REV. 267 (1977).
779 See Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 51-52, 355 A.2d at 669-70.
780 Id.
781 Id.
782 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
783 See Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 51-52, 355 A.2d at 669-70.
78 See Quinlan Dies - Decade in Coma, USA Today, June 12, 1985, at IA, col. 2.
785 Id.
76 See id.
787 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977).
788 373 Mass. at 729, 370 N.E.2d at 418.
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ous painful side effects, 789 a probate court could first determine whether
he had properly exercised his right to refuse treatment as guaranteed
by the fourteenth amendment's right of privacy. 790
Although criticized by the medical profession as an offensive and un-
warranted intrusion into the practice of medicine, 91 the court reasoned
that it had no other recourse than to intervene. 792 Utilizing the doctrine
of substituted judgment, the court considered whether Mr. Saikewicz
would have wished the invasive medical treatment, 793 and whether his
best interests would in fact be served by such a course of action.794 The
court struggled with its responsibility to preserve life yet maintain the
personal autonomy of all citizens so that their best interests would be
protected in all circumstances. 795 It also inherently utilized a cost-bene-
fit analysis in applying the primary doctrine of substituted judgment,796
evaluating the potential for short-term benefits from the chemotherapy
versus the long-term pain, discomfort, and disorientation that would
follow. 797 Ultimately, the court decided that the value of the potential
remission was not adjudged significant enough to merit chemotherapy
treatment. 7
98
Within a year, a new Massachusetts case was litigated that departed
from Saikewicz.799 In In re Dinnerstein,°° the Massachusetts Court of
Appeal was presented with a case of first impression - involving,
789 Id. at 733, 370 N.E.2d at 421.
790 Id. at 739, 370 N.E. 2d at 424. Recognizing the right to refuse medical treatment
in appropriate circumstances "must extend to the case of an incompetent, as well as a
competent, patient because the value of human dignity extends to both." Id. at 747, 370
N.E.2d at 427.
791 See Curran, The Saikewicz Decision, 298 NEW ENG. J. MED. 499 (1978).
792 Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 759, 370 N.E.2d at 444.
793 Id. at 752-53, 370 N.E.2d at 431.
794 Id. at 738, 370 N.E.2d at 423. The Saikewicz court distinguished its actions from
the Quinlan court's in which parents determined, based on past experiences with their
daughter, that she would not have wished respiratory assistance. Id. at 751, 370
N.E.2d at 430. The Saikewicz court had no such interested relative to consult regarding
what Mr. Saikewicz would have wished; therefore, the court was compelled to inter-
vene. Id.
791 Id. at 741, 370 N.E. 2d at 425.
796 Id. at 731-32, 370 N.E. 2d at 420-22.
797 Id.
791 Id. The two powerful principles the Saikewicz court advanced were that courts,
not physicians, should make the ultimate decisions about life and death and that these
judicial decisions should always reflect what the patient, herself, would have chosen.
Stone, Judges As Medical Decision Makers, 12 THE HUMAN LIFE REV. 84, 91 (1986).
799 See In re Dinnerstein, 380 N.E.2d 134 (Mass. App. Div. 1978).
80 Id.
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namely, the issuance of an ONTR.80 1 The court held that an attending
family physician, acting with family consent or agreement and without
prior approval from a probate court, may issue an ONTR in the event
of respiratory failure or cardiac arrest for a patient who is incompetent
and terminally ill.02
Recognizing that the case presented questions directly within the
competence of the medical profession, and consistent with her family's
wishes, the court found no reason to apply the doctrine of substituted
judgment." 3 Shirley Dinnerstein was a sixty-seven-year-old widow,
who suffered from the advanced stages of Alzheimer's disease as well as
from a coronary condition.80 4 After suffering a stroke, her adult son and
daughter together with her physician sought declaratory relief to deter-
mine whether her attending physician could lawfully enter a "no-code"
order if she suffered cardiopulmonary arrest. 05 Dinnerstein, unlike
Saikewicz, could not be construed as a "right to treatment" case simply
because there was no course of treatment that could significantly im-
prove her degenerative condition.
Thus, the difference between Dinnerstein and Saikewicz is not as
startling. The two Massachusetts courts are merely making a valid and
thoughtful distinction between a patient who will in the near future die
from one who is in the current process of dying. The significance of
this distinction was stated and elaborated upon by the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court in its case of In re Spring.0 6
In Spring, Earle N. Spring, .a seventy-seven-year-old man suffering
from advanced senility and end-stage kidney disease, was being heavily
sedated three times a week to make him more compliant to receiving
five-hour hemodialysis treatments. 80 7 Both his wife and his only son
requested that his treatment be stopped; but his physicians refused to
comply. 808 Mrs. Spring and her son, his father's temporary legal guard-
ian, then asked the probate court for an order directing that the physi-
cians cease life-sustaining treatment.80 9 The probate court held an evi-
dentiary hearing upon receiving a report from the court-appointed
101 See id.
802 Id. at 139.
803 Id.
wo4 Id.
805 Id.
806 405 N.E.2d 115 (Mass. App. Div. 1980).
807 Id.
808 Id. at 117.
809 Id. at 118.
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guardian ad litem.810 The court subsequently ruled that all treatment
decisions were to be made by Mrs. Spring and her son and the attend-
ing physician. 81I The guardian ad litem appealed and, granting the mo-
tion, the probate court stayed its own judgment. 812
On appeal, the Spring court chose to draw a distinction between a
patient for whom further treatment would be of no value and one for
whom additional treatment would be a genuine alternative.1 3 Although
the court concluded that death was indeed inevitable for Mr. Spring, it
acknowledged the remote possibility that he "might regain competence,
experience lucid intervals, or even be able to express a 'sensible opin-
ion' as to his desire. 81 4 The probate court was then forced to modify its
order.81 The appellate court ordered no further use of life-prolonging
treatment and went further in holding that the probate court, and it
alone, not Mr. Spring's wife nor his son nor attending physician, was
the proper party to determine the extent to which the substituted judg-
ment standard would be applied. 1 6 Ultimately, the court found that the
standard of substituted judgment had been properly applied and met.817
In New York, the courts were less understanding and more conserva-
tive than in Massachusetts in their decisions to forego treatment. In In
re Eichner818 and its companion case, In re Storar,81 9 the courts held
that it was unnecessary to determine whether the right to refuse treat-
ment was an inherent element in the fourteenth amendment's right to
privacy because common-law principles supported its recognition.820
The doctrine of substituted judgment was not a point of contention be-
cause clear and convincing evidence would always be required to prove
that an individual was competent when she decided to initiate or dis-
continue treatment. 821 Furthermore, the Storar court refused to follow
Saikewicz's application of the doctrine of substituted judgment and held
that life-prolonging treatment of a terminally ill, incompetent cancer
810 Id.
811 Id.
812 Id.
813 Id. at 123.
814 Id.
815 Id.
816 Id. at 117, 122.
817 Id. at 122.
818 73 A.D.2d 431, 426 N.Y.2d 517 (App. Div. 1980), rev'd, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420
N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266 (1981)..
819 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266 (1981).
820 Id. at 376-77, 420 N.E.2d at 70, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 272-73 (consolidated with
Eichner).
821 Id. at 378-79, 420 N.E.2d at 71-72, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 273-74.
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victim could not be withdrawn.822
In Eichner, Brother Fox, an eighty-three-year-old member of the
Roman Catholic Society of Mary, went into cardiac arrest during a
routine hernia operation.82 3 He lost oxygen for only a few moments
and, while in a state of coma, he was placed on a respirator.824 Brother
Fox suffered substantial brain damage and had no reasonable chance of
making any type of recovery.8 2 When a close friend, Father Philip
Eichner, requested that the respirator be removed, the hospital refused,
and this present action was initiated.8 26 The Appellate Division of the
New York Supreme Court held that the right to refuse treatment was
an inherent, protected guarantee found within the common law.827 Ad-
ditionally, under the fourteenth amendment's right to privacy, this right
could be exercised by applying the doctrine of substituted judgment. 28
Heavy reliance was placed upon the Saikewicz and Spring
Massachusetts precedents.8 29 The New York Court of Appeal rejected
the majority of the appellate court's analysis and skirted the major
problem by finding that, when Brother Fox was competent, he had ex-
pressed the view that he never wished to be maintained on artificial life
supports.8 3°
In the companion case of In re Storar,831 a fifty-two-year-old re-
tarded man, John Storar, was afflicted with terminal bladder cancer
822 Id. at 380, 420 N.E.2d at 73, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 275.
823 Eichner, 52 N.Y.2d at 371, 420 N.E.2d at 67, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 269.
824 Id.
825 Id.
826 Id.
827 Id. at 372, 420 N.E.2d at 68, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 270.
828 Id.
829 See In re Eichner, 73 A.D. 431, 426 N.Y.2d 517 (App. Div. 1980), rev'd, 52
N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266 (1981).
830 Eichner 52 N.Y.2d at 378-80, N.E.2d at 71-72, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 273-74. On
October, 14, 1988, the New York Court of Appeals ruled that life sustaining medical
treatment cannot be withheld from an incompetent patient unless, while competent, the
patient made a clear and resolute decision to reject such treatment. In re O'Connor, 72
N.Y.2d 517, 531 N.E.2d 607, 534 N.Y.S.2d 886 (1988). Chief Judge Wachtler stated:
[The patient's] statements with respect to declining artificial means of
life support were generally prompted by her experience with persons suf-
fering terminal illnesses, particularly cancer. However, [she] does not have
a terminal illness, except in the sense that she is aged and infirm. Neither
is she in a coma nor vegetative state. . . .She is in a stable condition and
if properly nourished will remain in that condition unless some other med-
ical problem arises.
Id. at 533, 531 N.E.2d at 615, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 894..
831 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266 (1981).
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causing him regularly to lose blood.832 In order to replace that which he
lost, he was subjected to blood transfusions. 33 His mother and guardian
sought to discontinue the transfusions - even though Storar had more
energy after them and was able to resume his "normal" routine.834 Be-
cause Storar's infant mentality prevented the court from ascertaining
his wishes about a continuation of potentially life-prolonging treatment,
the court held that the artifice of substituted judgment could not be
employed by an infant's parent or guardian to deprive a child of life-
saving treatment - especially since the transfusions were analogous to
food. 835 Tragically, while being so quick to criticize and reject the ap-
plication of the doctrine of substituted judgment, the court chose to dis-
regard the opportunity to develop a new framework for principled deci-
sion making. Instead, they simply called upon a mandatory procedure
to be forthcoming from the legislature. 836
In the combined 1983 decision of Barber v. Superior Court and
Nejdl v. Superior Court,8 37 the California Court of Appeal for the Sec-
ond District for the first time equated the discontinuation of an intrave-
nous feeding with the removal of a respirator or any other medical in-
tervention.8 38 The court declared that each procedure was a medical
treatment and could only be used if it benefitted the patient.839 Thus, if
the intervention merely sustains biological functions, it should not be
regarded as a treatment - but, rather as a useless gesture and one the
physician is not obligated to follow.84° Especially significant is the
court's shift in its analysis from the more traditional emphasis of "ordi-
nary v. extraordinary" means of treatment to a "proportionate-dispro-
portionate" benefits standard.8 41 In essence, the court shifts the focus
from medical treatment involved to the condition of the patient that
would result if the treatment were either started or retained:8 42
Thus, even if a proposed course of treatment might be extremely painful
or intrusive, it would still be proportionate treatment if the prognosis was
for complete cure or significant improvement in the patient's condition. On
832 Id. at 373-74, 420 N.E.2d at 68-69, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 270-71.
833 Id.
11 Id. at 374-75, 420 N.E.2d at 69-70, 438 N.Y.S. 2d at 271-72.
835 Id. at 380-81, 420 N.E.2d at 73, 438 N.Y.S. 2d at 275.
836 Id. at 382-83, 420 N.E.2d at 73-74, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 276.
837 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (1983).
838 Id. at 1016, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 490.
839 Id. at 1019, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 491.
840 Id.
841 Id. at 1018-19, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 491.
842 Id. at 1019, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 491-92.
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the other hand, a treatment course which is only minimally painful or
intrusive may nonetheless be considered disproportionate to the potential
benefits if the prognosis is virtually hopeless for any significant improve-
ment in condition.84 3
Shortly after surgery for closure of an ileostomy, Clarence Herbert
suffered a cardiopulmonary arrest, went into a coma and was placed on
a respirator.844 After five days, the physicians determined his condition
to be irreversible and so advised his wife and family.845 After obtaining
permission from the wife, use of the respirator was discontinued.
8 46
Nevertheless, Mr. Herbert continued to live in a state of coma.
8 47
Thereupon, the doctors received written permission from Mrs. Herbert
to terminate the administration of nutrition and hydration.8 48 Six days
later, he died - but during those days he "received nursing care which
preserved his dignity and provided a clean and hygienic environ-
ment."
49
The issue confronting the court of appeal was whether the two at-
tending physicians, Dr. Barber and Dr. Nejdl, should be held guilty of
murder and conspiracy to commit murder.5 0 The court, in reaching a
conclusion that no charge of this nature would be sustained, chose to
view the conduct of the physicians "as that of omission rather than
affirmative action. 8 5 1 The court stated:
There is no criminal liability for failure to act unless there is a legal duty
to act .... 852
A physician has no duty to continue treatment, once it has proved to be
ineffective. Although there may be a duty to provide life-sustaining ma-
chinery in the immediate aftermath of a cardio-respiratory arrest, there is
no duty to continue its use once it has become futile in the opinion of
qualified medical personnel.85 3
No precise guidelines as to when or how these decisions should be made
can be provided by this court since this determination is essentially a med-
ical one to be made at a time and on the basis of facts which will be
843 Id. at 1019, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 491.
8" Id. at 1018, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 490.
845 Id.
846 Id.
841 Id. at 1010, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 486.
848 Id.
84 Id. at 1011, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 486.
850 Id.
851 Id. at 1017, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 490.
852 Id.
853 Id. at 1017-18, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 491.
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unique to each case. 854
The Barber-Nejdl court stressed its position that judicial interven-
tion was not required in cases of this nature, unless ordered by the
legislature."85 Indeed, a requirement of judicial intervention in all simi-
lar cases should be viewed as not only unnecessary, but unwise. 85 6 The
court agreed that Mrs. Herbert was the proper surrogate decision
maker for her husband and that his previous expressions of not wishing
to "become another Karen Ann Quinlan" had been taken into full ac-
count in reaching the ultimate decision.1 7 Furthermore, the court noted
that in those cases when it was not possible to determine the choice the
patient would have made, the surrogate should be guided in her deci-
sion making by the "patient's best interests. 8 58
In April 1984 seventy-year-old William Bartling was admitted to the
Glendale Adventist Medical Center in California for treatment of de-
pression.5 9 Suffering from emphysema, arteriosclerosis, and an abdomi-
nal aneurysm, an examination revealed him to have a malignant lung
tumor.860 During efforts to obtain a biopsy of the tumor, however, the
lung collapsed and failed to reinflate. 861 A tracheotomy was performed
854 Id. at 1018, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 491.
855 Id.
856 Id. at 1022, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 493.
857 Id.
858 Id. at 1021, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 493. The factors to consider would include relief of
suffering, preservation or restoration of functioning capacities, quality and extent of
sustainable "life," and the ultimate decision's impact on those closest to the patient. Id.;
see also Lo, The Death of Clarence Herbert: Withdrawing Care is Not Murder, 101
ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 48 (1984); Lynn & Childress, supra note 664, at 17.
The Massachusetts Court of Appeal cited Barber approvingly in In re Mary Hier,
18 Mass. App. Ct. 200, 464 N.E.2d 959 (1984), to support its ruling that a 92 year old
incompetent patient who pulled out her gastrostomy tube did not need to undergo
forced surgical intervention to have the tube reinserted. Id. at 201, 464 N.E.2d at 959.
The court decided the case fully knowing that the patient's intravenous feeding was
used only as a short-term technique to maintain hydration rather than as a balanced
diet. Id. at 203, 464 N.E.2d at 961. Acknowledging that the substituted judgment test
as used was valid and proper, id. at 207-10, 464 N.E.2d at 963-66, the court concluded
that medical nutrition and fluids were to be administered similarly to any other medical
intervention: to accord with a balance of benefits and burdens to the patient. Id. at 207,
464 N.E.2d at 964. The court further stated that such actions in certain circumstances
do not violate either the law or medical ethics. Id.
859 Bartling v. Superior Court, 163 Cal. App. 3d 186, 190, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220, 221
(1984).
860 Id. at 190, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 221.
861 Id.
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and Mr. Bartling was placed on a respirator. 862 Requests made by Mr.
Bartling and his wife to the physicians for the removal of the respirator
were to no avail.863 Thus, in June 1984, Mr. Bartling sought to enjoin
both the hospital and the physicians from administering further treat-
ment. 864 Bartling also sought damages for nonconsensual treatment in
violation of his state and constitutional rights, for breach of the fiduci-
ary duty owed to him by the hospital and his treating physicians, for
intentional infliction of emotional distress, and for conspiracy.8 65
Mr. Bartling had executed a signed and properly witnessed nonstat-
utory "living will" stating his direction that should he be placed in a
situation of "extreme physical or mental disability" in which there was
no "reasonable expectation" of recovery, he wished to be allowed to
die.866 Additionally, he had executed a declaration under the state Nat-
ural Death Act underscoring his wish to die with dignity rather than
continue in the "intolerable" manner in which he was living. 867 He also
executed a durable power of attorney for health care with his wife in
which he directed her to honor his desire to end his "humiliating indig-
nity" by refusing ventilator support.868 Both Mr. Bartling and his wife
- together with their daughter - signed a release which relieved the
hospital and physicians from civil liability. 869 In spite of all of these
measures, the physicians found Mr. Bartling's condition not termi-
nal.87 0 He could potentially live for a year if weaned from the respira-
tor.87 1 However, real doubts existed about the feasibility of this ac-
tion.872 Furthermore, although not questioning his legal competency,
the physicians questioned Bartling's ability to make a meaningful deci-
sion. 873 They also expressed concern about the ethics of disconnecting
life support and the potential civil and criminal liability that might fol-
low their actions.874
The court held that the right to disconnect a life-support mechanism
862 Id.
863 Id.
864 Id.
865 Id.
866 Id., 209 Cal. Rptr. at 222.
867 Id. at 191, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 222.
868 Id.
869 Id.
870 Id.
1 Id. at 192, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 223.
872 Id.
873 Id.
874 Id., 209 Cal. Rptr. at 222.
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was not limited to only comatose or terminally ill patients. 75 Grounded
in a constitutional right of privacy as it emerges from the fifth and
ninth amendments, this right of patient self-determination should be
regarded as "paramount to the interests of the patient's hospital and
doctors. "876
Disregarding the assertion that the state had a positive interest in
protecting against suicide, the court held that the state's interest was in
protecting only against "irrational self-destruction. ' 77 The court noted
that a patient could make a "competent, rational decision to refuse
treatment when death is inevitable and the treatment offers no hope or
cure of preservation of life. There is no connection between the conduct
here in issue and any State concerns to prevent suicide.8 78 Consistent
with Mr. Bartling's request, the court held that no civil or criminal
liability would attach to the act of disconnecting the life-sustaining
equipment; nor would advance judicial approval or intervention be re-
quired. 79 The fact that Mr. Bartling executed a declaration which at-
tested to his wish to die with dignity proved that he was aware that he
would die if disconnected from the ventilator.880 Although finding that
the California Natural Death Act applied only to a narrow number of
terminally ill individuals and that a directive under it was not the ex-
clusive method of refusing treatment, the court chose not to set forth a
defined structure for competent patients to follow.88'
In 1979 Claire Conroy was eighty-four years old and residing in a
nursing home.882 She was ambulatory, and although often confused, she
875 Id. at 194-95, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 224-25.
876 Id. at 195, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 225.
877 Id. at 196, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 226.
878 Id. (citing Saikewicz approvingly).
879 Id. at 197, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 226.
880 Id.
881 Id. at 194, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 224.
In In re Torres, 357 N.W.2d 332 (Minn. 1984), the Minnesota Supreme Court held
that allowing the removal in this particular instance of a respirator required a court
order. Id. However, the court observed the almost weekly procedure in Minnesota in
which, after the physician consulted with the terminally ill patient's family and the
hospital ethics committee's approved the action, terminating life support systems was
undertaken. Id. In situations following this recognized procedure, the court would not
interfere. Id. While this recognition was important, the court is primarily cited for
recognizing that the substituted judgment test, with a conclusion to withdraw life sup-
port systems, is totally consistent with the patient's own best interests in this type of
case. Id.; see also Rasmussen v. Fleming, 154 Ariz. 207, 741 P.2d 674 (1987); Foody v.
Manchester Memorial Hosp., 40 Conn. Supp. 127, 482 A.2d 713 (Conn. Super. Ct.
1984).
882 In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 336, 486 A.2d 1209, 1216 (1985).
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was able to converse.883 She was afflicted with arteriosclerotic heart dis-
ease, hypertension, diabetes, a gangrenous leg, and organic brain syn-
drome.88 4 She also employed a urinary catheter because she had no
bowel control.8 ' Between 1979 and 1983, these conditions became ex-
acerbated, especially the severe organic brain syndrome.8 6 A nasogas-
tric tube was subsequently inserted which supplied her with nutrients
and fluids.88 7 Her life expectancy with the tubal feeding was set at no
more than a year; without it she was expected to die of dehydration
within approximately a week's time.888
In 1983 Ms. Conroy's nephew sought judicial authorization for the
removal of the nasogastric tube so that she might die.89 The trial court
held that when intelligence had been permanently reduced while the
patient suffered from a corresponding array of medical difficulties, life
becomes impossible, and tubal nourishment could be withdrawn even
though Ms. Conroy's ensuing starvation might be painful.890
Although not discussing the contention of Ms. Conroy's nephew -
that if she had been competent she would have wished to be taken from
her artificial (tubal) nourishment8 91 - the intermediate appellate court
refused to sustain the orderof the lower court. 92 The court reasoned
that Ms. Conroy appeared to be suffering no pain, and that she well
might endure it if the tubal feeding were to stop. 93 Furthermore, she
was neither in a terminal condition nor permanently comatose or in a
chronic vegetative state. 94 Thus, since death was not imminent,8 95 rou-
tine life supports could not be withdrawn because the state interest in
preserving life supports such as nutrition simply outweighed Ms.
Conroy's privacy interest.8 96 The court also noted that before it would
judicially recognize a patient's right to terminate life-sustaining treat-
ment, the patient would need to show that no medical benefit would
883 Id.
s Id.
885 Id. at 338-39, 486 A.2d at 1217.
886 Id.
887 98 N.J. at 336, 486 A.2d at 1216.
888 Id. at 338, 486 A.2d at 1217-18.
889 Id. at 340, 486 A.2d at 1220.
890 In re Conroy, 188 N.J. Super. 523, 529-30, 457 A.2d 1232, 1236 (Ch. 1983).
891 In re Conroy, 190 N.J. Super. 453, 457 n.4, 464 A.2d 303, 306 n.4 (App. Div.
1983).
892 Id. at 457-58, 464 A.2d at 306-07.
893 Id. at 475, 464 A.2d at 315.
894 Id.
89s Id. at 469-70, 464 A.2d at 312.
896 See id. at 469, 464 A.2d at 311-12.
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result from the continuation of treatment.897 No conclusive evidence on
this point was shown in Ms. Conroy's care. 98
The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed the Appellate Division and
held that a competent adult has a general right to refuse life-sustaining
medical treatment and does not lose that right because of subsequent
incompetency. 99 Also, under certain defined sets of circumstance, a sur-
rogate decision maker may - acting on behalf of the incompetent -
withdraw life-sustaining treatment.9°
The court defined rather complex procedures that must be followed
before a decision to terminate treatment (such as artificial feeding)
could be withdrawn from a dying patient.901 For elderly incompetent
nursing home residents who "will probably die within approximately
one year even with treatment,"902 treatment could be withheld if three
conditions were met: (1) it was clear that the particular patient would
have refused treatment under the present circumstances (the subjective
test);903 (2) there is some indication of the patient's wishes - even
though she has not "unequivocally expressed" her desires before be-
coming incompetent - and the course of treatment "would only pro-
long suffering" (the limited-objective test);9°4 and (3) when there is no
evidence regarding the patient's wishes but the burden of the treatment
"clearly and markedly outweighs the benefits the patient derives from
life" (the pure objective test). 905
Under procedures set forth by the court, in the case of an incompe-
tent patient, a judicial determination must be made that the patient is
incompetent to make the decision regarding the withholding or with-
drawing of life-sustaining medical treatment. 9 6 If no guardian has been
appointed, the court will do so after this determination. 90 7 Even if pre-
viously adjudicated as incompetent, the court must determine whether
the patient can make the present decision concerning medical treat-
ment.908 If a guardian has already been appointed for the patient, the
897 See id. at 475, 464 A.2d at 315.
898 See id. at 466, 464 A.2d at 310.
899 In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 388, 486 A.2d 1209, 1244-45 (1985).
900 See id.
901 Id. at 360, 486 A.2d at 1229.
902 Id.
903 Id. at 361, 486 A.2d at 1229.
904 Id. at 365, 486 A.2d at 1232.
905 Id. at 366-67, 486 A.2d at 1232.
906 Id. at 364-65, 486 A.2d at 1231.
907 Id.
908 Id.
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judicial inquiry must be directed to the suitability of the guardian to
make this decision.909
The guardian who believes that the actions of withholding or with-
drawing would either effectuate the patient's wishes or meet either the
second or third tests must notify the office of the State Ombudsman of
the contemplated action. 910 Similarly, for any person who believes that
the contemplated action would abuse the at-risk patient, that person
may contact the Ombudsman.91' Upon notification of a possible abuse,
the Ombudsman is required to investigate and report the matter to the
Commissioner of Human Services and other concerned administrative
officials.9"2
The attending physician and nurses are required to furnish evidence
concerning the patient's condition.91 3 Two other doctors, unaffiliated
with the case or the institution where the patient is being maintained,
should be appointed to confirm both the condition of the patient and
her prognosis. 914 If the two physicians present the necessary medical
foundation, the guardian may then - with the concurrence of the at-
tending physician and the Ombudsman - proceed to either withhold
or withdraw life-sustaining medical treatment.915 The decision maker
must have a good faith belief, based on medical evidence and evidence
supporting the wishes of the patient, that one of these tests is met.916 In
the case of the use of the limited-objective test, the patient's next of kin
must also concur. 917 Because of the complexity of the tests and their
procedural requirements, it is very difficult to imagine a situation in
which treatment would be withheld or withdrawn under the Conroy
structure.918
909 Id. at 364-66, 486 A.2d at 1230-31.
910 Id. at 383, 486 A.2d at 1241-42.
911 Id.
912 Id.
913 Id. at 384, 486 A.2d at 1242.
914 Id.
915 Id.
916 Id.
917 Id.
918 For example, if an incompetent's guardian believed under one of the objective
tests that actions terminating life-sustaining treatments were in the patient's best inter-
est and proceeded to follow the court's mandatory set procedure, treatment could be
continued as a consequence of but one dissent from a family member. In addition, if the
same judicially designed procedure were followed and the patient's entire family con-
curred that such actions were in the patient's best interests, and assuming further that
all other conditions were satisfied, one of the two physicians necessarily appointed by
the State Ombudsman for the Institutionalized Elderly - if hesitant to agree regarding
19891
University of California, Davis
On February 26, 1986, a New Jersey State Superior Court Judge
ruled that Nancy Ellen Jobes, who had been unconscious since April
1980, had a right to remove a feeding jejunostomy tube which was sur-
gically implanted in her small intestine. 919 Mrs. Jobes' husband had
maintained the action for removal of her feeding system.920 The Lincoln
Park Nursing Home, where Mrs. Jobes was a patient, opposed the
action and sought its own appointment as a "life advocate" who would
"fight for the life" of Mrs. Jobes.921
In disallowing the claim of the nursing home for an appointment of a
guardian ad litem, the court observed that
it is not the function of the guardian ad litem in these life-support cases to
argue for continuation of the incompetent ward's life in each and every
case. Such a view misconceives the time-honored obligation of the guard-
ian ad litem to act in the best interests of the ward. 2
The court explained that a policy which mandated extraordinary life-
supporting measures in all cases involving terminal care would violate
an individual's constitutional and common-law right of privacy. 923 The
court also concluded that both the competent and the incompetent pos-
sess the same right of self-determination in matters of this nature. 924
In a 6-1 decision, delivered June 24, 1987, the New Jersey Supreme
Court found that the trial court had properly determined that there was
"clear and convincing" evidence that Mrs. Jobes was in a persistent
vegetative state.92 Finding further that Nancy Jobes' situation was di-
rectly analogous to Karen Quinlan's, the court held that nutrition and
hydration were medical treatment issues which could be withheld or
withdrawn on behalf of the afflicted patient.926 Interestingly, on this
point, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's finding that clear
and convincing evidence had been adduced, after finding that Mrs.
Jobes had not made sufficiently specific statements, but instead had
the patient's condition - could cause treatment to be continued. In sum, the Conroy
procedures cause too many check-points that result in road-blocks. See Comment, Nat-
ural Death: An Alternative in New Jersey, 73 GEO. L.J. 1331, 1351 (1985); see also
Annas, supra note 665, at 24.
919 In re Jobes, 210 N.J. Super. 543, 545, 510 A.2d 133, 134-35 (1986), affd, 108
N.J. 394, 529 A.2d 434 (1987).
920 210 N.J. Super. at 545, 510 A.2d at 134-35.
921 Id. at 543, 510 A.2d at 134.
922 Id., 510 A.2d at 135 (emphasis added).
923 Id. at 547, 510 A.2d at 136.
924 Id.
925 In re Jobes, 108 N.J. 394, 529 A.2d 434 (1987).
926 Id. at 426-28, 529 A.2d at 439-41.
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made statements that were "remote, general, spontaneous and made in
casual circumstances. 927
Even with this ruling, Justice Garibaldi, speaking for the majority
court, acknowledged that tubal feeding could be ended if members of
the Jobes family exercise their best, substituted judgment after consid-
ering the wishes and motives that would control Mrs. Jobes' medical
decisions. 928 If close, caring members of the patient's family are willing
to make critical care decisions, the court would neither appoint a
guardian, nor would it review the family's decision.92 9 If an incompe-
tent patient has no close family members, and has failed to establish
clear and convincing evidence of her wish to have a distant relative or
friend make a surrogate medical decision, a guardian must be
appointed. 930
Even though Mrs. Jobes was in a nursing home, the court deter-
mined that the decision making process for surrogates "should be sub-
stantially the same regardless of where the patient is located." 931 The
court established a set of guidelines that would remove criminal or civil
liability for the implementation of any good faith surrogate decision to
decline medical treatment. 932 Simple and straightforward, the guidelines
recognize that certain safeguards which exist in hospitals are not usu-
ally found in nursing homes. 933 Thus, for the nursing home patient
under sixty years of age who is "non-elderly" and "non-hospitalized"
but in a persistent vegetative state, the surrogate decision maker must
secure statements from at least two independent physicians before de-
clining life-sustaining medical treatment.934 The statements must allege
that the patient is in a persistent vegetative state without any reasona-
ble possibility of recovery. 935
The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed the lower court's decision
which allowed the Lincoln Park Nursing Home to refuse to withdraw
Mrs. Jobes' feeding tube.936 The court reasoned that since the Jobes
family had no reason to believe it was foregoing the right to select
among various medical alternatives when Mrs. Jobes was placed in
927 Id. at 428, 529 A.2d at 441.
928 Id. at 430-32, 529 A.2d at 444-47.
929 Id. at 431, 529 A.2d at 446.
93o Id. at 432, 529 A.2d at 447.
931 Id. at 433, 529 A.2d at 448.
932 Id. at 433-34, 529 A.2d at 448-49.
933 Id. at 433, 529 A.2d at 448.
934 Id.
935 Id.
936 Id. at 447, 529 A.2d at 450.
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Lincoln Park and, because it would be extremely burdensome to locate
another nursing home facility that would accept her, discharging her
from the Lincoln Park Home would essentially frustrate Mrs. Jobes'
right of self-determination. 937
937 Id.
On June 24, 1987, two other cases involving the right to refuse medical treatment
were in close proximity decided with Jobes by the New Jersey Supreme Court: In re
Farrell, 108 N.J. 335, 529 A.2d 404 (1987), and In re Peter, 108 N.J. 365, 529 A.2d
419 (1987). In Farrell, a woman in her early thirties suffered from amyotrophic lateral
sclerosis (or Lou Gehrig's disease), was paralyzed, was on a respirator, and required
around-the-clock nursing care at home; she was, however, able to express her wish to
be removed from the respirator. 108 N.J. at 335, 529 A.2d at 404. Upon petition to the
trial court by Kathleen Farrell's husband and children for authority to disconnect her
respirator and for a declaratory judgment to negate civil and criminal liability for such
actions, the requested relief was granted. Id. However, while awaiting appellate re-
view, Mrs. Farrell died connected to her respirator. Id. The New Jersey Supreme
Court nonetheless proceeded to decide that a competent patient has the right to refuse
life-sustaining medical treatment. 108 N.J. at 349, 529 A.2d at 413. Moreover, when a
competent patient living at home requests to discontinue such life-sustaining medical
treatment, the first procedure that must be followed is to establish: her competency, that
she has been properly informed about her prognosis, available alternative treatments,
and the risks involved in withdrawing the life-sustaining treatment. Id., 529 A.2d at
413-14. Thereafter, two independent physicians must examine the patient at home to
confirm both the patient's competence and the fact that all necessary information has
been given. Id. at 354, 529 A.2d at 414-15. Unless a situation presents an unusual set
of circumstances (i.e., conflict among physicians, family members or other health-care
providers), the actions will not judicially be reviewed. Id., 529 A.2d at 415. Emphasiz-
ing its respect and confidence in the family unit's approach to treating its sick members,
the court stressed that decision making should be unencumbered by legal processes, but
it should entail the advice of a physician. Id. The court stated, "Thus, we do not want
to impose any restrictions or burdens on the competent patient's right to have life-
sustaining treatment withdrawn if he or she is at home that would not be present if he
or she were in a hospital or nursing home." Id. at 353, 529 A.2d at 414.
In Peter, Hilda M. Peter, while in her early sixties, collapsed in the home she shared
with Everhard Johanning. 108 N.J. 365, 529 A.2d at 419. She was resuscitated, but
was moved to a New Jersey nursing home where she remained permanently uncon-
scious and in a persistent vegetative state sustained by a nasogastric feeding tube. Id.
Although she had executed no living will, Ms. Peter had conveyed a power of attorney
to Mr. Johanning in 1983 - a year before her collapse - authorizing him to make all
health decisions on her behalf and "to be given full and complete authority to manage
and direct (her) medical care." Id. at 371, 529 A.2d at 422. The court concluded that
the evidence established clearly that - if competent - she would choose to withdraw
her feeding tube. Id. at 378, 529 A.2d at 426-27. Since none of the various traditional
state interests were found to be sufficiently strong to overcome Ms. Peter's right to
refuse medical treatment, and since no prognosis committee existed at the nursing
home, the State Ombudsman for the Institutionalized Elderly needed to obtain two
independent medical opinions confirming that no reasonable possibility existed for the
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This ruling extends both Quinlan and Conroy; while removal of a
respirator may or may not cause death within the foreseeable future, as
with Ms. Quinlan's case, the withdrawal of artificial feeding and its
recognition as treatment means that in most cases death will occur
within one or two weeks.938 In Conroy although the court recognized
artificial feeding as a medical procedure which could be withdrawn
from a dying patient, for incompetent nursing home residents, a com-
plicated procedure was set forth making the whole matter exceedingly
cumbersome.9 39 In Jobes the simple recognition of the right of self-de-
termination and its coordinate right of withdrawal of treatment made
the process neat and unencumbered.9 40
patient's recovery to a cognitive sapient state before life-sustaining treatment was with-
drawn. Id. at 382, 529 A.2d at 429. The court distinguished the instant case in which
Ms. Peters was existing in a persistent vegetative state from the Conroy case in which
Ms. Conroy's condition was similar to Karen Quinlan's. Id. at 377, 529 A.2d at 424.
Thus, the proper inquiry was whether a reasonable possibility existed that the patient
would return to a cognitive and sapient life. Id. With Ms. Peter, no such possibility
existed. Id.
918 See Sullivan, Jersey Judge Permits Denial of Food to Patient in Coma, N.Y.
Times, Apr. 24, 1986, at 17, col. 5; see also John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v.
Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921 (Fla. 1984) (court refused to become involved in determin-
ing whether withdrawal of respirator should be allowed - deferring instead to either
the family or appointed guardian to discharge incompetent's right to refuse extraordi-
nary medical treatment).
919 Conroy, 98 N.J. at 368, 486 A.2d at 1237.
940 See supra notes 931-35 and accompanying text. In Jobes, convincing evidence
existed that Mrs. Jobes had previously expressed on several occasions her wish never to
be sustained on artificial life supports if she became helpless. Jobes, 210 N.J. Super. at
543, 510 A.2d at 133.
In Rasmussen v. Fleming, 154 Ariz. 207, 741 P.2d 674 (1987), the court held that a
right to refuse treatment to incompetents and to those who previously had not articu-
lated their desire to refuse could be considered in one's best interests and furthered in
certain circumstances of withholding or withdrawing treatment. Id. The court also de-
termined that using "extraordinary medical treatment" could be regarded as including
artificially supplied nutrition and hydration. Id. Although recognizing state natural
death acts as providing a convenient form to avoid complications in exercising the right
to refuse treatment, the court acknowledged that these acts were not the sole or exclu-
sive procedure by which the right could be exercised. Id. at 216, 741 P.2d at 680.
On July 23, 1987, acting partly to affirm and partly to reverse the appellate decision,
the Arizona Supreme Court held that Ms. Rasmussen had the right to refuse medical
treatment and that this right was protected not only by the common law, but also by
state and federal constitutions. Id. at 217-18, 741 P.2d at 681-83. Agreeing with the
appellate court, the Arizona Supreme Court held that the ethical integrity of the medi-
cal profession would not be compromised by either "Do Not Resuscitate" or "Do Not
Hospitalize" Orders. Id. at 219-21, 741 P.2d at 684-85. The Court added that no
material distinction existed between irreversible coma and Ms. Rasmussen's irreversible
1989]
University of California, Davis
On November 1, 1983, Elizabeth Bouvia, a competent, college-edu-
cated, nonterminally ill county hospital patient asked a court of law for
permission to starve herself to death because her disabilities made her
unable to take her own life.941 Unfortunately, she never realized that
her quest for enlightened self-determination would not be recognized
until April 16, 1986.942 She initially sought a prohibitory injunction
against the Riverside General Hospital's administering any health care
without her consent. 943 She predicated her claim on the right of per-
sonal autonomy or self-determination to decide when and how her life
should end, and that there was a societal obligation to render her assis-
tance in executing that right.9" The defendants alleged that she had no
such statutory, constitutional, ethical, or moral right to undertake this
action and, if she did have the right, it could be overcome by compelling
state interests.945
Since birth, Ms. Bouvia has suffered from severe cerebral palsy, and,
as a quadriplegic, she has virtually no motor function in her limbs. 946
She does have slight muscular control which allows her to operate an
electric wheelchair. 947 Voluntary control of her face, mouth, and throat
allows her to eat a normal diet fed to her and allows her to converse.9 41
At the time she filed her action, her cerebral palsy was not of a pro-
gressive nature. 949 The trial court found that Ms. Bouvia had the right,
under the unwritten right of privacy and self-determination found in
the first, fourth, fifth and fourteenth amendments, to terminate her ex-
chronic vegetative state. Id. at 221, 741 P.2d at 685. Finally, in deciding a ward, the
court held that the guardian should be guided by either the substituted judgment stan-
dard or by the best interests standard; furthermore, when there is no evidence at all
regarding the choice the patient would have made - as with Ms. Rasmussen - the
surrogate decision maker should utilize the best interests standard. Id. The court held
the quality of life - as an objective standard of evaluation - to refer to the patient's
value in continued life and not the value others find in the patient's continued life. Id.
Relief from suffering was also considered an objective standard which the surrogate
decision maker should consider. Id. at 222-23, 741 P.2d at 688-89.
'41 Reporter's Transcript at 1238-50, Bouvia v. County of Riverside, No. 159780
(Dec. 16, 1983).
942 See Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1986).
943 The trial court decision is reproduced in 1 ISSUES IN LAW & MEDICINE 486
(1986). Subsequent references are from this journal.
944 id.
945 Id.
946 Id.
947 Id.
948 Id.
949 Id. at 487.
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istence.950 However, Ms. Bouvia could not assert this right while she
was in a nonterminal condition with the assistance of society. 951 There-
fore, her petition for injunctive relief was denied.9 2 The court, without
any supporting authority, admonished Ms. Bouvia because "there is
hope in life" and because she could be a "symbol of hope" to others
similarly situated. 953 The court believed that she could live another fif-
teen to twenty years.
954
Although recognizing her decision as rational and competent,955 the
court concluded that allowing her request would have "a profound ef-
fect on the medical staff, nurses and administration" of her treating
hospital.95 6 Furthermore, the motive behind the anticipated act and the
actual act itself of starvation would constitute suicide, thereby violating
the state's interest in preserving life and preventing the assistance of life
being taken.957 One commentator suggests that the court discriminated
against Ms. Bouvia because she was prevented from exercising an abil-
ity to achieve an act (e.g., starvation) which an equally competent per-
son who is not physically incapable could do without restriction. 958
In the case of a young woman, such as Ms. Bouvia, who openly
contemplates her suicide, surely reasonable efforts should be made not
only to assess her competency but also to dissuade her from self-de-
struction. The testing area is what happens after reasonable steps fail.
Perhaps, after a waiting period of six months during which a psychiat-
ric assessment and psychological counseling may be given, a re-evalua-
tion of an initial request for starvation could be made.95 9 Because Ms.
Bouvia had been previously hospitalized for several days in order to
"change her mind,"6 0 it is perhaps possible that further hospitalization
and forced feeding would allow her to once again change her mind.96 1
Although forced feeding of a competent adult raises serious issues of
individual autonomy and integrity, efforts to persuade and offer oral
950 Id. at 489.
951 Id. at 491.
952 Id.
953 Id.
114 Id. at 489.
9s5 Id. at 487.
951 Id. at 488.
917 Id. at 490.
958 See Van den Haag, A Right to Die?, NAT'L REv., May 9, 1984, at 45, 46.
919 See Annas, When Suicide Prevention Becomes Brutality: The Case of Elizabeth
Bouvia, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Apr. 1984, at 20, 21.
960 Id. at 46.
961 See id.
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nutrition should perhaps continue. 962 But beyond these actions set
within a defined time frame, it would appear brutal and unconsciona-
ble to require more than this. 963
By the time her appeal was decided April 16, 1986, Ms. Bouvia,
now twenty-eight years of age, had regrettably deteriorated to such an
extent that her palsy and quadriplegia were now joined with a degener-
ative and very crippling type of arthritis. 964 She was completely bed-
ridden and, with the exception of slight head and facial movements,
was physically helpless and dependent upon the care of others.961 She
had to lay flat on her back for the remainder of her life, continually
suffering pain.966 In addition to tubal liquid feeding, she had another
tube attached permanently to her chest that injected her periodically
with morphine in order to relieve some of her pain.967 The court
granted Ms. Bouvia's request for preliminary injunction and ordered
the removal of her nasogastric tube and prohibited its further use.968
Additionally, any replacement tube or any such device like it could not
be given without her request. 969
Noting the factual similarity of Ms. Bouvia's condition to William
Bartling,970 and the similarity of issues to Barber,971 the court held that
a patient may refuse any medical treatment or medical service even
though such treatment or service may be termed nourishment and hy-
dration, and even if such actions precipitate a life-threatening condi-
tion.972 Observing that Ms. Bouvia was neither comatose, vegetative,
nor in a terminal condition,973 the court also recognized that the quality
of her existence had become hopeless, useless, unenjoyable and
962 See id.
963 See id. See generally Note, The Role of Law in Suicide Prevention: Beyond Civil
Commitment - A Bystander Duty to Report Suicide Threats?, 39 STAN. L. REv. 929
(1987).
96 Bouvia, 179 Cal. App. 3d at 1135-36, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 299-300; see also Annas,
Elizabeth Bouvia: Whose Space Is It Anyway?, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Apr. 1986, at
24; Williams, The Right to Die, 134 NEw L.J. 73 (1984).
965 Bouvia, 179 Cal. App. 3d at 1136, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 300.
966 Id.
967 Id.
16 Id. at 1146, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 307.
969 Id.
970 Id. at 1138, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 301-02 (citing Bartling v. Superior Court, 163 Cal.
App. 3d 186, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1984)).
971 Id. (citing Barber v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484
(1983)).
972 Id. at 1137, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 300.
973 Id. at 1142-43, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 304.
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frustrating. 974
The court determined that the right of refusal derives from not only
the right of privacy protected by the state and federal constitutions, but
by case precedent - Bartling and Barber, specifically - and by the
California Natural Death Act. 975 Furthermore, the decision to forego
mechanical treatment was solely within Ms. Bouvia's own province to
determine. 976
It is not a medical decision for her physicians to make. Neither is it a legal
question whose soundness is to be resolved by lawyers or judges. It is not a
conditional right subject to approval by ethics committees or courts of law.
It is a moral and philosophical decision that, being a competent adult, is
her's alone.
9 77
With respect to motive, the court determined that if a right is recog-
nized, the motivation behind its exercise is irrelevant.978 Thus, the right
may be exercised without the approval of any other person. 979 More-
over, the right to refuse treatment may not be characterized as suicide
or an assistance of it.90 Citing California case precedents to support its
findings, 98' the court observed that the means to effect or assist a suicide
traditionally involved conduct that was affirmative in nature, proximate
or direct such as furnishing a gun or poison.9 2 "Here all that is being
considered is the presence of a doctor directing the exercise of a consti-
tutional right. '9 8 3
Prior to March 22, 1983, Paul Brophy had been a healthy and ro-
bust forty-nine-year-old emergency medical technician and fireman in
Easton, Massachusetts. 98 4 On the evening of the twenty-second, he suf-
914 Id. at 1142, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 304.
97s Id. at 1139-40, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 302-03.
976 Id. at 1143, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 305.
9-n Id.
978 Id. at 1145, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 306.
979 Id.
980 Id.
981 In re Joseph G., 34 Cal. 2d 429, 667 P.2d 1176, 194 Cal. Rptr. 163 (1983).
982 Bouvia, 179 Cal. App. 3d at 1145, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 306.
98 d. (citing Joseph G., 34 Cal. 2d 429, 667 P.2d 1176, 194 Cal. Rptr. 163 (1983)).
In In re Requena, 213 N.J. Super. 443, 517 A.2d 869 (1986), the court compelled
St. Clare's Riverside Medical Center, a Catholic-affiliated hospital, to allow petitioner,
dying of amyotrophic lateral sclerosis ("Lou Gehrig's Disease"), to remain as a patient.
Id. In addition, the court compelled the hospital to co-operate with her refusal of tubal
feeding. Id. The court compelled the hospital in these orders despite a contrary institu-
tional policy against such procedures and the availability of another facility for her
transfer. Id. The court maintained that hospital staff sensibilities were subordinate to
the psychological pain and trauma the patient would suffer if transferred. Id.
984 Brophy v. New Eng. Sinai Hosp., Inc., 398 Mass. 417, 421, 497 N.E.2d 626, 628
1989]
University of California, Davis
fered the rupture of an aneurysm at the apex of his basilar artery.9 5
Although not considered brain dead, he failed to regain consciousness
and became vegetative. 986 He was kept alive by the maintenance of a
surgically inserted device, or gastrostomy tube (G-tube) through which
he received nutrition and hydration.9 7 When the hospital refused to
respect the family's decision to remove Mr. Brophy's feeding tube, Mrs.
Brophy sought legal redress. 98 While acknowledging that Mr. Brophy
could decline the use of the G-tube if he were competent, the trial court
nonetheless refused to permit removal, arguing that the state's interest
in preserving life outweighed his right to choose his form of treat-
ment. 98 9 On expedited appeal, the Massachusetts High Court held that
the personal rights of self-determination and individual autonomy aris-
ing from the common law and the constitutional right to privacy gave
Mr. Brophy's surrogate decision maker the right to refuse medical
treatment. 990 The court further noted that this right was superior to
that of the state interest in preserving life.99'
Drawing upon past precedents, 992 the court concluded that when ef-
forts to sustain life were demeaning or degrading to one's humanity, an
individual had every right to avoid such circumstances. 993 The court
acknowledged that while the distinction between ordinary and ex-
traordinary care was a factor of some meritorious consideration, its use
should not be the primary factor in decision making.994 The court
stated: "[T]o state that the maintenance of nutrition and hydration by
the use of the existing G-tube is only ordinary is to ignore the total
circumstances of Brophy's situation. He cannot swallow. . . . [T]o be
maintained by such artificial means over an extended period is not only
intrusive but extraordinary. '" 995
(1986).
985 Id.
986 Id.
987 Id.
988 Id. at 422, 497 N.E.2d at 627.
989 Id. at 422 n.5, 497 N.E.2d at 627 n.5.
990 Id. at 430, 497 N.E.2d at 635.
991 Id. at 439, 497 N.E.2d at 644.
992 See, e.g., Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297
(1986); In re Spring, 380 Mass. 255, 405 N.E.2d 115 (1979); Superintendent of
Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977); In re
Dinnerstein, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 466, 380 N.E.2d 134 (1978).
993 Brophy, 398 Mass. at 432-34, 497 N.E.2d at 634-35.
994 Id. at 437, 497 N.E.2d at 637.
991 Id. The trial court accepted evidence indicating that the longest recorded survival
by such means was thirty-seven years. Id.
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In response to the hospital's argument, the Massachusetts High
Court agreed that the hospital was not obligated to deny nutrition and
hydration to facilitate Mr. Brophy's death, and that the moral and ethi-
cal principles of the medical profession forbade such practices. 996 The
court found that neither the doctrine of informed consent, the Massa-
chusetts Patients Right Statute "nor any other provision of law requires
the hospital to cease hydration and nutrition upon request of the guard-
ian. ' 997 Acknowledging that Saikewicz998 and its "progeny" would not
compel health care providers to undertake measures that would be re-
garded as contrary to their views, the court concluded that the right of a
patient to refuse medical treatment "does not warrant such an unneces-
sary intrusion upon the hospital's ethical integrity in this case." 999
Thus, the solution to this quandary is to order the Mount Sinai hospi-
tal to "assist" in transferring Mr. Brophy to a suitable facility where
his primary wishes may be effectuated. 1000
Since Brophy is the first written state supreme court opinion author-
izing the removal of artificial, tubal feeding during the patient's present
existence, it should be viewed as quite significant. The court took a
bold step in finding that a feeding tube may be intrusive, extraordinary
treatment. 10°' The court noted that when a feeding tube is removed
from a persistently vegetative patient, the cause of death should be un-
derstood as the underlying condition preventing swallowing, not the re-
moval of the tube. 10 2
Brophy's significance goes even farther in re-enforcing a developing
judicial trend that acknowledges the right of a patient to refuse artifi-
cial feeding as she would all other medical treatments. °0 3 The decision
996 Id. at 440, 497 N.E.2d at 639.
997 Id.
998 Id. (citing Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass.
728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977)).
999 Id.
1000 Id. at 434-35, 497 N.E.2d at 639-40.
1001 Id. at 432, 497 N.E.2d at 636.
1002 Id. at 432-33, 497 N.E.2d at 637-38.
1003 See id.; see also Corbett v. D'Alessandro, 487 So. 2d 368 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1986). On December 10, 1987, the Washington State Supreme Court held that a 22
year old woman suffering from Batten's disease (a terminal genetic, neurological condi-
tion) - though not comatose but suffering from severe and permanent mental deterio-
ration - has a right under Washington law to have life-sustaining treatment withheld.
In re Grant, 56 U.S.L.W. 2341 (Wash. Dec. 22, 1987). In Grant, the patient re-
quested to have nasogastric tubes and intravenous feeding withheld at her mother's
request. Id. However, Missouri has refused to join the trend in recognizing a patient's
right to die. In Cruzan v. Harmon, 57 U.S.L.W. 2324 (Mo. Dec. 6, 1988), the
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refuses to recognize any valid moral distinction between withholding
treatment and withdrawing treatment; a refusal of life-sustaining treat-
ment is not synonymous with suicide, it is inapplicable.'00 An incompe-
tent patient's substituted judgment outweighs the state's interest in pre-
serving life even though she is not diagnosed as terminal. In light of the
far-reaching effect of this notable trend, state legislatures should be
cautioned against enacting legislation that would seek to prohibit artifi-
cial feeding. 1°°5
4. The Aftermath
Quinlan, Saikewicz, Dinnerstein, Spring, Barber, Bartling, Conroy,
Brophy, Jobes, and Bouvia all point with unremitting clarity to the fact
that more and more courts are respecting acts of enlightened self-deter-
mination by competent patients - or their surrogate decision makers
- to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining medical treatments, even
though death may result.100 6 Behind the extended judicial rhetoric of
balancing individual privacy interests and rights of self-determination
against countervailing state interests'017 is a highly predictable endpoint
of judicial reasoning;10 0 8 once it is reasonably understood that one has
chosen to end her life by refusing life-sustaining medical treatment, the
appellate courts will respect and uphold this decision as within her
common-law right of self-determination as guaranteed by the right of
privacy found within the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution. 009
Missouri Supreme Court held that when an incompetent is neither legally dead nor
terminally ill, even if there is no hope of recovery, a legal guardian may not seek
judicial assistance in removing the patient's feeding tubes. Id.
100Brophy particularly held that refusing medical treatment merely allows the par-
ticular disease to take its natural course, and when death eventually occurs, it is pri-
marily from the underlying disease and not from the self-inflicted injuries. Brophy, 398
Mass. at 434, 497 N.E.2d at 638; see also Rasmussen v. Fleming, 154 Ariz. 207, 741
P.2d 674 (1987).
10 See Annas, supra note 665, at 26; Gostin, A Right to Choose Death: The Judicial
Trilogy of Brophy, Bouvia, and Conroy, 14 LAW, SCL & MED. 198 (1986); see also
Reidinger, Trends in the Law: Go Gentle into That Good Night - More States Rec-
ognize Right to Die, 74 A.B.A. J. 122 (1988).
106 See Gostin, supra note 1005.
1007 See In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 343, 486 A.2d 1209, 1223 (1986).
1008 See Gostin, supra note 1005, at 198.
00 Id.; see also Annas, Fashion and Freedom: When Artificial Feeding Should Be
Withdrawn, 75 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 685 (1985). In what appears to be the first
federal court decision directly addressing the right to die issue, the Federal District
Court of Rhode Island ruled that the right of privacy implicit in the fourteenth amend-
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V. A CONSTRUCT FOR DECISION MAKING OR THE FRAMEWORK
FOR PRINCIPLED DECISION MAKING
A. The Structural Goals and Procedures
Because of the great variation in the factual situations of each case of
critical and terminal illness, no one approach o procedural scheme is
either possible or desirable. The individual situation gives rise to and
mandates a functional or situational ethic of response. 010 Yet, certain
goals can be set. An advance directive requesting treatment should be
executed to serve as an obvious guide for subsequent cases. However,
when it becomes necessary or operative, the management of a patient's
actual case must be made in light of all current circumstances which
may not have been foreseen by the patient when making her original
directive. 101' When all concerned parties cannot agree on an acceptable
medical alternative, a compromise should be sought.0 12 If an institu-
tional ethics committee exists, the compromise should be worked out
there. 10 13 If the committee is unable to find a consensus solution or com-
promise, and disagreement continues between at least two of either the
health care professionals, or members of the family, then legal redress
should be sought in the courts. 014
It is strongly urged that the courts avoid making decisions among
several treating options. Instead, courts should appoint a responsible
surrogate decision maker or guardian to collect and consider all infor-
mation relevant to making a decision regarding the course of treatment.
Any decision would be reported to the court.015 In the long run, justice
would be promoted in each case if the duly appointed surrogate is given
wide discretion in her decision-making authority. Legislatures and
courts should never look to the judicial process for making routine deci-
sions. 016 Expeditious and sensitive decision making is more obtainable
ment's due process clause includes the right to decline life sustaining treatment in the
form of nourishment and hydration. Gray v. Romeo, 697 F. Supp. 580 (D.R.I. 1988).
1010 See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 386, at 192.
1011 See id. at 193.
1012 Id.
1013 See id. at 194.
1014 See id. at 154, 194.
1015 See id.
1016 See id. at 156, 196. Overusing courts for these issues appears to have its counter-
part in the medical professions tendency to overtreat. See Newman, Treatment Refusals
for the Critically and Terminally Ill: Proposed Rules for The Family, The Physician
and The State, 3 N.Y.L. ScH. HUM. RTs. ANN. 35, 79 (1985).
In Judge Jones' dissent in In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 386, 420 N.E.2d 64, 74, 438
N.Y.S.2d 266, 278 (1981) (Jones, J., dissenting), he stressed that there was "no empir-
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through intra-institutional processes than protracted judicial inquiry.017
Ethical and social policy can also more easily take form through the
deliberative processes of committee work, which would in turn benefit
future similarly related cases. 10 18 The well-being of the patient remains
the focus and primary goal of all decision making for the incapaci-
tated." 19 For the competent, any decision must recognize the patient's
right to pursue rational and self-enlightening acts of autonomy.
B. The Family
The extent of the family's right to direct or interfere with treatment
decisions of the competent or incompetent terminally ill or nonterminal
family member remains an unsettled area of contention. The family's
right to assert the patient's right to self-determination in the areas of
tragic choice cannot remain unfettered and unchallenged. However, in-
trusions by the state or primary health care providers should be limited
generally to those cases in which the limits of reason and the best inter-
ests of the incapacitated family member are being disregarded in a fla-
grant manner.020
In expanding upon the circumstances when a family member should
not be regarded as having sole decision-making authority over issues of
withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining treatments, three situations
can be submitted when intrusion or challenge must be made: (1) when
the parent or other family member is unable to comprehend the rele-
vant medical facts of the instant case; (2) when they are emotionally
unstable and; (3) when they appear to be placing their own interests
before those of the severely handicapped or at-risk family member. 021
Indeed, physicians often make a much better surrogate decision maker
than a parent or other family member. Physicians may exercise a
greater objectivity, technical knowledge, and expertise given their pro-
fessional involvement with similarly patterned illnesses and their
knowledge of complex health problems. 0 22
ical evidence that society or its individual members have suffered significantly in conse-
quence of the absence of judidical oversight." Id.
1017 See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 386, at 169.
1018 See id. at 161.
1019 Id. at 170.
1020 See McCormick, supra note 350, at 339, 378. See generally Smith, Defective
Newborns and Government Intermeddling, 25 MED. SCI. & L.- 44 (1985).
1021 See R. WEIR, SELECTIVE NONTREATMENT OF HANDICAPPED NEWBORNS 269
(1984).
1022 See id.
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Once a decision is made to provide life-sustaining treatment for a
seriously ill patient, the issue of the costs of the continuing care come
into focus. 1023 Families need programs that can support their valiant
efforts, especially when special care is required either at home or in an
institution. 10 24 Hospice care is becoming a more viable option for the
last stages of a terminal illness; specialized care can be given within a
family-like setting without the physical and economic drain of at-home
care. 1025
C. Reasonableness
Social justice demands that each individual should be given an equal
opportunity to maximize her individual potential. Yet, individuals often
reach a point in their lives when their maintenance is a defiance of both
humanitarianism and social justice. When an individual's condition
represents a negation of "truly human" qualities or of "relational po-
tential," the best form of treatment should be no treatment at all. 10 26
Stated otherwise, when therapies would be futile, and thus run counter
to the best interests of a patient, they should not be undertaken regard-
less of the age of the patient. 10 27 In this instance, efficacious treatment is
no treatment at all. Although the potentiality for human relationships
cannot be measured with absolute precision, in the cases for example of
an anencephalic infant born without a brain, or of a patient who has
been declared brain dead, it is rather obvious that these individuals
would not qualify for developing the potentiality. 0 28
In less clearly defined cases, the standard of reasonableness, which is
always flexible and responsive to individual factual applications, may
offer a useful if not dominant construct for decision making. Any deci-
sion based on reasonableness must balance specific social policies
emerging from each particular case against principles of justice, hu-
maneness, or love. 10 29 The best interests of one family member would
necessarily be based upon individual family beliefs in a set of social,
1023 See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 386, at 228.
1024 See id.
1021 See S. LACK & R. BUCKINGHAM, FIRST AMERICAN HOSPICE (1978); S. STOD-
DARD, THE HOSPICE MOVEMENT (1978); Note, Hospice: The Legal Ramifications of
a Place to Die, 56 IND. L.J. 673 (1981).
1026 See McCormick, supra note 350, at 349.
1027 See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 386, at 6.
102 See generally Fletcher, Indicators of Humanhood: A Tentative Profile of Man,
HASTINGS CENTER REP., Nov. 1972, at 1.
1029 See Fletcher, Love is the Only Measure, 83 COMMONWEALTH 427 (1966).
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spiritual, and economic values. If an act renders more harm than good
to the at-risk individual and to those around her, the act would prop-
erly be viewed as unloving, unjust, or inhumane. Thus, the concepts of
ordinary and extraordinary treatment are little more than value judg-
ments that determine whether a given course of treatment poses an un-
due hardship on the patient or provides some hope for a direct
benefit. 1030
The crucial point to understand is that the linchpin to deciding in a
constant state of pain any course of reasonable action is a basic cost/
benefit analysis. Its stated simplicity belies its complexity in applica-
tion; reasonableness will always be incapable of absolute predetermina-
tion. In other words, the application of this cost/benefit analysis will
always be set in motion and constrained by the dynamics of each spe-
cific case and by the accepted standards of medical science and practice.
D. Intra-Institutional Review
Hospital ethics committees are immensely valuable as a construct for
decision making. Yet, it would not be cost-effective to convene the com-
mittee for every difficult ethical problem. Committee involvement
should occur only when the ethical deliberations reveal an exceedingly
complex question. 1031
A prognosis committee is potentially more crucial to validating deci-
sions which either withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment than
an ethics committee. If this committee reaches a unanimous decision,
the work of any other committee is greatly minimized. Thus, when a
disagreement arises between a personal physician and the family over
the prognosis for an at-risk patient family member or between a court-
appointed guardian, the matter should be referred to the treating insti-
tution's prognosis committee for a second opinion. This committee
would be assembled on an ad hoc basis, as need arises, and would be
composed of the patient's physician and at least two other staff physi-
cians. If the committee unanimously agrees that the patient will never
return to a rational or functioning state, then the prognosis would be
1030 See R. MCCORMICK, NOTES ON MORAL THEOLOGY 1965 THROUGH 1980, at
565 (1981). See generally G. SMITH, supra note 31, at 2, 8, 164; Arras, Toward an
Ethic of Ambiguity, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Apr. 1984, at 25.
1031 See Purtilo, Ethics Consultations in the Hospital, 311 NEw ENG. J. MED. 983,
984 (1984). See generally Otten, Can't We Put My Mother to Sleep, Wall St. J., June
5, 1985, at 30, col. 3. One author has cautioned that ethics committees need a proven
performance record in these areas before they should be endorsed widely or required by
the courts. Newman, supra note 1016, at 80-81.
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entered in the patient's medical record. 10 32
Essentially, the only function of a prognosis committee would be to
confirm the diagnosis and the prognosis. This committee would have
the ultimate responsibility in determining whether there was any rea-
sonable hope for recovery for the terminally ill patient. 10 33 If the prog-
nosis committee could not resolve the matter, the matter would be sent
to a full multidisciplinary ethics committee for resolution. Even if the
ethics review committee were to review the case after the case had re-
ceived a unanimous opinion from the prognosis committee, it is hoped
that the thorough and professional "preliminary" work of the prognosis
committee would considerably lighten the work of the ethical
reconsideration.
Perhaps the easiest way to avoid the cumbersome machinery of com-
mittee decision making would be to relieve the physician of civil and
criminal liability for those actions which she might undertake in good
faith.10 34 This standard of reasonableness, or good faith, is a well tested
and proven mechanism for assessing degrees of responsibility within the
law. However, if the physician followed the course of action suggested
by this proposal, the current disjointed state of legal, social, and medi-
cal attitudes would most surely subject the physician to professional
censure as well as civil and criminal liability. The directions are clear
from a handful of cases and from a significant legislative trend among
the states that terminating actions may be rendered by a physician act-
ing in good faith if certain defined procedures are followed. Swift pre-
emptory, good faith actions of a unilateral order, which lack an histori-
cal or evidentiary record of deliberation and consultation, have yet to be
approved. Perhaps because of this state of affairs in the United States,
the Dutch physicians who regularly assist terminally ill patients with
acts of enlightened self-determination regularly employ a "team" of
doctors, nurses and a representative of the patient's faith to counsel and
evaluate the requests for relief made by terminally ill patients. These
teams also provide a level of protection and cover for the doctor's legal
liability if she were ever to be prosecuted. 035 This team has an obvious
parallel in the prognosis committee, or ethical review committee used in
1032 See In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 134-35, 660 P.2d 738, 749-50 (1983).
1033 See id. at 135, 660 P.2d at 750.
1034 See G. WILLIAMS, supra note 38, at 340; see also Newman, supra note 1016, at
87 (similarly extending proposal to good faith actions taken by family members).
Newman also admonishes courts and legislatures to de-criminalize this sphere of deci-
sion making. See id.
1031 See Appleyard, The Last Appointment, The Times (London), June 7, 1987, at
13, col. 4 (Sunday ed.).
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the United States. Of course, the similarity in this procedural mecha-
nism between Holland and the United States is the only aspect of shar-
ing; Holland regards the right of enlightened self-determination in an
altogether more tolerant and accepting manner than is evident in the
United States.
What of the nonterminal yet severely suffering patient who can ex-
pect little more than years of suffering, incapacitation and personal
degradation because of her Elizabeth Bouvia type of condition? Surely,
she should have the same rights of self-determination as other less-af-
flicted citizens. After a period of psychological counseling, the physi-
cally and mentally distressed individual should present her case to an
ethical tribunal for the required permission and/or assistance in ending
her life. 1036 Composed of a wide sampling of independent individuals,
representing legal, ethical, medical, social, religious, and lay interests,
the tribunal would be empowered to decide the issue before it without
interference or deference to any other interest group. Ideally an amicus
curiae could oppose the position taken by the petitioner. If the commit-
tee rules in favor of the petitioner, then she must be assisted in ending
her life. Contrariwise, if the committee rules against the petitioner, the
deliberative issue is whether she should involuntarily be committed to a
state or other proper institution to prevent her from realizing her goal.
If, after counseling for a reasonable period of time, the individual
still wishes to exercise her right of enlightened self-determination,
should she be entitled to assistance? In other words, could she ask for
another review by the same or different ethics committee or could she
appeal to the courts to either assist her actively or passively in exercis-
ing her right? One commentator has suggested that before consent is
given, the proper authorities should satisfy themselves that it is the
"patient's firm and well considered choice and not the desperate whim
of a mood of melancholia and not under pressure from others.' '10 37
However, Bouvia suggests that a possible wedge may be developing
that would recognize a right of rational self-determination regardless of
whether the applicant or petitioner is terminal. Elizabeth Bouvia won
the right not to be forced-fed and to starve herself if she wished. 10 38 By
the court's reasoning, the doctors, who must necessarily assist her in
carrying out her wish, are directing the execution of her constitution-
1036 See generally Dagi, The Ethical Tribunal in Medicine, in 1 ETHICAL, LEGAL
AND SOCIAL CHALLENGES TO A BRAVE NEW WORLD 201 (G. Smith ed. 1982).
1037 A. TOYNBEE, supra note 46, at 158; see also M. HEIFETZ, supra note 35, at 97-
98.
1038 See supra notes 950-83 and accompanying text.
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ally protected right, not assisting in her demise. If more courts were to
see the simple validity of this position, the current state of confusion
would end. This view cannot realistically be expected to come quickly;
traditional values which seek to preserve "life," regardless of the indi-
vidual's degenerative state, dictate a response that curtails those who
wish to act otherwise and label them as irrational.
E. Legislative and Judicial Responses
Model laws, such as the Uniform Rights of the Terminally Ill and
the Uniform Determination of Death Acts, and enactments such as nat-
ural death acts, living wills, and durable powers of attorney, 1039 while
certainly not an unfettered guarantee of an individual's right to control
her final act of self-determination, must be applauded. These laws are
constructive both in setting a direction and in responding to a growing
number within a contemporary society who demand the option to die
with dignity. New laws must be passed to correct the practical difficul-
ties that have been encountered in the administration of these legislative
acts. 1040
If more enlightened courts of the caliber of Barber, Bartling,
Bouvia, and Brophy would assert and guarantee the right of every citi-
zen - competent or incompetent, terminal or nonterminal - to refuse
life-sustaining treatments and to be assisted in the execution of this
right without an imposition of civil or criminal liability, the task of
developing a firm judicial construct for decision making may be at-
tained sooner than had been expected.
Always cognizant of their role as interpreters of the law, thus mak-
ing them reluctant to be bold, creative architects, the courts need strong
and unequivocal legislation to assist them in interpreting the law
within a framework of contemporary values. This legislation must un-
erringly recognize an individual's right of autonomy, while protecting
the individual from exploitation. 10 41 More specifically, such legislative
guarantees should assure that competent patients - or those who not
only can appreciate but also understand the nature and consequences of
their actions - have an unequivocal right to refuse any form of treat-
ment. Moreover, all citizens should be able to execute a document that
not only declares the manner of care they wish to receive should they
become incompetent, but also designates a surrogate decision maker to
1039 See supra notes 371-85 and accompanying text.
1040 See generally id.
1141 See Annas, supra note 1009, at 688.
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enforce these wishes through a durable power of attorney. Finally,
when a patient becomes incompetent and has failed to designate a sur-
rogate decision maker, the patient's legally appointed guardian should
be able to direct that any medical treatment be withheld or withdrawn.
This course of action should be mandated upon the guardian's demon-
stration to the immediate health care providers that this action was pre-
ferred by the patient. If the patient's wishes are unknown, the guardian
could use a cost/benefit analysis to show that the burden imposed by
the use of continued treatments "outweighs any reasonably hoped for
benefits from the patient's perspective.' '0 42
F. Other Persuasive Guidelines
The proposals of the New York State Task Force on Life and the
Law take another positive step toward shaping a workable construct to
aid health care providers, afflicted at-risk patients and surrogate deci-
sion makers with complete knowledge of their rights and responsibili-
ties.0 43 The proposals, many of which have been enacted into law, also
add a degree of momentum to the growing legislative efforts to ac-
knowledge the right of critically ill patients to assert their right of
autonomy.
Opinions by the American Medical Association's Council on Ethical
and Judicial Affairs for establishing Guidelines for Withholding or
Withdrawing Life Prolonging Medical Treatment recognize the ethical
propriety for withdrawing life-sustaining medical treatment, including
food and water,1044 and afford the physicians and other health care
providers with a professional endorsement of actions of this nature.
Protocols, such as the one established by the Massachusetts General
Hospital on "Optimum Care for Hopelessly Ill Patients,"'10 4 also aid in
the development of a workable standard of good medical practice in
rendering assistance to the terminally ill.
Finally, the framework for principled decision making can be
strengthened by a record that discloses few successful legal prosecutions
for aiding, abetting, or assisting one in an act of suicidal self-destruc-
tion. 0 46 Moreover, the growing trend is to adhere to the same
1042 Id.
1043 See NEW YORK TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 613.
1044 See Wallis, supra note 654, at 60.
,04- Clinical Care Committee Report, supra note 605, at 362.
1046 See Podgers, supra note 34, at 1500-01; Euthanasia: Criminal, Tort, Constitu-
tional and Legislative Considerations, supra note 34, at 1206; see also Engelhardt &
Malloy, supra note 34, at 1019-20.
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prosecutorial standard of legal inaction for passive euthanasia.0 47
Taken as a unit, these various constructs reveal a developing frame-
work for principled medical, legal, ethical, philosophical, religious, and
economic decision making. Whether they are recognized for their value
or taken as obstructions to the principle of sanctity and preservation of
life depends on the attitude of the participants in each particular criti-
cal intervention. Perhaps, with time, they will be viewed correctly as
keys to humane or reasonable value judgments.
CONCLUSION
It is purely speculative whether the acceptance of a policy of rational
suicide will open the floodgate to genocide by eliminating feebleminded
people, 0 48 or will introduce a bias in favor of death,'0 49 thereby al-
lowing suicide to be viewed as "socially useful,"'0 50 or will find a crowd
eager to enter the passageway of suicide.'0 51 The fear of the "slippery
slope" has accompanied every new release of knowledge, scientific or
otherwise.'052 Such fears discount the rationality of humankind and de-
mean their ability to meet and resolve personal crises. Indeed, the hu-
manistic essence and positivism of all religious and theological thinking
is also largely discounted by expression of such meddlesome fears.
Perhaps the only permissible restraints - temporal or physical -
that can justifiably be placed on a suicidal person are those restraints
which lead to either autonomy or rational liberty. 053 John Stuart Mill,
in his essay On Liberty, states unequivocally that the only purpose for
which power should be exercised over any member of society is to pre-
vent harm to others.0 54 Protecting for one's own good, either physical
or moral, is not a sufficient warrant for intrusion.'055 Why should not a
sane person decide her own fate if the choice is rational and not based
1047 See Podgers, supra note 34, at 1500-01.
1048 See id. at 1501.
1049 See Blake, supra note 244, at 85.
1050 Id.
1051 See Barber, Guilty Verdict in Mercy Killing, USA Today, May 10, 1985, at 3A,
col. 1.
1052 See Delgado & Miller, God, Galileo and Government: Toward Constitutional
Protection for Scientific Inquiry, in 1 ETHICAL, LEGAL AND SOCIAL CHALLENGES TO
A BRAVE NEW WORLD, supra note 1036, at 231.
10s See Fromer, A Few Good Words for Suicide, Wash. Post, Sept. 6, 1981, at C5,
cols. 1-2.
1054 See Mill, On Liberty, in THE SIx GREAT HUMANISTIC ESSAYS OF JOHN STU-
ART MILL 135 (A. Levi ed. 1969).
1055 See id.
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on impulse or impelled by emotion? Is there some broader societal or
moral interest in compelling life for those who would commit suicide?
The judiciary is beginning to elucidate criteria from which a con-
struct for principled decision making may be undertaken. While offer-
ing sweeping generalizations, the courts have carefully crafted stan-
dards designed for subsequent percental value to provide a developing
pathway for the all too many similar case determinations that follow.
Although death with dignity may not be acknowledged uniformly as a
fundamental right by all states, it is at least being recognized more and
more as a humane and enlightened policy.
To bemoan what has been occurring in the courts as a triumph of
the functional ethics prescription for death - "death by neglect, dehy-
dration and starvation"' 56 for the incurably disabled - and then to
conclude dramatically that "the protection afforded life and equal-
ity" 10 57 by the Constitution has been changed for the hopefully suffering
and terminally ill,1058 displays an illogical and pro-life blindness that
subscribes to the shibboleth that where there is breath, there is "life." It
is also a position that fails totally to appreciate or understand the elo-
quent balancing test of individual costs versus societal benefits used in
determining the course of action required in each case of terminal ill-
ness. Determining a patient's best interests are thus grounded in poli-
cies of reasonableness and humaneness. It is an inhumane and callous
argument that protracts the agony of death by using gastronomy tubes,
nasogastric tubes and other means of providing alimentation under the
guise of being efficacious treatment.
Suicide. Euthanasia. Rational Suicide. Assisted Rational Suicide. Be-
neficent Euthanasia. Will these words and theories soon exist only in
the past? Hopefully so. What has been proposed could rightly be
thought of as being somewhat revolutionary. However, in contempo-
rary times, sometimes revolutions are necessary to correct situations
that are seemingly incorrectable by no other means. Perhaps, if respon-
sive courts and astute state legislatures continue at their current pace,
declaring one's inherent right of enlightened self-determination to de-
termine the nature and form of this last rite of passage, no dramatic
revolution in taxonomy will be necessary. Perhaps the revolution will
come from within the system, thereby giving rise to a new socio-legal-
1056 Destro, Quality-of-Life Ethics and Constitutional Jurisprudence: The Demise of
Natural Rights and Equal Protection for the Disabled and Incompetent, 2 J. CON-
TEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 71, 121 (1976).
1057 Id. at 123.
1058 Id.
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medical and cultural appreciation of death, which embraces the dying
process as humane and nonviolent. This new attitude will recognize old
age not as a terminal disease, nor as a stage in the life cycle mandating
that all means should be employed to maintain'01 9 all terminally ill or
otherwise incapacitated individuals. If this attitude were adopted, it
would then render moot the distinction between the right to decline
life-sustaining treatment and the right to commit suicide. This attitude
implicitly recognizes that in whatever context of self-determination the
central issue is cast, a moral and a legal right is nevertheless bestowed
upon the individual to act - for whatever purposes she wishes - to
end her life by refusing life-sustaining medical treatment or for
whatever enlightened or rational reason she wishes. 060
109 See Jonas, supra note 769, at 31, 34.
1060 See J. CHILDRESS, supra note 22, at 163.
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